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PREFACE. 
No apology is required for this edition of S'ivâditya's 
Saptapadârthî with the commentary of S'eshânanta. Eng-
lish notes have been added, which, I hope, wrill be useful 
and sufficient for the students for whom they are meant· 
The very nature of the book is such that a mere literal 
translation is of no use, and the notes have been so adapted 
as not only to elucidate the text but to give a sufficiently 
full and connected idea of the elementary conceptions of 
Nyaya. The figures at the beginning of the notes repre-
sent the corresponding sections in the text. 
The commentary, as the reader may see, is sufficiently 
learned and calculated to supplement the original rather 
than merely to paraphrase it. And though, I am afraid, it 
may not sufficiently interest young students, it deserves 
even to be read by itself and as such may be found 
useful by the Sanskrit Pandits. 
Thus it is intended that the book should fulfil a 
double purpose of satisfying the wants of old and new 
students as well. 
The price of the book would appear to be very 
reasonable if the fact; that the book is printed at the 
Nirrtaya-sagar Press is taken into consideration. 
V. S. GHÂTE. 
4* 
Publisher's Note to The Second Edition, 
With the exception of a few typographical corrections 
here and there, this is a mere reprint of the First Edition, as 
Br. Ghate could not go over the same owing to his illness ever 
since his return from Europe, 
SAPTAPADARTHÎ. 
The present edition of the text of Saptapadârthî has been 
based on 11 copies in all, of which only one is pr inted and the 
rest are Mss. all belonging to the Deccan College collection. 
A. A Ms. writ ten in Ja in Devanâgarî character with 
^^i-j|^|S, on the whole neat and correct, which I have followed 
almost uniformly in my text , wi th only a few exceptions, e. g. 
section 163. I t has in the margin the commentary Padâr tha-
chandrika, almost continuous, with only a few gaps here and 
there, referring to topics not very relèvent to the text . The age 
of the Ms. is Sam vat 1728, i. e. it is almost 250 years old. c<}g^ 
W * ^ TSrçpi φ[ ^ §fr %f^( f ^ ) ^ n' I t appears to come 
from N o r t h e r n India. I t should be noted t h a t the marginal notes 
end with c^% ^shd^^^rere (not tro^rr) fafadr cmrcrr·5 
B. A Ms., very carelessly wri t ten, full of mistakes, general­
ly due to the scribe, I believe. There is no indication of the 
date or the scribe, either at the beginning or t h e end of t h e 
Ms. But i t seems to be ra ther new in appearance. 
C. A Ms., writ ten in Sam vat 1751. ζφτρ^ %^\ v$ ^l-
ftqj^KJteH § ^ I fefeqfoô[ g ^ é U5 This Ms. comes from 
Gugarâth. I t is also very incorrectly wri t ten. 
Z>. This Ms. also comes from Gujarath, No date is given 
&t the end; but the Ms. seems rather old in appearance. 
-, E. This Ms. is very legibly written and old in appearance. 
The name of the scribe is Nârâyana Krishna Gadre, son of 
Mahâdeva; and the place is Prat ishthâna on the bank of the 
Gautamî. 
F, A Ms., belonging originally to the Vis'râmabâga collec-
tion. I t is on the whole reliable and as old as 350 years. The 
reading of section 1β3, is adopted from this Ms. and probably 
seems to be the reading of the commentary Padârthachandrikâ 
also. 
The Ms. must have come from Gujaratbj as appears from 
the scribbling on the blank side of leaf 1. 
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G. .. A Ms.j quite new, wri t ten as recently as Samvat 1885* 
I t is very incorrect. The name of the scribe as given at the 
e û d îsfïrsnH^r. 
H. A Ms., also very old, being written in Samvat 1639, 
Yery carelessly wri t ten. 
K* A Ms., wri t ten in Samvat 1784, and named ^ ^ t ^ j f a ^ · 
Ν. A Ms. without date. I t differs from all t h e rest in 
at t r ibut ing ggq^pff to {§&3R; ( 'm^Mdt^rgf^hTTW^r^i^-
'pcStU' ) ; a n d l&st Pag© contains mat ter found in no other 'Ms, 
for which see the footnotes at the place. 
L· The edition in the Yizayanagaram Sanskrit Series, a t 
Benares (1893), with the commentary Mitabhâshinî by Mâdhava-
sarasvatî. 
The text of the commentary ' Padâr thachandr ikâ ' by 
S'eshânanta has been based upon four Mss. 
Py A nice old copy, generally correct and reliable, which 
I have uniformly followed with only a few exceptions. The 
Ms. is complete except the 10th leaf, in whose place two leaves 
from some other work on Nyâya are found. 
P 2 . This is also a good copy but; rather carelessly writ ten, 
with many omissions also. But i t has afforded good readings 
where Έ1 was not satisfactory. The copy was wr i t ten in 1685 
S a m v a t . ' ^ ^ %%& ^ %f ^ ^ w î r 4ΚΙ<Ή4( ϊ ^ Τ Τ ^ φ τ -
Both P 2 and P 2 belong to the Gujarâth section. 
P s . This is also a very nicely wr i t t en copy in Ja in Deva-
nâgarî character with ^gm^ys . I t was wri t ten in Samvat 
1665. Thus i t is even older than P2 , 
All the three copies belong to the Dec can College collec-
t ion. 
P 4 . This copy belongs to the library of the late Prof. 
Jinsiwale, now deposited in the Kesari ofnce,Poona. I t was kindly 
lent to me bv Mr. N . C. Kelkar. But as I came to know of i t s 
existence very late, I could use it only at the time of reading the 
proof sheets; so I have given only those readings which were 
•found to be really useful. The copy is very old, being written in 
Samvat 1623, and it is incomplete, wanting the first six leaves. 
INTRODUCTION. 
S'ivâditya's Saptapadârthî is a short manual of t h e N y â y a -
S'âstra, like Tarkasangraha, Tarkabhâshâ, Tarkâmrita, Bhâshâ-
parichchheda, Tarkakaumudî and others. I t strictly follows 
the Yais'eshika system of Kanâda as opposed to the Nyâya 
system of Gautama, inasmuch as i t deals with t h e seven 
padârthas instead of sixteen and has only two kinds of Pramas^ 
viz., Pratyakshaprama and Anumiti , and two Pramânas corres-
ponding to them, viz., Pratyakshapramâna and Anumâna, 
instead of four. No traces of an attempt to reconcile both the 
systems are seen in Saptapadârthî and comparatively a very 
short space is devoted to the treatment of Anumâna ( inference) 
and the Hetvâbhâsas (fallacies). Owing to this last circumstance 
we are inclined to regard the manual as very old compared with 
Tarkasangraha and others, since the temptation to deal wi th 
Hetvâbhâsas and other kindred topics at length would have been 
very difficult to be resisted by a later writer. This argument, . 
though not very strong by itself, is only confirmed by t h e follow-
ing discussion regarding the date of the work and i ts author. 
Unfortunately the manual provides us with no internal proof 
whatsoever which would enable us to determine its age, even 
with approximate certainty, since it strictly follows the principle 
of naming and defining the several padârthas in order and their 
sub-varieties, allowing no space for illustrations containing the 
names of some known persons f or other occasional dissertations. 
Under these circumstances, we have to rely solely on external 
evidence in the form of allusions to our manual in other works. 
To begin with, there are three known commentaries on 
Saptapadârthî:-( 1 ) Mitabhâshinî by Mâdhava-Sarasvatî; ( 2 ) a 
commentary by Jinavardhanasuri; and (3) Padârthachandrikâ by 
S'eshânanta, which is itself commented upon by Nrisimhâchârya 
in Padârthachandrikâprakâs'a. 
There are -also other commentaries on the work, e. g* one 
hj BhavavidyesVara;i another named S'is'ubodhinî by Bhaira-
vânanda and so on; but I could not have access to them. 
* An article contributed to J. B. B. R. A. S. No. LXIIL 
f e. £7. in Tarkasangrahadîpikâ, we have c ^ ^ q y f w g i ^ R ^ 
t Dr. Bhândârkar's report for 1883-84, p. 6. and 312. 
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Of t h e three mentioned above, a Ms. of Mitabhâshinî in the 
Vizayanagar Library has a t its end a verse beginning -with 
'Bânabdhîndramite S'âke, etc. '1 Thus the Ms. was wri t ten in 
1445 S'aka, corresponding to 1523 A. D. Thus Mâdhava-saras-
vatî must have lived some time before this year; and S'ivâditya 
must be still earlier. 
The Deccan College collection contains a Ms. of the commen-
ta ry by Jinavardhanasuri, the colophon at -the end of which runs 
t h u s - ? φ $ n < s K < K ^ ^ f e ^ ^ r ^ q % ^ T 5 n î ^ R ï 3 ^ % ^ ? r T 
^ R ^ n f f Zfàt ^PRIÇTT*"'2 This Jinavardhanasuri , the successor of 
Jinarâjasûri belonging to the Kharataragachchha, was high 
priest of the sect from 1405 A. D. to 1419 A. D., when he was 
deposed on account of his having transgressed one of the vows.3 
This is also confirmed by the fact tha t a Ms. of Udayana's 
Tatparyaparis'uddhi, belonging to our collection, has at i ts end 
the remark in a modern handwri t ing % j c ^ 18^1 ^ I %ft<^d^-
n ^ è gftf^^i^^RM^ ^fa^<TH%[fru ^ * 3 C l i ? 4 a n d S a m v a t 
1471 corresponds to 1414 A. D. Thus S'ivâditya's work must 
have been writ ten before 1400 A. D. 
S'ivâditya is also referred to by Ganges'opâdhâya in his 
Tatvachintamani^ who refutes his doctrines and quotes his very 
name5 as i ^ j % fei^nf^^f^^n:'. Thus S'ivâditya must be earlier 
than Ganges'opadhyaya. The latter, however, must be placed 
about the 11th century A. D. For a Ms. of Tatvachintâmanyâ-
loka, a commentary by Jayadeva on the Tatvachintamani, is found 
transcribed in 159 Lakshmanasena Samvat, i.e. in 1189 S'aka or 
1267 A J ) . 6 And Udayanâchârya is frequently referred to by 
Ganges'opadhyaya, e. g. on p. 284 in the S'abda Khanda of the 
Tatvachintamani, where he s a y s ^ ^ ^ f e g sœ^Êf îT^TC^F^Ï^ î -
ïfàj etc., and the commentator explains, ' s f i ^ j ^ : ?^^ i^ t^ fp ? > 
1 The full verse runs thus : i ^ F i i * ^ ; W ^ Γ^Τ% ^TFiT ^ H ^ ^  I 
^I^n^r^fH^Tf 5^" ^^ÎhKÎsfèiâ^ Ν7—Râmashâstrî Telang's Introduc-
tion to Saptapadârthî. 
2 Dr. Bhândârkar's Report for I8S2-S3. P. 25. 
3 Ind. Antiq., Vol XI., p. 249. 
4 Dr. Kielhorn's Report for 1880-81, P. 19. 
5 Tatvachintamani, Pratyakshakhanda, P . 839, Bibliotheca Indica 
series, 
6 Chandrakânta's Introduction to the Kusumânjali of Udayana ; also ' 
the Introduction to the Vais'eshikadars'ana in the Bibliotheca-Indica series» 
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So alsOj in his Is 'varânumâna, Ganges'a seems to follow closely 
the t ra in of reasoning in Kusumânjali1 . Thus Ganges'a must be 
placed after Udayana and before Jayadeva. Now Udayana's 
Lakshanâvalî ends with the verse, 
Thus Lakshanâvalî was wri t ten in 906 S'aka, corresponding 
to 984 A. D.2 So tha t Ganges'opâdhyâya very probably belongs 
to the 11th century A. D,; and S'ivâditya must precede him. 
S'rîharsha in his Khandanakhandakhâdya has "grar d N ^ 
'cT^T^pjfiï: ΐΓΉ5 ξ ^ Π ^ τ έ } etc./ ' on which the commentator 
* S'ankaramis'ra remarks, < { ^ ^ M l 4 ^ ^ ^ * J W I ^ t i < ^ JITOfM» 
5ΓΤΠ^^Τ ^ ^ f o r ^ M ^ c i r ? f ^ T 5 ^ % ^ f , etc." Now this 
Nyâyâchârya is none but S'ivâditya to whom another work 
named Lakshanamâlâ is at t r ibuted.3 
Now the author of Khandanakhandakhâdya is supposed 
either to be a contemporary of Udayanâchârya*, or to have 
followed him immediately. 
-i Thus S'ivâditya must have preceded S'rîharsha ; a t t h e 
same time I am inclined to think tha t most probably he did 
not precede Udayana. For:— 
1st, the Lakshnâvalî of Udayana is a work similar to Sapta-
padârthî . Now the former divides Padarthas into two, bhâva 
( positive ) and abhâva ( negative ); and the positive categories 
fur ther into six, while the latter has seven padarthas to begin 
with, without a reference to the twofold division of bhâva and 
abhâva. And the Sûtras of Kanâda contain only six Padar thas 
excluding abhâva. Now the division followed in Lakshnâvali 
seems to be a stage of transition from the six Padar thas of the 
Sûtras to the seven Padar thas of Saptapadârthî, whose very 
title lays stress on the sevenfold division of Padar thas . 
2ndly.—S'ivâditya is also sunposed to be an author of a com-
mentary (Yti t t i ) on Pras'astapâda's Bhâshya. For Râjas'ekhara 
in nisPanjikâ, a commentary on the Nyâyakandalî of S'rîdhara, 
1 Chandrakânta's Introduction to Kusumânjali. 
2 The date of Udayana has not been finally settled yet; see the article 
* *Udayana and Vâchaspatimis'ra/ J. B. A. S., April 1908. 
3 This point is treated further on. 
4 VindhyesVarîprasâda's Introduction to Vais'esnikadars'ana. 
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says in the very beginning that there are four Yri t t is on t h e 
Bhâshya of Pras'astapada1.—( 1 ) Yyomavatî by Yyomas'ivâ-
chârya, ( 2 ) Nyâyakandalî by S'rîdhara, ( 3 ) Kiranâvali by TTda-
yana, and ( 4 ) Lîlâvatî by S'rîvatsâchârya. Now th i s Yyoma-
s'îvâchârya mentioned by Rajas'ekhara may be regarded as n a 
other person than S'ivaditya, the author of Saptapadârthî, if we 
can at all rely Upon "the colophon in a Ms. of Saptapadârthî 
belonging to the Benares Sanskri t College which runs thus %f^ f 
And it is very probable that S'ivaditya should be t h e 
author of some more important and voluminous work than the 
short manual of Saptapadârthî, before he is so frequently alluded
 n 
to by wri ters like Ganges'opâdbyâya and Srîharsha. 3 
Now if S'ivaditya's Yr i t t i had been composed earlier than 
XJday ana's Kiranâvali, the latter should have referred to the 
former somewhere in his works; and moreover the assertion 
contained in one of the int roductory verses of Kiranâvali * 
would lose much of its force. Thus I am inclined to hold t ha t 
S'ivaditya did not very probably precede Udayana. 
To the argument tha t the order in which Bâjas'ekhara men-
tions the four Yr i t t i s must; have reference to chronology, much 
weight cannot be attached in the absence of other proofs·-
t h u s S'ivaditya belongs to the close of the 10th century and the 
early beginning of the 11th century. 
Another work by name Lakshanamâiâ is also at tr ibuted to 
S'ivaditya5; because in Chitsukhîvyâkhyâ, the commentator, in 
connection with the refutation of the definitions of Dravya etc., 
1 Dr. Peterson's report for 1S8M886, p. 272 and ff. 
2 Edition of Saptapadârthî, in the Vizayanagar Sk. Series, p. 80, 
foot-note. 
3- The general plan of Saptapadârthî also is in favour of this assump* 
tion, for which see further on. φ 
S J ^ ^ f è Î t 5f âS3^c2j^f ς% Η Yais'eshikadars'ana, Bib. Ind. 
Series, p. 3. 
5 Notice in connection with this the objection raised by Col. Jacob­
in his préface to part III, Laukîkanyâyânjali. Varadarâja in his Târki* 
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consisting of Dravyatva and similar words, remarks, " e n & Rl5l · 
^rfe^ îr f^ sîspnÊr 3^*Ι4Ι<6ΚΗ£ΤΜΡΙ OT^rfîr Ercoli*·"1 
I t cannot be said that Lakshanamâlâ is only another name 
for Saptapadârthî; for in the same work Chitsukhîvyâkhyâ, we 
read further on, dur ing the discussion of the definition2 of 
Φ^Γ Ri^l Îà^Î^^Tblf t ' 3FfeuiiR M&^^dlkf etc." 
Now the definition, referred to here, is not found in Sapta-
padârthî; so also, no trace of the passage referred to in 
Tatvaehintâmani3 is seen in Saptapadârthî 
The general plan followed in Saptapadârthî is quite obvious 
and seems to be solely based on the fourth Sûtra of Kanada, of 
which the whole work may be regarded as only a full and 
systematic exposition. After the customary salutation to 
S'ambhu, the author enumerates the seven Padârthas and their 
sub-varieties (Uddes'a), then states the Prayojana or object of the 
enumeration, t ha t it is the r ight knowledge ( Tatvajîïâna ) of 
these Padârthas tha t leads to the highest good ( Niss'reyasa ). 
But as the right knowledge cannot be derived unless t h e 
Padârthas are defined, the author proceeds to the Lakshana 
section, after explaining the meaning of Niss'reyasa which is 
the ultimate object in view» 4 
karakshâ has * & ^ ί ^ Φ 3 Ϊ ^ Φ ΐ Π 8 Π # Î^ î f^T ^ S F i m ^ ï f ( p. 179), 
on which Mallinâth comments thus: ^5f SW<3Ç$ ^ H ^ * l f à m $ 
from which it appears that Mailinâtha attributes Lakshanamâlâ to Uda-
yana. But this alone cannot disprove the fact that S'ivâditya is the 
author of Lakshanamâlâ, which is positively mentioned elsewhere. More-
over it is very possible that the Lakshafcâvalî of Udayana might have 
been mentioned by the name of Lakshafcamâlâ, owing to the similarity 
of the two names; as for instance, VeBîsamhâra is named Venîsamva 
raiia in some Mss. 
1 Râmas'astrî's Introduction to Saptapadârthî, p. 4. 
2 Râmas'astrî's Introduction to Saptapadârthî, p. 4* 
3 P. 830. 
4 It is noteworthy that the definition fîx^TîîRlfw ^ 4 ' in Sapta 
padârthî is, word for word, the same ae that in Kiraçâvali, ρ, 6. Bibh 
Indica Series. 

Il Φ II 
m% ïïtteRÎ 3FÏÏ% wk ΦΠ II ? il 
mk îïïΦτï^ wfίqτ^ Γ?rwîâ, Ryan ι ϊτνΐ| ΐ^^υικΠ)" ^ng-
«î Ρ
χ
. and P 3 . have a third verse thus:—3^K°3N^i**m%o5^f 
•^m^ t ^  nit^m ^ξJ^τmψà-\i τ τ^^κ® P2. P 3 . ^ *qg*£l twice. 
-P2. s οία P 3 , 
îrfîri^ T%^TT* ^Tr«ft: I R il 
St^^relsftcT^f sr?rt#*r MR4ft^ %^ srwwtlxi^ ur q*^-
^Wlik^^J^ I RM I Π)' ^>£Ϊ^Γ 3 3 ^ ί ^ # 3 # ^ Γ Η^Γ^ ΤςΤ-
.* s?T^ n: om. G. N. 
2 ÏÏH^C 
4 il « II 
#iRWfîW^%^ H H II 
TOT # 3*Γ ψΓ %fô Ϊ t^fa ττ^ %ft 5 ^ j ^ r ^ J H I SmTOcT: 
m\^é $&\m Sm^fà ι a w ι ^fhre^s? Φ^ΠΦΓ^Γ ïrerfcra-
. ΪΓΤ# 3oi^ aiTq^ ftgi«feptTra: a u ^ ' ^ r a ^ τ^τ^ τφ· ^β^ς««ι^-
^3Π**Πκϊ I δΐ^ ΤΦΤΓ^ Τ^ Τ 3^T^l?TO^OTtarf^rfTOT ^ # -
f^RP^ U , _ _ Pa. ^ °*mé P2. and P3. ξ e ^rft^ etc. Pâ» 
*rmFT wm$ Ψ$& %fà ^ r f ^ il ^ il 
^prerw^ ψ( 11 ^ Il 
w r ^ f t w t 11 to H 
^ prfësf preceding q<+m etc. Α.; fèfèw om. Β. F. G. Κ.; ^m^ 
%&*? qx^ rci ^ ι <κ 3ττπ 3?qt ^r^t^; ι Ν. * ftf^rr after gfsrêï C. 
^ ^qi for ^^ΒΠ in both the places. A. B. C. Ρχ. P^. ^ . E*. ^ 
s f w ^ om- P 2 . — 
<Ι<νΜΪ JM^jfêli^ I fiNN" *ΡΝ·*Ι3Ι«Μ( ι M i t 
^Tf^: Il U II 
srHt f^rr s d ^ P ? I <RW<A#JÏÏ Êfërn I ^li-
Mit T ^ t % ι ψ$$ m&fmz( ι fapr: #Rr«ï-
sift: il ?* il 
< t e ? H i\ i> 
STPT: 1 qT^ïïS^ÏÏ ï^ê^ ^ ϊΠ^ΓΓ «Tat 5ΤΡΡΓΦΚ4<Ι£«Κ**Ϊ I 
«*^^>iife5RR5râ«c*Rui^i firs ÎT srarerfoè ^rror ι *r ^  y * i * -
.i Hrfq- f^% r^ etc. Η.; ° ^ Φ Τ ^ Γ ^ Prfw Ε. Ν. * JT^ f^g^ om. Ν. ^ ^ή 
added. Κ. Ν. s fèrafts^il^: ι fWrtefq fofàsr: ι ^MIW^RSSSFTU Ν, 
^ vmtsft A. Β. C. F. D.; feftqrs after this Ε. Η, | grog^nr-
^rfesjun^ F. D. ÏS":; ^rr for a^jurr A. Β, C. D. Κ.; ?<m i^di= Ε. $ m sdq" 
i^rer: Η. <: δττ^ τ sr#c Ρ. * ^ τ ^ Κ. ΚΓ. . ι« gftq; om. F. D. H / Ν . 
i v ^ s f t (KN F. H. i* *tf for <saj*i A. B. D. F. G. N. H. K. 
^ a ^ f a f t M Ην i^l^rçr^ri^ F. v^ïrflraî after *êl% Ε; Ή srçj* 
Ν. Κ. *» Rm^'fin; G- H. ι* Vroc^re^^gK^vË. «i^  e^d<c4 P2* 
WF§ ^T^F^Mtk^i Ι*Γ ψ[ ïïï^OTïï-
^Ï3^T: Il ? 8 II 
1 ^I3tft %f^p H. G. * ^ rf^: for Asft L. E. D. G. H. K. * 5$vrs 
for ^ : L. F. E. D.; HÏsfr ^ f e F. N. * cireur ^pftt F. ^ « ^ K. H· 
I V m ^ : E. ^ r^nft K. <: g^: om, B. C. D. F. G. H . K . Ν. s. <rw-
3^T= G.; ^ s t s ^ ^ . Ν. ι ο çfsnf^ r 5FfKn*Fcï\ -4\mïu P3. ^ ^ frmm° Pa<; 
&πππ° Ρ * . ** ° * Φ ^ Ϊ ^ Î P«· ** e^^kçî Pi;. P 3 . n« CE^S^SR^ P 3 , 
c «fi 
m&m Hi\*mftfttftâ^& ψί it \\\\ 
ftïï^ STïM T^FÏÏÎ frmï Γ^ΡΠίίτ *ΠΨ& ^ t 
3faft ïïtft ifafr fcfr ^ W ^ j R q T II ?*l l 
snRïïT ξ wmïïT iNrt fà fêtâv ι TOftÀ*rc 
Φττ^κπ^ qfë <TOTM^ ^Rf^rercsre s r ^ % ι ere 3iï#fR€t 
^ ^ P T F t f e R f a 5Π*Γ& Γ Κ ^ # # ^ T ^ t s r^JRTf^Ti^l Rfdd^W^nC-
ι £ M ^ K . Î ÎT^T H. ^ fejîft C. K. G. Ν. δ îrooft Β. ^ snsftflr 
^VTT N, ξ ^ % ^ A. F. N. y> 33; after s ^ f w ^ A. D.; ^nf^^R^ 
Κ.; ^n^Tifè^ Ε. < m;nw\ g etc. P
x
. P 2 . ; w om. Κ. N . <v «Η-ΦΤΦΚΙ 
ipr E, io aiqt Prenf%^ ? B. L. C. F . G. N. H . K.; Ê n s î f t ê ^ E. 
n $H»wiÎM Pa. Ϊ * 5 Ε Γ * Π Φ Pa. n ^mtfaS^iq: om. P2. 1« IKHICH-
f^nwvi P 2 . 
^ff^ïïri^mr^ïftïïïï^gpm^' flcFg^a: WFÏÏ*TT% f î w f t -
ïR i^ï N^yyu^^'i^rg^rRr^ilH^iiéiciîf w i s . fer: g*ç f^êr 
' - - g • — . . . . . . ι • • • -• — • • 
ι q^- § A. R ^ft^ A. B, D. E. F. • H; ^^M^Rdfosfo^mi, JC. 
G. Κ; χ « $ 4fe etc. P
v
 Pa. D. E. F. G. H. K.; ^ f t 1ST. s *?&-
^Tffr. P j . ^ w ^ î î i 0 Ρ 1 β 
? f ^ T T O ^ i < ) ^ ^ M ^ ^ H ν& it 
? ^ ^ ^ R ^ # ï I! \ί II 
tfWteft Τ$$Ψ> #f> ^fàta^t Il ^ Il 
f^ Tïïtsfô ftfif^: ^ t fàïïFT^ II 3° il 
ΐ qftîïï°î etc. is put between 4*fci and fè^mr 3λ ^ ^H^ktewi 
f|fè# N". ^ TC# fèfiiq H.; TCsmà gn^fà f^^ ^ A. s am^ifa 
cf«n C. ^ ÎT ft; om. P4. ξ qft+uukrti^  for srcftwMict, P2. 
f^mwm*fà% M* Il 
%m*t η ^ I I 
^^kl i fe» ' 3 F ^ ^ " § ï %^ | gçft ^ φ3§ 
^ II TO^Wrft ^ Î ^ ^ I ^ t ^ M ^ R ^ l R I 
gwnfTÊt qspnfcr TO* TO fiw*itaRK«H-
•3 ftf^n om. Β. L. C. D. E. G. ST. Κ. Η The order of sroft and 
snmrfc changed in G. ^ f%$m om. B. L. C. D. E. F. Ν, Χ. s ^hr-
£3|ρϊί etc. Α.; srFrcsïï^ï^T^^ppîfJTO: Β.; ^τφτ for ζΦξ. C ; *rf%f^ -
*πί*ϊ f^irici G. H; the same found after °*Hte3pi A.; &st etc. seems 
io be om. from the original followed by the Pad.; also om» D. F. 
H. N.; notice the several readings mentioned by the Pad. ^ °^t} 
D
^ t A. B. C. D. E. F. | q%cf after °ftmmft A. H. * ^ ^ N, 
5 3ï5We"P3. P i . * *EW P3. P i . 
sferm #RT^T5ÏÏÏ%^ Il ^ if ^ tosq^f t -
W + $ % RîTFÎïïmînïïT ^ R T ^ il ^ Il ψί 
$wt qt 11 \c π 
t f^|^ ; Α.; éf^^ between sR^refèa· and ^i^m^rcf^s S", H SRR 
ora. N. ^ ^ for 5 A. B. $3ïïreFri om. N. ^ srcpfe after ^m A. H. 
% i^wigi^w<^sfq· P3.-P4, «. r^HKi^ ï^ îTfq· P3. « «resirâç^ P2 . 
^ 3«ilà T^ P2. 
TOWfëfilr S S ^ i 3^pT^ ïï%ÇT WOW tT^r^T^: îFq^ts^t-
^N«i^f4i 3«nfô |:^r^iRR^4ïï çRn^w^^çnfi: fa 
Ί%^^ψ&^ν^^$^ψϊ$ς^%%&3 k sa; ι fê*nrf ÏÏ^-
<i g after ^g Λ. Β. D. F. G, Is. Κ; f|£ni after"5* H. * f:^n-
^ïT^ïïîm D.; sfssraiftqKHim ^ after this D. Ν. χ ^ s ^ omf P3. 
s 5 om. P 3 . Η <£f : ftwift P5. Ρ*, ξ τ om. P s , P*t 
ν 
smfà RRdRfi^i^Fi^:. Il *ft II 
#t:^pnto wrto^ Il v$ il 
^ f d Ht πτ^ ττ M^lnw^ il w il 
wtfN" ÇR% ft<*^ ?Tc^^^3^T^n^r#T ftsyiK-ia^-
ι ftfon om. A, Β, C. D. G. N. K. * ^ s f t %f%^  E. F. H. 
* 3fdS>si G"· « ° ^ ^ ^ T : A. B. C. P
r
 P 2.; tëm^: I>. H 3^4 f^ foi 
H. ξ ^ cf^  %fW H. » #$Sfq- f^ f^ f: H. <: é^ïî*%f^: H. <î> fê^ 
for ftsfô0 A. B. C. N. H. 1 ο ^ f ^ H. 1 -j 3TW % £ Φ H. ^ 
^ ï W l « f 3 R î D . G. H . ; ΪΓ^ΓΦΜ^Η: Ν . η 3Tsroi(^«itt43T D . IS fë-
^wu*iM%snft{Nig; only, with srfsr*rcf etc, omitted, P2. 
wst w$m%t^w%%% H \i\ ii 
*WW4*KI srRâ**kMU ι SF% P&iPkwu ι 
zêmmt ftfoflfljiKKftfoMu 11 H* II 
; • • - . , „. • . «. ' . 
Hi<mCH5* f^fiS^[7çfsr: I ^lA*f «EDITOR: ##ïïïï^ïï^-
ÏÏ^W emt îT *npftir ΗΪ^ΜΓ: i ^ n c r : ι 3F% Ç& Ι ÇHWW^I-
>fc% ywiNwi^r 8*£Ν3ΡΜ§Π ^ ^ t ^ ÊfëiïRiy«w sssrr:» 
Φ π ^ 11 
irot'E. s '^ ritaBm^ms G. K. <* ° Η ^ ^ Γ ^ ^ P2. P 4 · ξ
 β%ξρΡ4. 
•'eww^t P2. < : ^ w ^ P 4 . 
K\ r^en^ pff. 
^ N r f t l <4mÎ*&<i MhHttilft II *ft II 
srPRfln^T* 4ft4tft^4K«NI Ψ( Il ^ Il 
ΦΦ$ MWWWRR: il H8 II 
T ^ ^ Ï P S W Ï Ï C Ï ; ι qg ^ s w ^ T i f o : OT SÏ*TF4 Sm^wm* 
^ΠΗΙ^^Ν^η Φ^ΤΪ ^f^c# I ?Γ : ^ Γ fà^T: i Τζ4 W3r4 3cS*T-
3î4t *i|ÎN*W%d: I ^ ^ R r q ^ r ^ P C ^ w f t Φ" ïï^fè frc4 ÏÏ^T 
^Tf^FStfïïfàsfô 5Rft% I 3T«T 3Tftc4 ^ W%F$ çrgg^PHïï: I 
*i}uiraa*n3s Φετιΐξ srrsR^r ξ ί % 7 ^ 3»*rg<nf£r: WHR&tà 
%^ ι sts4 ^wiwi^goi^ngn^-sr^M^fer^nft *ΡΚΓ ξ& STORT-
^ s r M t ^ : ^ 4 5ES3T: Il 
ftSPParf f ^ T W ^ T * 3F=r^54 cFP 1 ^ ï ï f ô 3T ^ f t l i i ^ l a W · 
ftfà çreïhr ι Φπ& ΪΓ ?R> ΪΓ gig: ι ï i t ^ r *r sjra^ srëR· ι M -
* !^&&m A. B. P
r
 P
a
. D. F. E. G. H, K. K ; H R Ç ^ for ^ ~ 
ç^ nf^  Ε. * S R F Î after ^ π ί ^ ί Β. % MN+C4 A. C. Ρχ. P2. P. Κ.; 
iTN*ccim<i*^ |^ci«hc«ii(^  H. s *F£rei etc. and ST^^K etc. om. D.; ττ^-
mi Jin ν. 0,^ΡΤ^Γ *œ A. G.: °c2n^ fàr»ïï3: 0· ξ fW^y+ftttawWF%sft 
t&M ^ Μ Φ Τ Μ Φ ^ Φ ^ Γ «£T Il W II 
^} ^ ί : I ^ ^ s f i N ^ W T * : W«ldM^à«* 4 ^ 3 ! fil* F^SPTT-
T^r^rft^TT%: I 4W^4<Wdc<i*FWr ceretsR^NM^SrW I 3RT: 
srr^Rrr: 5ΓΡΤΡ% Φ Ρ ^ Ϊ ïf goît r^fr srepnra: ^$*N" r^m^ t 
%ct ι erat 3t ^ rf^ftst Φ® : ΦΡΤ: sr TÇT cri dtRi^ft^r * çfe$^ 
ι g after ^fe A. F. G. H; ^nf^ om. B. C. Pi. P 2 . D„ K. N." 
Jîn. R ftfti 3 B. C. P.v P2. D. E. K. N. ^ ftSqutftfrgKEfas A. 
G. Jin; fèifaïïfèâsspTO! #ΦΞΡ L. E. a %f^ s·^  P*. ^ After ^na^ ίΗψζ-
ψΜ\ ^ H R N W ^ <^Γ η H<5 it 
%ψ* g^TïïRî II ξ° Il 
^ Π ζ ί jpt (I $1 II 
q # 3ÏÏ$^ ^ I fo «WlR+K«W«M l^R*R* 
3Ç<?mM3$refà ïfuiFd<îfà RiR*i4f*wi% T^fërfsrcnN' srnrPinr-
«ff&Wrer ξ<Ν*Π$3ΚΓ 3ΤΓξ ι <A'^ cc|U>'k>' 1 S ^ T R S W 3W<W-
CRÏÏ 3wô*rwiwKW3|g<reT 3g*rcn«*wFf «wwwai $3*τ-
ϋ^τ^^^πξ 1 srsrr ^srrar ξ& η ^  3 w t ^ R r ψι 
fi'gïRf <=hKm<^tî&iïï I Η44»Α"ί ΕΤ3ΤπΤ% ^pfewfrft ssr^ 
ι fàsnr om. A. B, G·. N. H.K. χ ^r for v& A. F. H. ^ n^om.A* 
s tr? τ^πτί A. Β. D. Κ.; ^Rq after nrf^î om. A. Β. H. Κ. Ν. G.; ?Î^ 
3ÎKOT G. Ν. H τ Φ ΐ ^ P4. \ ^rasr Pi. P3. Pé* e- n^^ sTRT^ Pj. P s · 
P^. < ^ om. P4. 
SWVÎÇR src^fam Il î\ il 
φύ wmtà fournit ι ^ fT^ Rrîtf^  $Φξ ι 
r*^dPa^r5N^5*a^i ^ R ^ Ι 9τΜίΜ*π«πϊξΡΐτ $CR7RPÎ-
3τ««Μ$ο : ft%3î: t ^ ^ ^ ^T^TcMWil^lWKuiMil^^H^RlM^-
?faT&ft 3fpre4 5Π3%^ I T^fcn^TqirpT &tiii*ttlM^^ππτ-
sftfë: ι qg^it 5 iî^cînTn^r: sfïï ^ ^ns: erniMiR^susï-
^rers; ι ^rrft ^ ftè*% .^ wretfôcCT^ fêli mzm <rar*n i <φ 
«wftft "3»^i^ft«rfi^ifïrftft ft*^ ι * r^^ rtfir ^ΦΪ#ΤΡΓ-
«rfti$raî Çïwts«HTi^ lRkl S'WSN^ ^srr^ssrrw ! ^^raraî ï 
çr =3t sra%ft ι g&q^T^^r%Rigftft: ^r^r^ ι gfcforc^-
dsft "I f^î^qH jpftft I ξξΗΪ ^&^:^kf t i r% ^ iwf t ι 
Î ÊT^TO A. Β. C. After fSpfferetss, Κ. has 's^i&wft ^ r ^ N 
î^. ^ ^ s ^ om. Α.; ^ Γ Φ Ϊ : & c. om# N. s îîhs: after f:^piî^î D· 
H ^c% P2. P é . | τφκ Ρχ. P±. » iftw P2- ^s. P4. 
5° r^ar^ nff.--
ψ$ %#^{%Î^R^ Il 5« II 
5^: r^^ : ! e^ r δττξ ι f^^rirr^^rawïTra*^ fir ι ^3 
feftl. ftwre^sft îgwri^S^HMfâ^lPlf i^^' ïT W O T · 
ïï5 * ^R^ri ξ 1 ^ ^ 3 ? Φ ρ ^ Ρ Γ g c ^ c g a ï ï ï ξ^Τ^ΓΙΪΤξ I! 
? °$<^ni D« ΕΓ. H. * T^RCT om. P3 ; P é . ^ 3©^$^. P2. s ^ ° P^. 
ΐξί il ΐξ# ^ ^ f ^ ï râtàts^! IUH 11 
%gni ^ 11 ____ 
%m ψπ% g^riîlHïïïft^nft ^ ^ i N s â * seront* ^^fâr 12Γξτ 
^ ^ Î d ^ i % 1 tlMiW^* ^ ^ r ^ 1 fçR^ ί^στ fi^ro· t 
ftglflsrar cf5T ^ r ^ r \ spa * %m^wmzfom M ^ ^ ï R T -
Φτ f& ι *r ^ . crcNr ^ r Φτ ξ^ %^Μ>η: 3*nr<îrfà %^<ΓΕ% 5*r-
«j t^ rfe^ uT Κ. G. Η. Κ. Ρ
χ
. Ρ 2 . ; fcm aftfifàro* *çr*ii ^
 Η
· 
RR *W4'W. 
Wfi^RR Sf*TTsn4: ! gfèf âïï *W ïïST ghr Ç& ^ t f a ζΤΓ^ΦΓϊ-
1*Π£^ ÊftW*: STCF^RT I 3Γ«Γ ïïife R*i<5$** <W ^ΤΕξίΦπΦ· 
^w^^rcf^ïïrfêsïïfH: Γ3πττξϊπ^ΗΐβΙ*<«ί ^WKwg^s&arr-
forint wiiîifâ s^an^ ι er^ 5 ?τπΐ qftîrm %* ^ ξ ^ wni 
^re^*i4^w*dw-ea^«irJwft^* ι erat ^ sn^Rtafgw: il 
jfâ®H ι ïï^wnl ^ 33W§^ 4W fèsrfçKWdf 5d<^i^% htà-
ftir * ^ ^ïw^fàftfèr IST: ι ς ^ 3 * ^«iwié ftafi^-
[KT %ÏÏ ι M^trà'^Frr r^a^qrRrencrerra ft^rra: ι ferait 
' *
 0fôHi«iKW*ifae A. B. N . G. H. K. H ar^qftraifti G. K. ; ς^οζη* 
ï.; * ft%^ *%T ^ : A* 0 % * ^ Pi, P§, P i . 
fttfow* mm** il «* il 
#l^^RM^dl q g ^ ^ g f t f l II V9»ll 
f^Tî Φ&% ΦI *FPïïfëanïrt TOTPT: ^ >Μ!ϊ*%<$*ϊΡΓ: U 
?Π*Γ fSÎSpPÎ: I WWMI-3" =3 %fa<p3W OTtcRPTT %ft<i«*M*MM-
" Φ ΐ ^ ^ ^ π ^ ^ ι ^ : ι ^ £rd*ft cT^T r^^ rc% r^r^ r^^ 3rm: ι 
* m^: TOP Pi. P 2 , D. E. F. G. H. K. * ç^n^ft TOfsfe: P2, 
TO4sfe+WfedU *H 
^ jR<jm RH^ÇM i^m<rmM <^i^*tm ^ u m ι ^ TT: 
4 1 H ^ I ^ 4 ^ ^ H & ^ l f W t TOll^ Il 
_ ^ 
$Π fi4©d4JL ι «rat Î Î M ^ R % Ï 4 ^ ι a^ q ^ R f ^ ^ n n # g^T r^-
SWKd^lc«*iil3MlHR^^^W,l& I *WW^lft*l<«INKd^ll &m-
^«ifiMifôRfil g*£Êt ι g ï s r ^ f t w t # ï w ^ ^^ri^rriS q f t^ -
^e^Sft" R w t W ^5Φ3^ I TÇFft =? fèïS^P^sft (I g%*pT 
WT: i.'i'wifteinft^ ^hrwwi 1 ^ K ^ R i ^ ^ ^ R i ^ ^ c i i i ^ -
Î Φππη A* Β.Ό. F. D. H. G. K. S. * ^ J R ^ A. B. C. D. E. F· 
G. H. K. N· \ 3T^ r: si&n^C. s ^m*^ï^wii^fta^î after ^hn^H, 
H %iiWl<Miae L.; ^ft^êiten^ again K.; è^ T r^ ST. ξ ifegqsn^ A. » ^. 
qswifiwna C. F. c j(éé P*. * ftg^r Pâ. 1 ο 'm^te* Pé. 11 After-
sfêra i^«m&Î, P* P3. Ρ** have ^ ^ « ^ ^ W ^ M ^ I €w3fn*m ζ^-
vi Jt^iftHWl ^JHHfeniTft gw win il <^ Il 
TO^Iln Il _ _ 
# dc Î^Îtô 3 ξ ^ ι M<qia»3 ^MiIîiRfâ % ι ^^f: ι ^S'ft-
^ l ^ l & H W f t f τδφϊ^ I V4«flRMlfâ<*IIfftra ' 3frfit4iT«iM -^
^fe 5aT4^yju4l«wSl& I ïï^T I ^4 l^fe l^d<44iM'lfti(Wk3«U-
g ^ l^&<M<sl44<WlSi' 3 W ίξ^Τ^^ΠΗ^ I ^ Μ & < « Η ! & Λ Ρ 5 4 -
9φ ^ l u ?:^R5ntr φ \ sïsr «d*wwfâ^ifà«it«iw. *^Γ-
5& tâm^fà τ *Φ$ψ. ι 3<*τΦξ § ^ r a * R P r ι sr&fëprcts-
IH II Î W H W j ^ I ^^l«15TOI^4>K^i^F^*lwtdlPl^P)a-
.-% ^^ ΐϋίΐΛ G-.; TO%Ê#WI$ÏI "8.^ * wu*mtâ Η. Κ. ,^ ^ H M ^ K I 0 Ρ1β 
Ρ3· * 4R*ii
uMci^ K!0 etc. F. ^ °w4=K<ws^ fè dc^iàfo^^iui^fe^ 
«radiftwcem^gii gs^ r etc. P3, P*. | % ^ ^ ^ ΡΗΒΜ^ΚΙ^Ρ^ Λ # 
Prefer P 4 , 
4a*iKVH 
^*MtH4»WJHR^? *FW* #ftïïî Ι1Λ* Il 
^ t f : ΙΙΛ? II 
V* II 
aw4i<l τ «N-^di&^wfa&wgpraifo: saw ^ΦΠζ%[ΐ 
îïïfr *idtfli^T^id1#dI$t: ^î^rrszr^qgïi^sft ^pTI^ ïï^T-
r^a: ι «rat ^Miditei^w ^r^^pitersRfi^Ror^r^i $n* 
«MH^KWWIWK^ inserted. A. s feMUic^^WM^ G. H. K. N\ ^ g^s 
fr*pr: T>. % Only qr^ Β. C. Ε. F. G. H. Κ Ν; ^ w i ^ f t Α..Β.Ό. 
D . E. F. G.; m^ifôqffir H. N. *.gpp TCÎ I>. 5 smô* only Ε. F . 
G. Nj amcwldflPi K. H . N . «L 301*. ^ I>. .1· ° P r a a ^ R 3 r e P** 
\ί SîPWI. 
J M ^ k M + l |^ : Il V^9 II ^ l ^ E T I ï ï N i R C 5FÏW-
# T %5T3nf : I # 5 ^ $ Ρ Ι 
^ : I 
\ 8ΠΉΠΜ*Κ SMTW-I& l-M+KJ^WM' 5?Pfe I ^"•uwAiftr 
«+KI4<Wh*WII d«ltw4*Hc«l«Rr Φ I Ç^ïftani^'S^RT çgf | 
^ t fê# Tïpè ^ F : OT/ cFîi I ^Î^NuNÎVlgMK'tf ΦΓΦ% t^lfeï* 
9 e&rçras A,; *prt ^fe: Ν
Λ
 * g«<rf«uld4ift D. F. H. Κ. - * | ^ -
<iWMi4lPl A.
r
 e
«wiwwK H. K, 8 jmgwwM&fl Δ. H g^ çg only Β, 
Ε. F. G, H. Κ. N. ξ TLe -whole sentence om. P 4 . * (WR^râ' 
«tC. Pj. «-3φ1& Ps# P 4 , * 3cUl**iff^W^? Ps· 
^#^(^4*WÎ^dÎ. 
^^»JM<i4»wiR*K^ g^^ i r ^ 11 3 3 ^ 
f^SC^ Φ Μ «iRrâ 
^HTq^ *ξ$3$& TOTOÏÏ^ï^ I ^ f^T ^ I ΦΪ**Π3Γπ^ S*dlc«idW 
SFRÏ Sfifa*S% l ^ R F ^ SW«" 4dHI*M««s!lït t &g SWFIJR 
f^r ι %^Ρξ[ Md'4W!viK«i ^κβίβΐ'βτ «iwwfêrer Mdwawïïit mm 
çsinrow^T^-wfd^fi jw l^ t f ι sr % $RufoïcidTfc^iR^Nwm^ 
^ τ % ^ Φ π ^ ΐ g f f c ^ « <wr *rfô 4ys 1 fiw*<M»K«i fi*tëWè<yw 
IfTc^ I ?T^^ÏÏ?[ÇÏ% M i a i ^ d ^ W ^ R u i d M r ft<Jfîdc«fAfit «fi^-l^ 
sparer a^-^^^mwH· itjlfcaîftfi ^ r anmwimtixifi-1*»^ 
ί H^fo° .A. * «n^ r om.-B. H. K. * j ^ only. B. C. E. F. G 
ï l . Κ. Ν. δ «iici&ÎÎk qçrats^ ° etc. P3. H #ΑΦ%^Μ(-- P3.. t *ER 
f*i?rP3· »°in%I^ 
» '- * ..ft 
ilR5^«dc*K«ldWW ^T^T f^t§r d^l€r^<UÏWK«lft I ^ f è -
• BNid^^NRfi sTTFrr 5jç5t#rçTTft; d^dww^wic^ÉWt 
? m^tW A. C. P. t^ BTTSF cm. in all Mss. except F.N. ^ ^ r -
««* A. C. Px. P2. D.'E. F. G. H. K. N.; s ^ ° (1) B. s °itaîipî 
P3 . H shrckil Ps. 4 "sritt&rT P3. * 0MnQmn»0 P3. 
#FEK* H toR II ^rWWPWiqC Ι^ΠΝΚΉΦΚ^ 
*cfcqfa^wilPïdN'^HNMT qfi srraâfôâ S01" 5& t ^ ^ 4 R t -
«fterageTrer'· c^râfâ * ^ ι era ι flrisrm*^ Μ<ΗΙΤΙ^4Μ«*ΚΙ-
*» %ιιβ4Μ-Ν. * srai^Rti ^νή P 2 . * ^ for r^ P 4 . « a*g^N43iqi 
«te. Pi;« i^cik^R*^4tHi^ Th<ï*idi(i4T« î^tfcr between fègf^cisfqrand JTT^Î9 
Ps· t Hiid^ilà: P^. » a§?îtri«ii^wterFn^^i^ etc. with the inter-
vening words om. through the mistake of the scribe. P3. * sjfô-
&tïfe0 Pi . <κ 5 om. P3. 
u ?RPwr. 
^R[î II ?°MI 
Il ?°ξ Il arc$MUM^l(dq^^4VfoK<ii ^ f t-
# Φ ^ Il ^\9 II 8Tlf*W^«nRlHA* l^WK4 $Λ-
133^ ιι Ι°ί 11 JWK"M«»R|ïii^ wK* # 
^ T R ^ 11 M n *i4H^ifiM<i^^i^Wiwi 
^ î TTR^II H ° Il 
^1^14+1^4Wtà VM&i II H? Il 
ST l^ft Mli^h^WH ftdlfikWRc«ïfè SrTCSHjttftd3<HWI 3Πϊ#-
Hifâoinf^ <fq ι j j ï ^ i f e * g ^fa«wMR^M^4i*3Mifà<sH<iRr-
%Mi<a^iTîfàid ^τπί^κίΠίπ^'Μΐiy<."ilid .«UÎ^H, ι ^ ^ i -
1 .»H«»Hia&ft A. Β. C. D. F. G. N. K. * ^màtmwfrsm 
A. D. F. * aj^ Ai«4Viw*wiRi+K«i A. s »ΚΙΚ<Ί«ΜΜΗ»?ΜΙ, Ν. *\m-
W.om. ï>. F. G. H. K. N. c "qif^m^Pt. 
«î5l^Psi*wfèd|. ^s 
T^FcT ξ& I N4lfe<4l3r4 3ffiïfë-
sreifo are: wvmt η ξ H il y ^ ^ t 
^ ^tfcPFPcPfef Pt^ M f2l4*i^ ΙΦ4c^^ T d^^d&iHWHAçpff ^ " * 
M" W«e4WfKI«l^re«i 3 ^ 3PIW ^ l Î ^ ^ Î N à ^ : 1 iW«W^l3l·' 
4«&fwiwd«*wiy: ι *r 1| dtw^viRtMw &Φ% ^r w^rrâcit 
ST«raft I ^'<fedAÀ«HP*& * # ^ l t t ^ l «HIlfiWIMTt: I ipr-; 
^ft ^ « 3 c ^ M ^ f*wr«3d«4 <ï$dl+«à*«MlgRI!l %Γ I frf^ 
^ · & ί ^4&*Ν$3β I Β Η - ^ * ^ Ι ΐ Γ ί | | β m*$ SP#ff 
4Hfliftfô|«4<L M«M)d I d«l*ldl«lfi<!& «WlRift: ?^df^<fo-
- s g*rercsr ^ Ρ2· * Jmrnmfi^  (?) Ρ3. * Prom srsws^etc. to a^ m-' 
^ ^ τ left out in P
s
. ggforoPg. H °crefa Em+mu° P^. «.TOcff· 
*iR î^S' om. Pj . 
\% m^j^ 
itàmmi il W il awjR«t»; TOkStsçî^rr-
mt il ««i l ^K»^R^s?^rrïn^: n ^ # 
tos ïn^ i^: il m n 3TÊteK# ÎT^M-
*rçll \V& IIÊ^m: l^NHTOig: Il '\U II' 
w^^wniifà4^dMq-^*dw$fii [ ^^R^rfra^sfaifè^-
ξ3Γ*?: I %HI*dV STO ç3^1c4{|34*l«raYÎ!3iï I înïRTT^^î ^FRT* 
çpmx ftwwiftR \ eniRs*: vmiï* fuirai Cteii: ι ^T#SÏS-
s &wfm<o om. H.; ^i^^sft éeimi^ etc. Κ. Ν. ^ di<kw*i*n^ s' Cj 
* fegrë5? g^TWifeeici Ç.« The definition of ^ ni follows that of sï^r-
3*rf% ÎÛ almost all the Mss and the same order is followedby Jin2 
and Mita., but Pad. follows the order in the text here. ^ 9*m^~ 
^3%. P4. \ fW^R SKfrg P2 . «The whole clause om,P 4 . <^ om.P^ 
^w^ 3H 
c5^r ^r WPSWC ι sparer wè^H^ iw i^ r i fh r *rrered ^ W Î T -
ftfàf I Φΐ N d W ^ ^ M4T^^ÎtiSri&*T$ST* I ^t * ^ÏKWft-
s 0^j^fo<*miy° P2. ^ fïî^q# after g<H P2. 3 ^w^ift^Kmdf P4. » s-
<u Ri Ri ai fr P2· ^ ^rnî^r^î^mî P4. ξ *Ttoi3<w<i«tidlqq%:' » P2. ^ i H ^ f ^ ^ , 
ΦΤ%: Ρ** After this P2. bas 'ïr ^ ^ ^ ^ r r ^ R ^ ^ ^ F ^ t ^ f ^ ^ ^ f f è ^ ^ -
. « 
tâ^lwA^M'ÎW H ÏÏRP#ïft UTO*-
^lWi ftw Π W II 
qft& 3ξ*Π ÇS^: 1 «HT %P^!^W^IiT4 eitRElWft'fit I Τζ# ^ 
ïïd" *£T ^^lRM^^^lfâR?HN^>i^<^^^Iç*Hl(^*Ndl^-
•'ftd*K«idi«R5qT7nH^^rft<^r4Ri: ι ti^efà*iifcRït3| anire-
'fiVJd l^ ^T^FdiKlRi^lR^dN·^^ Ç& ^iï^ I âïï ^πτΦτΝ-
1 z&m. om. N. ^ efWwk4f*f Β. C. Ν. ^ dvfki^ cHq; A. s ^rfo-
'égr& before gr^ ?0 A. ^ ^ratf^ om.B. C. Ε, J in. Mita, f gwm«wi 
om. Β. C. Ε. F. Jia. Mita; firorê instead D. N.. g.qreiwwfaaTs. 
< sœiMiKWicfi0 Pa. P±, * after ^ar:, ' ^ ^ CT^TTOI^MWOT^**^!· 
I^TI^FPC Pa. i« /.^ra$q^ 3RH#Mc«ift$ fèsfè^ ι 3F3r«n 
^NPs^wtesr. V» 
x^\imwm&i il v^» 11 
WfrKWNWfru II \R* Il 3iH^lH^Pr-
ΦΡΪΪ 4i*m*i. 11 W 11 ^πιπτ^ τηΓί^ ππίττ-
ΦΜ<Μ*«ίϋΡ«Μ*. met ΨΚ II «ο H |RT-
STFrenfà ^ f e ^ II '^S II ffrMJHM^ I ^ 
H l ^ ^ l M w f e ^ W ^ I l ^ΦΝΜΙΜ^Ν^Ρ^-
^ m 11 m u foro gsfa: 11 m u 
ι Φ ϊ ^ for Φτξ D. Ε. F. H. Κ. J in. * dH i^4ii<tt*nfiRÎ ^ i ^ c ^ 
H. ^ f^ for X%Î Pi, P2; w ^ Pj ; «^«4^ P2· ^ *r^ 4*iwcKi|<cr-~ 
*a<?*w^ H< Ν· îrpmT^rt%pîi^ffci^i^43^ Jin.; $m ^ΗΤ^ί^^^π^Φτ^ϊ-
^Π^<ίϊ^<!Γ*Μ4^ D, 8 Φ(%& A. C. <* 85 I^g^nfiîe P3· t This 
clause om. P*, 
mk^^^t^ M^MC^M^ il î¥\ il 
ïïg^f^; II «iwrîlf: i^PR^gd^ Il # r i # î 
fl<ieiR4>< Il « T O I ^ I Î ^ I R H " ^^^Hl· 
^ i R ^ n ^^11 
^T^tf^Fc%sft a ^ W ^ i l f ^ W dsi^RdWWaiTfit: I ^ t f t T^RT-
^rarfenpi^diR^flifèfâf Φ Ρ Ι ι ÏÏ ^  ^ I M ^ înnïrr^ rïïî%ïï g^r 
^ïïR^wTO^F^^fi^-diïïKiïï(5r*<^ wt ww<i«P*ic^r *r # -
^| |Μ4τ4$ΓΕΤ WT^ η 
ι Or^n^rere; m^km after ξ ^ ^ . C.; fo^fFr· q ^ n ^ H. * ^ÏTO 
after ssfcn^ teï C.; ^jfcn^n ^éim K»; the word &%m repeated every-
* where H. ^ ^ï^^îf^i^ A. 8 ΐξ^ϊϊ^πφπθ^ϊΓ^ϊΐίΜ» after 3*τρπ-
f^ .^ A. D. K. N.5 5T3^ j^f^ % A. B. C. Ε. H ?^ft *tz ^ om, P 3 . 
$ *t^nft«*lWMI^ P2. Pg. « <d^<H«KHf*S^ Ps. < 3^Κ«Ι*^Ι«ϊ P s · 
P4* * ^Ï^TflïïMï P4^ 
wit f^er: I fà^w*wiiHK«i+i fàïïPTt fàïïr-
mi 11 l\v il s i ï i ^ ^ T t ^ qMiH '^ *m~ 
ïi^ïïfî Il W Il s ^ n ^ : ΦΠ II sr^^Tt^ ttsjRT 
ί sjtfi^ Mft4dVign% A. C.j sing, instead of dual B. D. F. K.N.H. 
«TORUM Ν. ^ sîîmfTÎ S . Α,Β.Ε,Ε.α.Η. Ν. ξ dctf4U4to«Hk4ki P 3 . 
So ^HM^I^ff. 
I R f à ^ : l l W l l ^ ^ W ^ N ^ ^ i R i 
JRÎ^ RT II W II WHW+^W^W^I^Jltl^-
fîrtoïï 11 m 11 swflWfa^ TO^nmii 
im eiim^Rli q^rf^% ^re^f^r f& ι * ^T^ f^c# sq^r-
^ er^Fn*ï<rili^d<â €fçr ϊΓΗΛπβ etc. G.'Jin. ^ #dH° P3. * STKT-
^^^srcrfei ï . «t 
MHW'«t^  amrd ^ r aw ^ciii^w fR^T^^r ^rcto^c* 
Mr «symift ι * ^ wkm^^j era: aFrfrgtasRr *w erewn^r· 
^ 4 ^ [ 8RWWH«HdwâdW.3i ^W+*jR^4«W!ftfâ II 
1 STWsnpftï etc. also inserted in the definition of sr^pram (*· 
*.Ά*ιτ etc. om. Ε. Κ. \ sn&ss^^snr^IV ^4· 83&IHNT: ^tidiPi^-
f^ ^m* Pg. * *PR.......3n^flr om. P 3 , ^*iHiq<h°Pa; «HNWK* om. P
5
. 
f^err. 3 5 ? R ^ TTO^T: π ?»^ Il &tm wm$\ 
iHwaïi^r ^rrunr^^nîcîr^wfiïïw^: ι an ëqif^q^4diR*w-
i ^rr^c^^r^rftsift^n^ 3 sparer qwc^wi. 
^ sanfèfàfèrstei^ w only. Κ.; °f%f^ m &**|ϊρζ Jin. Η °fôwr#TT° Α.; 
e
^^itqrsî0 Β. C ; ^rp^re^jHrf^fi^ etc. (?) D. Ν. ^ TO om. Ps # 
s ΪΓ 31 om. Ps. M» TOtPd^ti^ Pa. I s^KJÎfa<w«M i^fîr?î3lr etc. P2 . ; 
n^fçr om. P3. » 3îf^ Jî^ :^ P s . P 4 . <: SPÏ ^^rtf^ s^^rats^i-d^ 
om, P2. % 3ΙΨ^^ΡΤ^Β^ΚΙ4ΪΡΜΚ5 only, P2. The next clause om« 
%$ ^WMlifc: Il ?V II 
? s m for feff C. =i gqïfeï ^Mgri^q^î ^imiomq^: N. ; ^ s q r f ^ j 
22 flHWff. 
âwî W H 4 II <T?Fnw TO^ $mi~ 
^ S ^ J M E M 11 W Il 
^?^n«A4^T^4iqwr4 q^rç η w l i ft-
5zm fèw^ 11 Μ η 
'feanf^ .-wnTfirapm^ ^ ?$iwi4* ç& ι ^ ^ f â ^ i V u t ^ 
srw^sft vwti ΆΤΦ® sn^r ι ^c^wren«nR^r5TPi*<**wi*t-
Î . *ÏHom.-A. B. E. F.; °gi<afarci etc. G. Ν". Κ. * ^m&mfc^vm 
A. Β. C. D. F. G. H. Κ. Ν. * ^ ^ f ¥ r ^ om. Pa. P 8 . 
2<Λ 
t* 3_. * -£L 
SOT wm ψ τ& ϋΜ*ί$&;. q^ren^rera: ι ^ ' ^ ^ffq^qg-
«j OTÎ.A. B. C. F. α. H. çrrô ^ T ^ T R T ^ ^ Κ. Η m* A. Β. C/ 
F.G. Η.; TO^ ^ s^r§^^^: Κ.? t ^ for gr Gr. Ν
β
 s eraît trajm P2* 
Ps. ^ 3îid«mfys P3 . ξ 3τ*3π%: P 3 « e^sn ^ P-a. « ^«ΓΙ^^ΜΡ^ Pg; 
wrf^  om. P
s # * sr* for çrsr Px î 33" P 3 . P é . 10 arf^ nvrrsr^ Hcr tr^rpïï-
ftâ<rP*Pfc , 
*IH*mm&HïR5R]gfà^^ 11 
W3fRÇI - 3 3rriyfà<*4c3ïï dcu*K^^ra^i ^ΠΤΡξΦπΤζΐϊ ^ricf-
^ ^ g f t f ô ' ^ 3 ^ ^ 3fRtâf I ^JM-
5 «ΡΒΙΦ^ΪΪ om. in many Mss. A. P
r
 P 2 .; ^ftftm^Pmi a£ter CTT 
G. * TOsfïiïrHsr om. P2. * s?3fè P r « cra° P2- ^ °/%TOI cwkun". 
P i · i e«5^w4<Qîf Pi. » JTi^ jsznaf^r0 P2. * ^iyPw^id P2.3 
^IIWII 
ft&sra^RRn^^ ^r^Tpt: 4NMftft^ ffrerarâ* ug^Tft-
^ q^ pS<rv*3m«hm«i Α.; fe^ q ^ ^ f Β.; Ri^ i^ 3 ^ only Ε. τ ^s^r-
%% before çsRT^nr C.; gwi^aKH^ni G. ^ &^q<wi^ iT5<?5np Pi» 
P2 . H.5 fef^r qsprfe^-^m^ E.5 q^me^fpri sw^rgq^ Gr. β ^sr-
î^^îf D. Ε. F. IST. H. Κ ; srsq^ nR- G-.j fë«frô%ïr ψΦ&··.0. 
M 3?roisf§^ Jin. ξ *rcs*r&33id 41OKR ι fëfv^nftik^ « Î ! % ^ ^ A # Î 
ετ^^ζ^ Mita. Jin. L. H. « af^sfr ^ (?) P
x
. <: ^vr^ for m ma P ^ 
^ ^cj^ cji0 etc. P 2 . Ps. P4/ 1« f^tf^ ct^ iif&i P2. Ρ*. Ή SÇRT«.«~3I 
^ ^ n f ^ î i om. P4. 
S<* çrçpwr. 
•H v\\ \\vêmr^w*\ww% η u° U^ ITT-
^T TTS^T ^taf^iMWii&si ^RNiRfa SFarrafêrsiï s ç ^ R y · ^ 
ïr^i^fâdM^ 3rara*ai«j*uï* uMtëRiwt Ι ^ n s r r w ^ r 
«TOWc4l¥fcra<W^WWWRI^d^MfiM(ld^^ïïPWl^ ΪΠΤΤδΤ-
^ *ΤΡΓ pm. Ε. * qspr^ rcnSci F.; °f^ R%^TÎ^ Rîs E.5 tr^^r etc. om. N. 
^ The same followed by/^T^^m^R^r^^ ^ ^ ί ^ ' C.; «jwid<(*n^ -
^m^^HMidfikM^ E.; *π«ίτΚ*«33Τ«κί srf^sic^ instead. Β. L.G.; the 
same with'«ÏTO*R^ for sns r^ N. ; srsmnw: ws *& ^Jpft ξΐ^Φ^πϊ-
RRT« y g i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ F . j t h e same with m ^ R i ^ f ô Pwft 
f3 : g*b<unws after sispsnrf&s:; Κ. & D. which has, however, srw^ici 
for TO, » ftMÛWI^Ç^^ Ε. ^ ei«i<K*U«i*IM*c<i «*<«i«Hc^ A.* 
Pi^ 4cî JrarrôPtre^ H.; om. Ν.Ε.5 for readings of Mita, and Jin, see 
notes. ξ srfëH Ρ*. » *ra f or τ c ^ P * . 
fN% *r tmmm it W « 
MHi^ J|«3M<t Il ?$» II ftil^H:?W f H 
ψ$π %r il w 11 ^q^u^fcrt ftff^-
* °«ΙΗΙ<ΗΚΗ1 A. B. E. * fiftg^BÎ P l e P2* H. Κ. Ν. ^ s^ ftcndiTT-
5TFR**MP*Me Α.; «ititattwiiifW Β. C Ε. F. D. Ν. β ^cteiM om. 
Ρ*. ^ *ra§pr for g^r P 2 . 
^W^HUMKH^l .^WHWliw^HU^ I IWII 
#rcrn*rcn«i pr $h il W. il «IftféMfotsl· 
$ fe TOTCÏ I Ï Ï : I IRSTJ #&rcï ÏÏFRT I fër-
ςτπ^ Il r^rfr8<H«r«Mrii,*r<.+ ? R ξΡΠϊ. Il ^sirpwtfis^R^ 
S N ^ T S R ^ C ^ $é f^cnfcs Sï#r ι fgét *wk®rt50^àir strict 
M ^ y i m ^ 0 H. K. N. * §^ra ro 0 Η. Κ. Κ χ vmmmtm0 IL 
Ν. * ^ ^ f d ^ t ^ : Α.; this is om. Β. C. D.G.K. Ή.} *ftftrai^(t) 
qrem^n ^ Ε * ,9jgfefe3 for ermf^ flpr Κ. Ν. ξ VW&MI^ etc. (?) 
Η. » **nfc«î D. F. Jin. < ft*R*ne ^EFC ffa ®^rmt %^^ΙΜΙ^Φ: #5re ;*sifcRsiiW· A.; only ^ ^ τ * etc. Β. Ε. G. Η,Κ. Ν. Jin.; j^raWK*»«tc. C ; ttra for fi*ft Η. Ν. ^ swifofrd P 2 . ι · 3T3%f^ r P 2 . « Jre sîfor *rer P 4 . i* A ter skiforfafcr, Ρχ. has 'g^çqifaHtK tmmi Jl'k'K1 
Il W 11 
^* lR4( id^^ l i f iw^ l l ?\s* Il 
H W l l 
^I^ÎMdwfi^^s^ts^r^t: Il VsP\ II w 
^ * M R V M ^ Il W H ÏÏ%I%ÏÏ fWîïR-
wnNfcrawwiM &k π^ çfêr s r^Bteïif: ι erawîre^îï^^i 
3Ρΐ*&<Πτϊ39ί3 ^39ΠΐπΦϊ<*φ>Πξ 1 3W %fèd&£<1ÇT VSfkm· 
JJWÎMIHKÎÎ fë«RresrpT% ^ ϋ ^ Γ Τ ^ ^ Φπ£ 11 
•pi^iCWraWHrRl*^ ^TT^ «UkMrffc Il 
3PÎ: I ξξ ^ ?W V^ °4N<kîl4 * ^ ^ 7 ^ I %ïïTÎtWïc% .?PïWïig*-
•J ^ T ^ f^ RW*àsïc*3$$juft^  before d^^H^etc.K.j^ra^ 3 ^ MPiWfl 
ft^i^<foà4fôqqfrrâ before s t q i ^ etc.G. & N. whicb however 
om. dx^ft«t etc* * ?π^ίτ4: Ρδ. τ, JŒW for im^ Pa. $ ^ ^ o*a. 
P1.P2.Ps. 
Vx - ŒPRPff. 
%tà ifopS^ Il ?w» Il ^llRs ^ tf^M<WU 
3^11 ^ Il 
«*WlPi*K«H^ Il «H l^Pi+I^ W^W^WW^W-
* ϊ ^ Ί ί W l l 
^ Il *<S* || » w W ^ « ^ ( ^ | | m*tât II M Il 
^MWM^4^^^IMR^I«I^^^*IRMI*UI<-
^ m < ^ u ^ ^ ^ ^ K i : rfiWdR II TOM· 
* r e i f j f i ^ r fà^Rïïcïïï ξ ΐ ξ ^ ί ^ î * ^ 'SS^RT tr^ î ï ï ^ ï ï ï ^ K -
&3T3Î: 5 ΐφϊ% !%%3T $ £ W « r ξ ^ ^ T ^ I ^ H i w r f r S ^ f -
i For a*?T œ etc., *ΜΗΗΠ^$ sm^îsf%ft^sFrs£rairc^A. ; era *œcîc*r~ 
D. Ε, F. G. H. Κ Λ 'fiprag.fia^KPi-D. F.; OT^^PRÏ^ Ptffa* 
^m G. H. Κ. Ν· s $t*h *$&% F. G. Jin. ^ çr ^ ϊ^ερ^^τξ^τ a?-
«sïntïî:A, $a*fSj^mrP3. « ^ τ ^ ζ ^ Ρ 2 . Ps. 
arrcrarcprêrarr* n. #^iMtoTO^q^iR<u4 iu 
«w«*(V^ 4rô<m M #*iwR4iiui^*wt(4ï*iRpflnïï-
^ i ^ | i%^T iw^RWï ï ïWî ï ï sn^RTC^ II 
WIMRli|U|^^^4lMR^I*lM<dlMi^yHKI ïï" 
ÏÏ:ÏÏ^TT: 11^ 311 ^ î ^$*^M^MPtoMhH?<ttU 
SWFT s ^ u i * 4 < k ^ H l<?\ Il fo$NK4 ftsr-
IFTCnrâiTî l l ^ l l «ΦΙΝΝΝΗ*Ι^ Ι^ Il *<^ >H 
# r . n ?** n 
ι % om. Ν. χ "«^^««iK^fnw 3ÎRH° C; ^iqftnFtîsi^^àit^wpi-
3<£Ηε)!ϋ<Ί?ιι -<s^ gq f^f: after 3j|^«^îiT: Α.; the same after *Fr:*w"5iai· 
C· ^ ^STeiîîFÎ Κ. 8 PR2R? after " ^ O T ^ I ' ? ; Ν. <* Ρτβπ m after 
Pirt^^tiilgi: Ν. ξ ftcns^4 for s ^ i ^si E. ; rs^sm^i D. F. N. G, 
» ^mr^r^ F. Ν. Κ. G. 
H» sroNf. 
W R Î %3PÎ: I ïï ^ arfft^RK*r<«lST5raW: I ΡΐφτΜ<4>Κ«ΗΙ*ΐΛ«Ι 
Eta*u<t ι * 3T f|c^r ^R:^C# ft?a f ^ i ^ r sp3çH%& fèrsRf 
^ °Î5^f^ïJiifîlT^r: F.; fàre^ r before fèd&#^ om, G. A, ^ ftfàxr 
before ^στ L.; ^H^if^^^^ft^éitïïr^rT oaiy B. ; Φ τ ϋ ^ : C,; ^T^Tf^r^-
fr^JhKéqtawî P. K.S. Jin. ^ 5ife4l4?^^ D · F . G· H * κ · Ν. 
Jin. s ^ ^ r om. P 4 v ^ gqSr^  om. P 4 . ξ égro P 3 . P 4 , 
srrt 5 *PE& W gMft'Rl II M i l 
^ R ^ Il Μ Η *Φ&$$ HmiwbWNL "' 
ϊ£ΐφΓΓίϊΤ& θ * : II 
ι _3»ra-*4fr ^ F, ^ Iwtëwl^ Γ. Η. Κ. G. Κ * ^ ^ ifcsN" 
for gwfàr G. Ν· « fàfàs Jin.; 3Ϊ?*ΓΗΪ ^ f fo Ν. H f^W"W^<h3<-T« 
W ^ A. Β, Jin, F. D. G. Η. Κ. & Ν. which has « 4 Φ ^ Φ for sre-
*#^ϋ s s^ om. Ο. | % :^éîkî% Ρ 2. · ^faafW Pa. JT*· Ρ*. 
Am^t^m^ 11 \v\ η 
%feé l ^ r ^ 4 &g*fà ι n i w t ι Stater l ^ r q ^ xçk ^^r-
s ^ M I E ^ I 0 G. Κ. Ν. H SÎRCT for ÇPÎÎÔS A . Β. P 1 # P 2 . G. H . K · 
-^ igaflnsï ft fi^i«4l *\Μ\£Μ\'. » 3H#&**mii«dïUi<ilîi8<l for 8fft^ww4\:etc. 
G.. N. reads thus:—fMwrc^fcrera^TO^ïtïpfèfêF1 ew«^ 4Utë3HWçeiH-
•^fàfà? ι s ssîSR«RÎW?ïsn*î% ΆΤ%4 3iwi N.5 si*Ra^rem% ^m &· L. 
ξ wn^*'te P 2 . 
^ Mlifoift^fai^ %ms$t mm ιι 
^ JttkiRi<bi Ε. G. After TOr^a*rtfw*r% ^ rei ^rra^ Ν. readscsjurfipn-
ï ï ç ^ M f ô w i ^ 3T Sifli+^K * ^ W W ^ 3Γ5 '^- éÎklià*TIÏÏi^^MHd î ërit-
qH^P ^ s ^ ! ^ f e : 1 ^s^SïS^gor: I *rf: ^ s q ^ ^ ^ g o p I ^ if ^ l ^ H ^ ^ i s I 
W^i^f war H' After the same,K. reads * ^ s ^^nNfeiggq: ι „,...-
...l^i^r s^spn: ( t te same as Ν. ) 3TS ^ igcfRi^i^sregrf^r gê^ α 
fttRh^hw* ..*«<wi*ite ( the same as Ν.) π m$m w sratârit 
( the same as our text ) ι φ im^i^fc^ HHi^ Η' * fij^f^rÎHSïfc*-
f^ crr Α.. the same with. Iforcrf. H.; f% w^siif OTÎÇTT Β. D. ; focn-· 
aqusFrarcfe P 2 « 7^r«ïîf^îàsfq P s , νς ÏJ fi^ig P2. ξ sreg^ om. P 4 % 
« *HÏ&... ,..€terr om. Pâ. P 8 . 
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Mita.—Mitabhâshinî, a commentary on Saptapadârths? by 
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Pad.—Padârthachandrikâ, a commentary by S'eshânanta on 
Saptapadârthî· 
San.—S'ankarâchârya. 
S. Ο.—Sidhânta-chandrodayâ,v a commentary on Tarkasan-
graha, by S'rikrishna Dhûrjati Dîkshita. 
S. D.—Sarvadars'anasangraha of Madhavâchârya. 
S. S.—Sârasangraha, a commentary on Târkikarakshâ, by 
the author himself· (Pandit, Benares·) 
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S 'v.—S Vetâs'vataropanishad. 
Tâfc.—Tâtparyatikâ by Vâchaspatimis'ra, on Nyâyasûtravâr-
tika. (Viz. Sanskrit Series.) 
T. B.—Tarkabhâshâ of Kes'avamis'ra, (Pandit, Benares.) 
•T. C.—Tatvachintâmani. ( Bib. Ind. Calcutta. ) 
T. D.—Tarkadîpikâ of Annambhatta. 
T. K.—Tarkakaumudî of Laugâkshibhâskara. ( Bombay 
Sanskrit Series.) 
T. B.—Târkikarakshâ of Varadarâja. ( Pandit, Benares.) 
T. S.—Tarkasangraha of Annambhatta» 
TJp.—Upaskâra, a commentary by S'ankaramis'ra on Vais'e-
sbika Sûtras. (Bib. Ind. Calcutta) 
V. B.—Vâtsyâyanabhâshya, a commentary on the Sûtras of 
Gautama. ( Viz. Sanskrit Series. ) 
V* S.—Vaïs'eshika Sûtras of Kanâda. 
Yivt— Vivriti, a commentary by Jayanârayana on the Vaï-
s'eshika Sûtras. * 
-» tK* 
1. According to-the usual practice of Sanskrit writers, 
the author begins with a ^ * ^ here consisting of a prayer and 
a salutation to S'iva. The necessity of M$<$ and its efficiency 
in enabling the author to complete his work, is generally dis-
cussed at the beginning of ÎTyâya works, e. g, Muktâvali, 
Tarkasangrahadîpikâ ; but our author abstains from it here. 
\ ^ s^A\r\\l\^—τς% is taken in several ways:—( 1 ) with 
Ν^Εοί? meaning one who is the cause of all the worlds without 
exception ( ΐ{^Φί<: Φ Ι ^ * ^ ! ^ ) · This seems to be the best way. 
(2) the cause of the created worlds only, excluding eternal things 
which cannot be created (Μ^ΦΤ? : 3?Φΐ4«4Ι4ςΙΦ:)· But this is no 
praise of S'iva and therefore deserves to be rejected. ( 3 ) %^Γ 
ΐξξ—-who is always the cause ( ι ^ Φ Κ : θίξ^<4*^ΐ«ΗΦ: ). (&) who 
is only the [^(^τίΦΚ^ and not the ^m^H^Hm. (According to 
the Naiyâyikas, God is only the agent of the world, but not the 
material cause, as opposed to the Yedântin, to whom God is 
both.) (3) and (4) are to be rejected, because ^ - is forced from 
its actual place. This clause states in brief the sr^ rpjf o r proof 
for the existence of God—Cf. Mu, p. 2— c ^^K+{^)^^ <=Π^ Ν I 
# ? ψϊ π ί ! ^ i ^ r e r sftsrra ftlîtT^K<Ju3lçrô: ι tr^· | ^ 
^ H l ^ N ^ ^ A ^ T h i s hints at the purpose served by the 
knowledge of God which is 3jt$T5 o r freedom from the turmoils 
of the worldly existence. *q«n § § : MKNK^rff VR STFTsrf^  
^n^nftrftartsft é ^ n W M Mt^i^ OTTO: ' Mita. Cf., however, 
the explanation of the word ^ j by S'an. on Br. Su. I. 3. L 
ϊΓ*% ^ R i l M l - C l ' f^n*; « ^ U H I ^ , Mahânâ. 17.5. Cf. 
S'an. on Br. Su. I. 1. 3. Pad. takes ^ H f ^ H J with ro% and 
solves ty^&^W a s a genitive Tatpurusha comp. = the know-
ledge of all ( Padârthas ). But this is to be rejected; because 
1st, the construction is forced and unnatural, and 2ndly, the 
Karmadhâraya comp. ought to be preferred to the Tatpu., 
w&ere both are pc ble, by ftm^^mfawu^ or according to the, 
aaaxim çr% ^ΠΓΡΠί^ - ' ^ *f <Wfîl4>4<Mi44· 
2 KOTES. 
2. The general method of treatment according to the 
Naiyâyika consists of three sfceps:—(1) <&£$\ or enumeration of 
things by their names only (4M4JfeÎU| ^ g H # # ^ ) 5 ( 2 ) 3 ? ^ or 
definition ( ^ϊ^π^τ^πτ: τεφ: ) and (3) qft^TT o r examining the 
propriety of a definition. Some regard f^n*T o r classification as 
t h e fourth step, but it may be as well included in $\$\. I n the pre­
sent work, the author, first, only enumerates t h e padârthas, their 
divisions and sub-divisions; then he proceeds to define them all in 
t he same order, but abstains from < τ $ ^ τ , a s the book is meant for 
beginners only. To begin with, however, he first explains what a 
Padâr tha is. A Padâr tha is that which is an object of knowledge 
(sj-f^fg·). Here Mtiffd ought to be understood to mean g ^ in 
general and not g r a r a l ^ r e , a s opposed to ^ % a n (3 ^ΡΤ^ΪΤ^ΝΠΤ· 
If, however, mTifd is understood in its usual sense, then STRtfe" 
' &*4^<* should be taken to mean i i & f a f c t M ^ ^ l · ^ o r 4><tfa< 
^ f i r *Γ% ^4j(5m4Vsft m | cT^ TcT 3 ^ Τ ^ I5 Mita. 
Mita, and Pad. hold t h a t ^ f a f e f a q ^ is no φ%ν\ of t ^ r s j , 
because the definition of ^gpïï given afterwards ( ^ < £ ^ & ^ £ > 
gidfa^ 1^ ^3TTO ) °^oes n o t aPP^y to this, But this goes against 
the author's statement 'ΐ44ΐ*3*Π4ίΐ«-4<£$ρή g f * r ^ ? in t h e begin­
ning of the ^%pn section. Though 5rfofd&^4<4 m a y not satisfy 
all the requisites of ^%ρη proper, still there is no objection to. 
regard it as a &ψη sufficient for t h e purpose. 
T. D. has ^ f t rè rq^r ^ T ^ T m T ? ^ î ^ ï ï ^ ' · — BTfir^TcW 'nam* 
ability* and s r f f r fàfa^c t or J T Î R T ^ 'knowability7 are really 
coincident. ( q^rsj- lit. means q^[ $$: and srsj: = ^ - ^ P ^ ΐξίΝΤ" 
3. The «ΤξτΦ a r e s e ^ e a in number—substance, quality, action, 
generality, particularity, intimate relation, and non entity. The 
-word t rer4 is best rendered by t h e word 'category' in English; and 
„ like categories, the q^r^fs of $ υ | | ^ are nothing but t h e highest 
elasses to which all t h e objects of knowledge can be reduced, 
and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system· 
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V.S. have only six Padârthas, not mentioning STsn^. As, however, 
every conception may be either positive or negative, so the objects 
also corresponding to these conceptions may be positive or 
negative. So later on Padârthas were first divided into Bhâva 
and Abhâva, and then the Bhâva Padâr thas were further divid-
ed into six. This is the case, for instance, in the Lakshanâvalï 
of Udayanâchârya. Later on the Padârthas were themselves 
divided into seven as here. The sevenfold division can be ac-
counted for thus :—First objects are, broadly speaking, positive 
( bhâva ) or negative ( abhâva ). Then again positive things 
may be either properties, or the substratum in which the proper-
ties reside. The lat ter is Dravya. The properties again may be 
either stationary, or evanescent. The latter are Karma. The 
stationary properties may be either those tha t are essential L e. 
the very life of the thing in which they reside, or may merely 
serve to distinguish one thing from another. The former is srrfct 
or « H U M { 9 and the latter is ψχ. Cf. S - R g w s f q % f ^ T : 5 f s ^ ; 
OT^ | % ^ t s f t ftfèsr:, Ψξί$φ ΣΠσΤϊΠξ: ^ Γ ^ Τ ^ Γ Τ π ^ δ ϊ | HSTÏsft· 
^Tfçf: f ^ f t 3*1: I ÇTT^ T: ^ r f t ^ d l ^ ^ ^ : ί ^ Π ^ Τ : Γ Κ. Ρ . 
I I . f^^lM and ^ ^ ^ ^ are only accepted to serve some technical 
purpose and they are peculiar to t h e Vais'eshikas whose very 
name is derived from f^fj^. 
As for the particular order in which they are mentioned, 
note the following :—'$*#<& ^ ^ K i ^ H u ^ ? ! «444ΐΡ&κυ|<%«τ 
STT^ T ^STT^n^R^TW d ? Ï H ^ d 4 ^ l HWT^Ï^T ^ T ^ f r R ^ fàd^ldc^«i 
a c r c r a ^ ι ψΝτ vwT*n wwzàf* *AU4MW d ^ M ^ ^ r 
^rorï ft^W^M^TVTTWCT d<4M*d4^ I ^ ψ Μ Φ Η : l ' Mita. 
^ after ^çj· is used to emphasize the number seven as? 
opposed to the sixteen padârthas, for instance, of the followers 
of Gautama. & 
4. The substances are nine in number—earth, water, 
light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind. 
As for the order in which they are mentioned, read % ^ 
4 KÔTESL 
WT S W i N ^ ^Fn^RTÎôFR: I 3 ^ ? ^ % S 3 r ΪΠΓΒ f % |* J in. 
5· The qualities are twenty-four only—colour, taste^ 
odour, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction* 
disjunction, priority, posteriority, intellect or knowledge, 
pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, gravity, fluidity, -
viscidity, impression, merit, demerit and sound. 
Of these, only the first seventeen are mentioned in Y. S.; 
but the following seven are added in P. B. as being implied by 
t h e particle ^ ' in the original Sutra of Kanâda. The present 
order of enumeration is more in accordance with the original 
Sutra than tha t in T. S. 
For the distribution of the several gunas among the nine 
dravyas,, see section 183. 
6* Actions are five only—throwing upwards, throwing 
downwards, contraction, expansion and going in general. All 
other kinds of action such as ^4 |m, ^^%*f etc. are included in 
q^pf. W h y not then, it may be asked, include ^^fauf e^°* a l s o 
in 7T7T«T ? However, some sort of principle might be revealed 
even in this arbi t rary division. "Motion is primarily divided 
into three kinds, according to its direction, namely, vertical, 
horizontal, and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion 
may be from below to upwards ( ^ ^ φ ϊ τ ) , or from above to down­
wards ( ST I^fqOT ). Horizontal motion also may be two-fold, 
motion nearer to oneself ( 3Π^!Ϊ*Γ ) or motion further from 
oneself ( jj^ft^uf ) . All other motions are relegated to t h e 
comprehensive class of ' Ϊ Τ ^ . ' -" Athalye on T. S. 
7 . mmrq-, or generality, is that common characteristic which 
rans through all the members of a class and which is the cause o£ 
the notion that these members form a class. Thus q ^ is a 
^Hl+H-q·, as it is found in all the individuals or gqfas of the g ^ 
class and it is owing t o vjdc^ * û a * w é a r e conscious of the fact of 
the g^s forming one class. ' q ^ R f w % 5 <TÇ$S Î t S g f ^ m ^ r i V 
^ro& τΒΓ mm*$ WWl*l? 3hu T n u S *Π*Π?*Γ d o e s n o t denote a 
olass or group but a common characteristic of t h a t class· 
mTSS; S 
This wmWA is of three k i n d s highest, middle and narrow­
est. A highest m m « m is t h a t -which belongs to a class which 
can only be a genus, and never a species, e. g. ^ Π " · &· narrowest 
d i m * ? is t h a t which belongs to a class which can only be a 
species and never a genus, e. g. ty&m; while a middle ^nW^T *& 
that which belongs to a class which can sometimes be a genus, 
and sometimes a species, e. g. ^ < ^ 4 5 since the class 5**^ is a 
genus with regard to g f S y ^ but a species with regard to q^rsf. 
Other writers have only a twofold m m « ^ 3 £. e. *rt and 3Π7* 
According to these, however, t h e terms are only relative and 
can never be predicated absolutely of any particular m m ? q . 
8, The idea of particularity ' is peculiar to t h e Naiyâyikas. 
I t is a sèqual to the idea of ^ΤίΠ?^ or generality. The lat ter 
serves to produce a class-notion, or to distinguish one class from 
another ; the former serves to distinguish one individual from 
another. The necessity of f%tR * s explained by the Naiyâyikas 
thus :—one product is distinguished from another by the differ-
ence of their component parts, ( ^ ^ i i ^ i ^ ^ f a : ^ : | ) Thus a 
jar is distinguished from a piece of cloth, because the component 
par t s of the first are distinct from those of the latter ; and 
so on we may argue, unti l at last we arrive at the ul t imate 
constituents of matter, viz. atoms which are indivisible. The 
same reasoning cannot be applied to distinguish one atom from 
another, since an atom has no further component parts. Hence 
we have to admit fc^yqf as serving to distinguish one atom 
from another, as also one eternal substance from another. The 
atoms of the four substances ^fS^V, 3Tq[, ?f^R£ aEL(i ^Tg* a s w e ^ 
as 3Π3£Τ5Γ, ^T^r, %Ç, SflUj^ and s p ^ ; , are eternal and in all 
infinite in number. So the fe^yqs abiding in all these are 
themselves also infinite. If i t be asked how one f ^ m is dis-
tinguished from another, they say tha t a fa^m not only dis-
tinguishes one eternal substance from another, b u t also dis-
tinguishes itself from all other f^ fqs . Such is its very nature. 
A n d besides if something else is supposed to distinguish one fe&^ 
from another, the reasoning may involve the fault of aHcHgn. 
0. NOTES, 
ggridRTh: srcnH" etrrfftsrerat s^rà & â $ r o ι π$ Ctèfla ft" 
iter 3#ï% WT ïr ^ π % ί^τΓ ^% ^ ^NP^RTf^r ^τ ι sniï Γ^ΠΤΤΤ-
^pft f^Nrc*r§ fèà^j ^RT <^ *r g ^ & d f è i w ^ ^ r ^% ι' Jin. 
9 · ^ 4 j < = U ^ o r intimate union is the keynote of the Kaiyâ-
yika doctrine. I t is admitted by them in order to account for 
the duality of the cause and effect. They hold tha t an effect is 
created by its cause and is quite distinct·from it, as opposed to 
t h e identity of the cause and effect according to the Sânkhyas 
and the Yedântins. A piece of cloth is another thing than the 
threads from which i t is made. I t may be asked then that if 
the threads can produce a piece of cloth which is altogether 
different from them, why they should not produce a jar which 
is also equally different from them. The answer is that the 
piece of cloth is in <H+Ht^ relation with the threads, while the 
ja r is not. The ^+jcUJ-l relation, as opposed to ^τ |7Τ 5 exists between 
two things which are 3HpT%f^5 ·^
 e
- inseparable by nature, of 
which one, as long as it exists, cannot but abide in the other· 
( s r e r a j ^ r = which are not known as joined or separated, i. e* 
which are always together), ^f^f^ is possible in the case of the 
Eye pairs—3fëHHH^fa4V *pt*jfit$h Ι λ ^ Ι & ^ Ι Φ - Α ^ ΐ Ι ^ ' Λ 
^
η
^ fi&'Mfiw%s3fr. I* is o n e a n ( i eternal ( in the sense that it is 
neither produced nor destroyed, except by t h e production or des­
truction of t h e related things). This ^ 4 4 ^ ^ and the ^ j 4 d R H < ^ 
of things have been refuted by S'an. in his Bhâsya on Bra. Su· 
I I . 2-13 and 17. 
1 0 . snTT^ or negation, whose knowledge necessarily de-
pends upon its counter-entity (ΜίτκΓΝΠΧ ^ss ^s^ °^ two k inds :— 
&w1?lTO ( negation of contact between the thing abiding a n d 
t h e abode) and ^ r ^ ' ^ i ^ N or reciprocal negation. ^πίΠΓΤ^Γ> 
Horn % 
again, is threefold:—îrnraT^ antecedent negation (i. e. the non-
existence of a thing before its production), ^ S B ^ ^ ^ T ^ consequent 
negation ( L e. by destruction ), and 3^«Ή|?Π% absolute negation 
( which exists always and in all places except where t h e thing is). 
3Γ?Π^3 as an independent tnÇTSJ", is not found in V, S.· bu t i t 
is afterwards added by the commentators for the sake of conve-
nience, though really speaking it has no external existence as 
such. Hence the Vedantins and others hold tha t an 3T?nW is 
nothing bu t the bare abode in which the S J ^ T ^ is supposed to 
exist. The Naiyâyikas, however, hold that an 3Π3Ϊ3" abides i n i ts 
srfèi^ui , by f ^ q u i f è ^ l ^ U e t - ^ or ^ ^ φ £ ^ τ . — € Ϊ Γ Γ 3 > ^ 5 Γ % -
^^«ïU^TT^sfè^rHRrr ΪΓΤΤΠΤΙ^: ι ΦΠ e g g <T3^n«pqr*n?r ι sr^i-
^^Tiits?^TWT^: I *«TC 3 2 : <ΤΖ* * ?ΠΤ% ^ t ^ ^ VRTcT l'jin. 
1 1 . So far, t h e author has enumerated the main divisions 
of the seven Padâr thas; now he proceeds to enumerate the sub-
divisions of these. 
Ear th is eternal in the form of atoms and non-eternal in 
the form of products. The H ^ J U M J ^ of the Yais'eshikas is 
briefly stated thus:—Every material product is made up of smaller 
parts. Each of these parts again must be in the same way made 
up of still smaller parts. Going on with this process of analysis, 
we come to the mote in the sun's beam ( called ^{ujcfr or s^ - fW ), 
the smallest thing visible. Now this ter t iary compound must 
itself be made up of parts, since it is a visible product, like a Jar 
or a piece of cloth. These parts are called ffiro<fes or diads. 
This jjfeiUH» also must be made up of parts, as i t gives rise to a 
product (viz. thesquicfr) which is possessed of magnitude ( which 
is necessary to make i t visible ), just as the cotton threads 
producing a piece of cloth are themselves made up of smaller 
parts. These components of a $^UH> are srors or atoms wi th 
which the process of analysis stops. These atoms are indivisible 
and eternal and supersensuous. If, however, we regard the atoms 
also as capable of being dissolved into fcheir components, there 
would be regressus ad infinitum; and the Meru mountain and a 
mustard seed would have to be regarded as of equal size, because 
both consist of the same number of parts i, e. infinite.. 
δ 
Î?CTE£ 
The process of the creation and destruction of the material 
world ( i. e. ^ j j ^ H i : s f ^ N J F Î N T ^ : ) is thus stated:—^jg^ÇT 
«rêffrêft^KUMttU^ Ίζ&Ρηπΐ φ Η ^ Π : II' T. D. Bee Sec. 189. 
^tftjf ^ r f f r^^r f^^T^TT—The non-eternal earth in the form 
of products is again threefold—body, sense-organ and mass.There 
is a great discussion as to whether this three, fold division be­
longs to earth in general, or only to the non-eternal earth, though 
the -weight of opinion is in favour of the latter view. Kanâda 
has %t3?r: ^ f e n f ? 3 r ô ? * Î fzfkv ^ f f l P ^ f a ^ & j f f ( Y · S · 
I V . 2. 1.); also < ^ T f^ ί^ %% I m Φί4^41 ^ f ^ f t firf^TT ^tff^-
^^Tf^^î Î r^Tf^^r^ ; 5 ( Mu. 37). Our passage is explained thus by 
the commentators:—ca?fti<& i^ I ξι f^ î^ ^M f^  I $U*ftret I5 Mita.; 'snsf-
J i n . T. S., however, has in most of i ts Mss. cM«i (^ f^^T? instead 
of %T *l*i$gïk^sf and the author removes the ambiguity by say-
ing 'u^Kl^dim f%VT^? in *be T. D.. which gives rise to the 
first view stated above. Nil. explains it thus:—c5T^RT«:cR" 
^ ^ * 5 ^ Sprf^fèrèrçgfrF: φ ΐ ^ ^ Γ ^ H ^ Π 3 ^ I % & ^ 3ΪΘΓ^Γ2-
ίζξ&Π *ξ% % f è ^ ^Nff^ct I5 ^h. , however, finds fault with the 
first view, admitting, at the same time, tha t tha t is the na tura l 
meaning of the t e x t — ' f s m ^ H ^ •ξΓφβ^'Η ΣΓ^ΤΤΠ^Γ^^^Τ^Π-
Our author also defines f £ ^ T later on as ' s n c ^ f t *Π^ΙΦΚ**Κ^»* 
Thus the second view is t o be accepted. 
Note t h a t according to t h e Naiyâyikas our body consists of 
earth only, as opposed to the popular view of the body being 
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made up of t h e five elements. For this and the different k inds 
of q-lP^cttlfti read '^ftftpSW^ft^ %3Γ«Τ: I «ftCtawR sÊRTJpmrç*! 
aràf t^ ι ϊτ ^ *n^î%rd*mî mm^ # *TH^ ξ% wrap* Ι 
*iik<àw M9iî^ ^Rig; iTî^^^^rsî sfà4tau%^: ι *ξ^ τ <πί«Ντ-
tydWl TOT^raî ftfi^fcfflrà τ&Φζ I' Mu. 
The sense-organ is jfftjj situated at the t ip of the nose. 
All other non-eternal earth except ^jffa and ^ l u i P ^ * s 
included in jEt^r. 
12. The sense-organ made up of water is t h a t situated a t 
t h e t ip of t h e tongue. 
13. The sense-organ of %3nj is that situated at the t ip of 
the black pupil in the eye. The d ^ f ^ N ^ * s fourfold—earthy, cel­
estial, gastric and m i n e r a l . — { ^ ^ ^ t WÎT: I ^ ^ Φ Ι ^ Ι ^ ^ Ι ^ φ Ι 
i f twà' ι f^fis nrô ^rit f^T: Ç? F^ ^J^^lf^: I ^ ^ 3î^ f^T^ : 
Τ*Γ: ^ « l ^ m f ^ ^ T : I ^TT^T^; ^ f i i m N I ^ ^(<fe<«*: l ' J i n . 
14. The cfei^Hlg is here described as being fourfold—the 
body, the sense-organ (i. e. t h e airy cuticle extending over t h e 
whole surface of our body), the external wind, and jrpjf or t h e 
vital breath moving inside the body. P . B. also has a similar 
division; but B. P . has a threefold division, including sfVJt in 
fè^r'sron^J 5Tf!5Igq4*dY f w ^ *TcT:,' on which Mu. remarks 
T. S. and T.D. are not quite clear on the point, although Ni l . 
takes up the threefold division, including jrpjf in fireq·. eTO"-
%fèsr : ^ ^ & 4 ^ â M W < l ^ . . . ^ < l « d : # ^ r & WTg: JTM: l' T. S. 
S^TT ^ ϊΓΤσι^ τ ï ^ r s ? < w h r : | ' Nil. 
. Note Pad. on the explanation of the word ' ^ { Κ ΐ ^ ^ τ Κ ^ ΐ β · * 
One and t h e same snsi * s called by five different names, 
ÎO. NOTES. 
owing to the difference of the particular parts of the body and 
of its functions, For this fivefold classification read:— 
^TW%FT^ï rS ï ?Γ5·ΦΤΤ?Τ: *4U<*fr II5 Am. Com, 
These five breaths are also otherwise named:— 
fêïSfo^Tg^ïetc·— I n a room which is closed and in 
which there is no wind at all, if a fan is brought and set to 
work, we feel the presence of wind; Now this wind cannot be 
said to be imported from outside, as the room is closed; so i t 
must be supposed to have been present in the room from the 
beginning, only in a motionless, still condition, but afterward 
caused to be felt by the operation of the fan. This wind of a still 
character must be classed
 ? says the*objecter, as a new variety 
altogether; for it cannot be included in the eternal Yâyu which is 
in the form of atoms and therefore always super sensuous. In the 
present case, however, it is made to be felt after the operation 
of the fan. Nor can it be regarded as the ordinary non-eternal 
wind in the form of a -product, for then why should its touch 
not be felt even before the fan was set to work ? 
The reply is tha t the wind in question is nothing but an 
aggregate of atoms which are only brought together by the opera-
tion of the fan, but which do not form a product as~ such. 
Thus what is called fefà^mg ^ included in fifsreTg- ' ^ 
ξ % I 3RRSW J[^ 5frr H cTOT I W f r f%ÎGKT3T*îh 
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Tr^f^Tft^Tm^ cffRs^resr -^TOÏTOHTI^V: ι ^rrf^raT-
3Π%^ Γ ïï&w4m f% ^ n f ^ * ^ ^ | | ' Mita. 
3T^Ç: 3^f: ïnifa% cHTHnTft I* J in . 
^ . 3fT^n?ror ether is really one, eternal and all-pervading; 
its plurality is only apparent, due to its connection with different 
limiting adjuncts like a jar, a piece of cloth and so on. Thus such 
terms as ^ | φ | ^ | ; 445|Φΐ$Γ,^1Φ1^, ào not really denote so many 
different δΠ^Τ^Γ3* ^ η θ same is true of | ^ â and zçj^ç also. See sec. 18, 
!7 . ^ t etc.—'çHbr ^ r r m ^VV ^T S%cT:5 Mita. The 
elevenfold division seems to be peculiar to this book, as popularly 
we know of ten quarters only. The first eight are the usual eight 
directions in order, beginning with the east. The last three denote 
the lower, the upper and the middle directions respectively, ^ j f t 
sn^apr^r;' Mita.; ' ^ ^ n ^ f t τ&τ π^νττπ ^% Γ Jin-
1-9. Note t h a t the Naiyâyikas regard God and individual 
soul as only two kinds of soul, in spite of the great difference 
between the two. Also their materialistic tendency is clearly 
marked by the fact tha t the soul is classed with earth, water etc. 
2 1 . The first four substances are eternal in the form of 
atoms, and non-eternal in the form of products. 
22 . After having enumerated the subdivisions of the 
nine dravyas, the author proceeds to enumerate the subdivisions 
of the twenty-four gunas. 
One kind of ^q- is f%^  or variegated. The necessity of 
admitting fa^^q- as a different kind and not a mere aggregate 
of several colours is thus explained :— 
! ^ ^ d ^ q ^ T ? ? or the possession of a manifest colour, is a 
condition necessary for the perception of an object. Now ^ q 3 
according to the Naiyâyikas, is a om^^PdM^? *· e* a quality 
which covers the whole of the object in which i t abides, as 
opposed to an srsgyrm'^trlfefA like #M\*[ which only partially 
covers its abode e. g. %%|<fe(q^H^i. ( -^ - ô i û m ^ f c w î *s defined as 
^ ^ T H T f ^ ^ n ^ ^ r W T ^ T R % ^ T f t W#:, h e- a property which 
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cannot coexist with its negation in one and the same object. ) 
Thus a variegated piece of cloth which is perceptible must be 
supposed to have a ssn^^fo^M* Now the several colours such 
as blue etc., which cover only parts of the piece, cannot be 
regarded ssn^qgfci ;^ with regard to the whole piece and cannot 
therefore make the piece perceptible. Hence we must admit 
of a new kind of ^ j 5 viz. p c H ^ , which is s^n^^f^ with regard 
to the piece of cloth, and which cannot be said to be a mere 
aggregate of the several ^qs; since a çrg^PT and its çrçj^rTfïrs 
are regarded as identical by the JSTaiyâyikas. 
I t may be said that ^iH<^|+Hctr5, or having parts possessed 
of colour, is sufficient for making an object perceptible. Thus a 
piece of cloth made up of parts which are some of them, blue, 
some yellow, and so on, may be made perceptible by virtue of 
t h e blue and other colours which are ^ i ^ i j p ^ with regard to 
the parts they cover. "* 
This is refuted by saying that such a condition as ^ ^ c ^ ^ -
- gjdfrj is unnecessarily elaborate as compared with ^ Λ Η ~ Ψ And 
besides in the case of an object whose parts themselves are 
variegated, its perceptibility will have to be accounted for by t h e 
colours of the parts of these parts. Thus a tert iary compound 
under similar circumstances will be imperceptible, because its 
parts and their colour are imperceptible. 
The sevenfold division of ^ q is not found in V. S. P. Β. , 
has only ^ ^ ϋ | Η Φ ? Γ ^ Κ ; ? and Κ". K. also does not say anything 
more. 
2 3 , ^ r or savour is also of seven kinds—sweet as in sugar, 
bi t ter ( fcT^S" ) a s i n the skin of a lemon, pungent (^g) as in 
black pepper, astringent as in the skifn of the Babbula tree 
(, «TW<5 }3 s o u r a s ^ a a 'mangOj saline as in salt, and variegated as 
in the preparation called <jxi|4£<i. 
' . This sevenfold division is peculiar to this book, as all other 
treatises admit of only six savours, omitting fe-sU^» The reason 
ior not admitting f ^ < ^ like fa^q is that the several savours 
abiding in one and the same object can be perceived distinctly, 
a n d besides the presence of one ^ like one ^q- is not a condi­
t ion necessary for t h e perceptibility of an object. 
Against this Pad, argues:—If several colours partially 
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abiding in one and the same object and therefore not opposed to 
each other, can produce one uniform f ^ ^ q , why should not 
several savours, also capable of being found together as i n ^ ç t c f i 
etc., produce one f%^^ ? Moreover if the several savours can 
be perceived distinctly, why should not the several colours also 
be perceived in the same way ? Thus admit both P^-^^q and 
f r ^ j ? , or admit neither. 
Even P. B. has the sixfold division. * ^ Ι Ι ^ Φ + ΐ Ρ τ « i l ^ t ^ -
^mi^ Sïsnrfspït ï f t?^%sfà ^ Τ π Τ ^ Π ΐ ; » ' M ^ k . The point is 
clearly and fully stated in Bh. 
2 4 . fe-sui*^·, of course, cannot be admitted, since the two 
kinds g r f i r and srcrcfsr a r e opposed to each other and hence 
incapable of abiding in one and the same object. 
2 5 . Our author does not admit of M ^ ^ ^ i ; nor is it accepted 
by Muk., T. S. and even P. B. But there are some who hold that 
f c M ^ ^ i 1 S a s necessary as pe^^i j ; for according to these, not only 
-S-^d^M^T^ but ^^H^n^^Tgj also may make an object perceptible. 
These men hold that ^rer3 though void of ^qp, is ϊΓ^Τ^τί^Γ^*,
 a s
 ^ 
has ^q^\, T. S. and others, however, deny ?Të?%jfV^t^ to ^ra,—· 
2 7 . M'faiui, or dimension, is of four kinds—minuteness as 
in atoms and binary compounds, largeness as in ordinary 
tangible things, length and shortness. This division is not 
very logical, as length and shortness may very well be included 
in largeness and minuteness. Besides STOT^ and jnp^" seem to 
denote magnitudes of two or three dimensions, while ^fsfçg· 
a n d & <^kcf only one dimension. 
28. 'q^ffs ΦΠ < 5 f c i ^ ^ s ? n f o \ ^ srerer%**Tt fà^ 
<sj«|^ >l<*t4 ^ ST^fà I ! J i n · See section 89. 
2 9 , çhrfar, o r conjunction, is of two kinds:—(1) tha t born 
of action, which is again twofold according as the aetion belongs 
t o one fasiHWN, e- 9- qfgW&M^Uf:) o r b o , t h fe*M««N,e· 9-
I ^W/ i iW ) of the things conjoined; and (2) t ha t produced from 
another conjunction, e. g. ^i^^MMiMi^ *MJ44d<MÏ4foT:. 
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3 0 . fifrWI} or disjunction,' also has the same varieties as 
^ J | l | ? with the same examples mutatis mutandis.. 
3 1 . ' ^ T ^ é Vïvk VW W^HT ^ T T ^ s ^ - ^ 5 3 7 ^ % 
«r^^ g*3& ^ **fà& uw^Briîiwwwlîrfîr Γ Jin. 
3 2 — 3 4 * See notes on sections from 139 to 163. 
3 5 — 3 8 . See notes on sections from 164: to 168. 
4 0 . The line is rather obscure, and its exact meaning is 
difficult to be guessed. Yery probably it means :—'Pain also is 
t h a t which springs from all causes of pain '; i. e. Pain is as 
manifold as its causes (i. e, infinite in its varieties), as opposed 
to the twofold character of pleasure. Pad. construes sfftj with 
•Τ»ΦΦΙ^ΜΙ*ίΤ5ΡΡΤ^Γ a n { 3 explains t h u s : — ' P a i n is also that which 
has for its abode a body t h a t is only the source of pain, v e . the 
pain in hell («Η^Φ T:*É)'· The word sjfq- 'also' implies that there 
is also the well-known variety of pain, viz. pain in ordinary 
mortal bodies which are abodes of pain as well as pleasure. Thus 
pain is also twofold. Mita, explains differently thus:—Pain is only 
worldly and not heavenly. -'g:^rcnf<T s H f e S W T f t ^ ^ F ^ ^ 3 ^ -
^ R ^ r I 3 T m i * H ^T^ * Ι Γ Φ « ^ 4 ^ ! τ I ? J in. has 5 ^ : # sr£i^<4%t|-
The Ms. D. reads c j : ^ r f q · ^ ^ r s H S T ^ i p r ê ^^Π^Ξτί^ΤΓ-
ζ Γ π ϊ Γ ^ ^ \ *ÛUS giving ^wo varieties of g;?^ also. 
4 1 . S^Tj o r desire, may be for pleasure and absence of 
pain ( ^sq ) , or for their means ( c m ? ). 
43. '&%Λ T^nçr* w^lgm^ Φ® sr fkï&fàvm f^r-
Mu. has three kinds of 5fq^ thus:—JTjfo or effort to do 
NOTES. 15 
something desirable, fa^irf or effort to avoid something which is 
an objectof aversion, and ^ΓΐτΗΦΚ^Ι °? the constant i n t e r n a l 
exertion of the body, necessary for life, which is super-sensuous. 
4 4 . This line is a l itt le obscure, j p ^ 1 , or weight, is of two 
kinds:—(1) t h a t in the form of an aggregate, e. g. the total weight 
of several things like particles of grain or masses of cotton put 
together, and(2)that belonging to one product, e.g. t h e weight of a 
stone, or a ball of iron etc. This seems to be t h e apparent way of 
interpreting the line; and Jin. adopts t h e s a m e - S i ^ j *fKWM*u4 
But this twofold division is almost meaningless. 
Pad. interprets it differently, ra ther in a forced way. The par­
ticle ^ is understood to imply a second variety, viz. S M ^ f a f a g . 
Thus ? p ^ is t h a t which belongs to a product consisting of parts 
i.e. non-eternal things, and that which belongs to things which do 
not consist of parts i. e. eternal things like atoms. The propriety 
of the word ^^n^K^M * s thus explained:—The weight of a whole 
product is only the aggregate of the weights of the different parts 
and not different from them, though generally t h e whole is re­
garded as altogether different from its parts by the Vais'eshikas. 
This twofold division seems to correspond to that followed in Mu. 
' s r f ^ ^ g ^ f c S g ^ R T f ^ ^ l frrar qwiufi ft^l' See sec. 99. 
r • ' 4 5 · See section 170. 
4 6 . %^, or viscidity, is either natural, as in water, or 
accidental, as in oil, ghee etc. Acording to the Naiyayikas, ^-^ is 
a quality peculiar to water. If it is asked how oil etc., which are 
regarded as ^ f i ^ , come to have ^ f
 5 they answer t h a t the %» of 
oil etc. is due to the presence of watery particles therein, sqrfàr 
means some accidental circumstance as opposed to nature. %^· can-
not be regarded as a natural quality of oil etc., because i t helps fire; 
whereas water, of which % ^ is a natural quality, is opposed to fire. 
If it be asked how oil etc., which is supposed to have water 
s • 
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mixed with it in order to account for its viscidity, can help fire, 
since water quenches fire, they reply by saying tha t it is owing 
to the excessive amount of viscidity, while pure water has com- . 
paratively very little v i s c i d i t y - ' ^ · ^ 3 W ^ H : %ftsfq" é$& ψί Y 
çra* ^sN'ï^îmg^T^ ι srasEirç ^ ^ ^ ^pmr i' Mu. . 
The argument seems to be anything but convincing. See 
section 101. 
4 7 . See section 102. 
4 8 . snîj or merit, is of two kinds:—1, tha t which leads to 
enjoyment and continuation of the worldly existence; and 2, that 
which leads to freedom from this worldly existence, by destroy-
ing the sins which obstruct r ight knowledge and thus producing 
right knowledge. See Pad. 
STKrâ", or demerit, is either tha t which ends by the actual 
experiencing of its fruits, or tha t which is counteracted by the 
performance of austerities and other virtuous deeds. sqitni%«T 
*nrfcr # ί * g ^ τς ^èt^mtn fè^n \ S^TT *n&tk ξίτΓ ^τ^τ: ι *ft 
qï^sft mfà: ^Tt^n^TT n^^ r^ ^TFT g^% .fsrf*: Γ Jin. 
4 9 . s&S^ o r sound, is either in the form of distinct le t ters . 
e
· 9* 3T 3> 3f etc., or of mere indistinct sound ( vacfe ) e. g. the 
sound of a tabor etc. See sec. 105, 
5 0 . The qualities τχ&% etc., twelve in number,* are ajfït^i-
φ ' ^ ί ; i. e. they are invariably non-eternal and never eternal, 
whether their abodes are eternal or non-eternal. T(**%9 even be­
longing to t h e atoms of earth, is 3Π%3Τ? because i t is always q r ^ f 
or produced by heating, and i t does not belong to any other 
kinds of atoms. The rest are sometimes eternal and sometimes 
non-eternal, according as they abide in eternal or non-eternal 
abodes; of these sjf^, &v&[ and j p ^ 1 are eternal as belonging to 
φ ^ ? and non-eternal as belonging to the sffos. I n the case of 
^FSr, it is only ^rT%f^^^cf^ which is O r e n f ^ T ^ T ; w h i l e 
• ΐ ΐ ϊ ί ί τ ί φ ^ ^ is ever Sif^^r, even when its abode is {Ξ^. 
^TSqtq·^ means 'covering only a par t of t h e abode5; e. g. in the 
* 
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case of a monkey sitting on the top of a tree, t h e ^ f q ^ ^ ^ V " ! 
is only in a part of the t r e e , while there is ^fqf^|^4J^H?¥TO 
in other parts of t h e same tree. Cf. 34441144*4 ^ Π Τ Τ ^ Π % 3 Ή Ϊ 
< sec, 172.). 
srf^ a ^ l and *4M$ are ^ g j n ^ or partial in t h e case of 
«ffes, but cover the whole of the abode ( L e. are ^ m ^ ) in the 
%, case of φίτζ. 
^ Τ ^ ^ ^ Ι ^ Φ means 'pervading t h e whole of the abode5; e. g. 
^ q covers the,whole of t h e g ^ in which it abides, ^ q and.^ΤΤΥΠ? 
cannot be found to exist together in one and the same abode. 
*«W ΐξ^§ ?ρΓ5 Ο^ΙΙφϋ 3^ TT #fc^5 ΦΠΡΓΤ^Ϊ^Τ^Π%5 ^fTT 
fèfST ^ H ^ " ^Τ^Γ^ρΠ: CT$ras4IW>T ψΐ | ' Jin. 
Cf. É ^ΐΐ^πτη^5ξτ^?^ξ(^3«τΓϊΐτ M ^ i i t r M ^ ( J T ^ T I -
52. See section 174. 
5 4 . ??ΰ??ς? needs not be regarded as a separate quality, 
because it is nothing but the negation of q ^ and.^m^çcf. That 
which is neither distant nor near is middling. Thus jy^Sf^ falls 
under the category of ST^n^. On the other hand if it be asked, 
why ; f ç q ^ should not be regarded as a quality and q ^ and 
3{ΐΚς4 as t h e negation of ^f^f^-j we reply—that would involve 
ίΤΤ^", and simple ^ssfc^f^n^" cannot give us the two altogether 
distinct ideas of m^4 and s r q ^ of which we are doubtless 
conscious as such. 5 5 . , ^ ^ , or darkness, is only the negation of §^R£, 
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according to the Faiyâyikas, The Bhâtta Mîmânsakas hold that 
xJiHQ is a substance, since we are conscious tha t darkness is blue 
and i t moves; and a substance is defined as that which has a 
quality and an action. Now ^M^ cannot be classed under any 
of the nine substances mentioned by the Naiyâyikas. I t can-
not be ether, time, space, soul or mind, since it has got colour 
whereas the last five substances are void of colour. I t cannot .,.-
be wind for this reason as well as for the absence of touch. I t 
cannot be % ^ £ , since it is void of bright colour and hot touch 
which are the characteristics of ^fSRj;. I t cannot be water, be-
cause it has no cool touch and it has a blue colour, while the 
colour of water is only white. Lastly i t cannot be ear th for 
want of scent and touch, Thus it must be regarded as a tenth 
substance. So the ninefold classification of substances is faulty. 
Against this, the Naiyâyikas argue tha t ^fcf^ cannot be a 
substance. For it cannot be said to be a colourless substance, 
since we are conscious of the blue colour; nor can it be regarded 
as a substance having colour; for it is perceived in the absence 
of light, whereas the rule is that light is necessary for the ocular 
cognition of every substance having colour. Hence 3$ft£ is 
nothing but the negation of light. As for the consciousness of 
the blue colour and motion, i t is only an illusion. 
For a full statement of the different views of darkness, see 
S. D. { 3<W<Hi^H )• The Naiyâyika view of darkness is not 
invented by the commentators; i t is as old as Kanâda—cf. 
-56· The sevenfold division of q^s fs is attacked on the 
ground that ^ff^, or the capacity of a thing to produce its effect, 
must be admitted as an eighth t ^ T ^ . Fi re burns; but if a par-
ticular jewel is placed between, it does not burn. To account for 
this, we must suppose tha t the f^f% of that fire, which first existed 
i n it , was afterwards abolished by that jewel, and that on the 
removal of that jewel it was again generated. To this the Naiyâ-
yika replies by saying that ^ r f e *s nothing but the nature of the 
thing. If it be asked how the nature of a thing can be changed 
by the juxtaposition of something else, we reply that the nature 
itself is such that the effect can be produced only when there is 
no obstacle. Thus the nature of fire is such t h a t i t burns, 
provided there is no obstacle ( Μ (τΝ«·ΜΦ )» ' ^ 3 *ξ^ ^HlfÎT 
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^ ï f m ?îf%: STOT: ^T^PT: ί% ^RT^r^TÎÇr^WTf I ^ T ^ : ^Γ¥*ϊ-
i f a ! *l1rb4$«il<0<iÎ * * ^ T ^ I τ 5H: ψΦξ φξϊ^ι %&§: I ^TJ 
Τ ^mfà&t i TOT sftf^T θΤ?Τ^Τ??Γ<ΤΤ^Τατ^ ΠΗ^Γ ψ ΐ φ β π Î I R T 
*Ï S^TOïfitèt ^5Γ ssm^reremcSTTri; ι * 3 sresreiit^R *τ*ϊ^ΐ-
sif^: ^rf^rr^t a^drn ^T Ι SÏT% tre wresrere ^r ι ^T ^Tsrnro: t 
S I T O ^ ^ ^Tè^TTO r^r ι f |^^r% m srf%: ^ T ^ fôfôf^^Hr 
^Ttm ^τ τ ^ d i ^ fier ^siTfàt$% ι ?re??r% ft;3ifôroçr *ro3r-
TO% ft*iNMraRTq; ι sra ^#*TTC ςτίΦ^π^τκτ ^N; s i t sr^gri: 
& fcWÇI 9^Π3; T^ ^Τβρ: ^^TcS^T^fTïï Γ Jin. 
57. What is the object of a combined cognition like 'sjq· 
qiUJV ( this is a man with a stick ) ? Eoth ôprgand raq cannot be 
regarded as the object, because the nature of cognition is such that 
i t cannot apprehend two objects simultaneously. 2STor can τξττξ 
alone or u^q alone be the object, since t h e cognition combines 
both. Hence some such thing like %%^-q-, an eighth q^ T%fr, must 
be admitted, which is t h e object of t h e cognition in question. Thus 
the sevenfold classification of q^t^s is faulty. To this the author 
replies by saying tha t%%^q > is nothing but the relation between 
t h e fc^qm and fa^uy, which are, in the present case, ^TJ^ and ^ q 
respectively. This is the interpretation when the text reads 
*fèt$Nuift&m<iH«•*£:*; *^n · adopts this. Many Mss., however, and 
Pad.read ' f a $ i q u u ^ ? r ^ d c ^ 5 ^ ? w n i c a means tha t %f^gqis noth-
ing but fcj^Mm, f^ RT^T and g^^Wfr, o n*y with the difference that 
in the cognition of %f^TWT"*ney a r e related ^° e a C Û other in a pecu-
liar way (Le, in the cognition {^u4fr,? ψτξis subordinate, as it is 
a
 JT^TC o r f ^ " ^ I > * ^ e S ^ * s principal, and this relation is neither 
subordinate nor principal, but appears in its bare nature); whereas 
if the cognition is of the form 6 N ^ m i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ î g t f ? T : ? 3 then all 
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the three are equally prominent, with no idea of subordination. 
This relation betweenf^$fou| and f^^fcq may be sometimes #y\*{ 
as in the instance c<%uJV? o r mHN a s ^11 % ¥ ^ : *T3:'. S'ivaditya 
later on defines tH^nfq- as s ^ o - m ^ p d , i.e. the exclusion of other 
things. Thus 4V<j>4jcM<j means the exclusion of all lotuses that 
are not blue. In the present place the author only wants to 
show that tjfei^q· cannot be an eighth q^T$. See -^a^· o n ^û*s· 
5 8 . When we say that ca jar is knownHf ,çr3: ^TçT:)? ^ û e 
•'" cognition or ^nf, which is a quality abiding in the soul, cannot 
be supposed to abide in the 3 3 . Thus the 3 3 is void of ^ j ^ as 
much after it is cognised as it was before. Then what is the 
difference between the known 3 3 and the unknown 3 2 ? Thus 
ς^ΙτΗΓ Eaust be admitted as a new q^rsj which is produced in the 
3 2 and whose presence or absence determines whether t h e 3 2 
is cognised or not. 
To this, the reply is that j^ T^RfT * s nothing but the relation 
of 3 2 with ^xq- as being its object. 
The +fi+ifcras n ° l d ^ n a * ΐξΠ^ΓΓo r M^ddl * s produced in t h e 
fèm^ or *fa as the result of its ;ξΠ*Γ. On the other hand, the 37-
fij§3ÎS hold that ^^f% is produced in the knower, as the result of 
the cognition of the object. This çrf^f% is also called SfiToS^cn^j 
or a consciousness in the form *$^ 3 2 sn^Tlft?' o r 63Ϊ!Γ W<i^N^K ? 
which follows the ^ d ^ ' i ? . 
I n the present passage, the word fa^ is omitted in many -
Mss.; and t h a t seems to be the proper reading, because later on 
t h e author defines ^TT^RS^, and not sj'HfaM^^H^ff (sec. 176). 
The whole clause itself is put after ' ^ 3 ^ 3 g^^TW^';5 ΐ η 
t h e text followed by J in . which has. ς ^ χ ^ ëg^g'fa ^ R f r î T ^ ^ î t 
59* 4tK^4| must be regarded as an eighth q^T3, because i t 
cannot fall under any of the seven. I t cannot be the first six, 
because it abides in m m « ^ and other q^r^s also (e. g. ifrm. and 
S?^3^ are possessed of ^ K ^ in as much as they are both 
eternal ), whereas none of the six padârthas ever abide in 
m m ^ . Nor can ^ κ ^ μ be Sf^n^i since it is cognised as a 
positive thing ( ^nw)· ' * 
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To this, the reply is t h a t 4 ^ 3 4 is nothing but ^qTf^ffr^ f*W 
( as opposed to ^ ifd^T^l^J ). According to Mu. i t is specified 
as '^β^% *3% ^r^^brf^^.' 
6 0 . If it be objected t h a t ôs^ra1 o r lightness is a quality hj 
itself and that; therefore the twenty-fourfold classification of 
JJOJS is faulty, we reply tha t ^œœ is nothing but jpsc^TOT^" o r 
negation of 3 p ^ . Then why not have ^r^cg· put in t h e list of 
qualities and regard *£i$& as only ^ g ^ T ^ n ^ ? This cannot be 
done; for just as the 4\^4 of a product made of two parts is 
greater than that of each, so also the e^a^ of a product should 
be greater than tha t of each-ΐ. e. the product ought to be <v>J^ 
as compared with its parts-which is not the case, however. 
I t should be noted here that there is some confusion about 
the exact meaning of TO^. If it means 'heaviness', then only 
&Qr4 or lightness is the opposite of jNy^. On t h e other hand, 
if 5 ^ ^ means 'weight' which seems to be its proper meaning 
( ^Î^MdWHWTfeEIffJT )3 then ^ψ% is only a degree of j j ^ f 
and not opposed to it, 
61- -Any other thing t h a t exists should be included in 
any of these categories already mentioned; as for instance, 
φι&Η or number is not a separate category but is included in 
jpis. The force of the particle ΐξ^· i s—liere is just an instance; 
we need nob go far to find out an instance/ 
6 2 . Eternal things can be only causes, i. e. they are never 
produced. f^^TT^T^5 tha t can be causes are only f i f ^ n ^ s 
excepting l y n ^ H u ^ ^ ; ^ o r SfC^ TPcTWT^  a * s o i s &&t ^ut ** * s 
never the cause of anything. So also q"lK^{u^^ ; o r the atomic 
size of atoms, is never the cause; for if it were supposed to 
produce the size of the product i, e. a binary compound, then 
t h e size of t h e product will be srore^r according to t h e rule 
i<T&SFTET ^ TOra^i<&4^gMR4^1>8M4>4fr' ^ u t t h a t is not the 
case. Cf. V&STi^^f irerrer i ^ICTëqg^Tgaqf Β · Ρ · A l s o s e e M u · 
thereon, srfif^ or non-eternal things, on the other hand, can 
be both a cause and an effect, e. g. a t%z IS a cause with regard 
to q ^ q " , and an effect with regard to çp^js. 
Wha t is a cfci^ ui ? I t is defined by S'ivâdîtya in sec. 179 
as c^|JSëqTÎ^^<i Φ Ι ^ Μ ^ ' — T h a t which produces t h e effect or 
product is a φ κ υ ϊ or cause. J in. has %TOT3r<ft ^ HM^ÎM î T ^ % - ' 
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But this definition is not very useful nor accurate. A bet ter 
definition is { ^ î ï ^ ^ ï § ^ i ï ^ 3 < | ï h r i i ! r ^ROi^.5 -
A ψτψΐ[ is that which invariably precedes t h e 35135-, and is 
^not an unessential and accidental circumstance or is not too 
remotely connected with it. The word i ^ i ^ f is used to 
exclude ^χή- itself which is otherwise invariably and immedi­
ately connected with itself. Only Sj>j^id ^TT^' would not do ; 
for even an ass, which brought the clay required for the jar, 
would be a ç^or. Hence [^m^ is added. The ass does precede 
the effect but is not, as a rule, connected with it. The colour 
of the threads precedes the piece of cloth and does so invariably; 
still it is not a cause of the piece of cloth because i t is not 
θΗ«-^2ΤΠ^ξΐ *· e· it is s r ^ s n f l ^ r or utilized in doing something 
else. The causal power of ^yg^q· is exhausted in producing 
q ^ q and is connected with q^ only through q ^ q . 
I n order to understand the meaning of θΗ^ΐ^τί^ΗΓι *& 
would be useful to know in how many ways a thing can be* 
« î^^ ï f e^—sr^«TTW% i s oi t h r e e kinds:-( l) ^ cffsf 3 ^ · ^ j r% 
^ # % ί % < ^ Φ ί ι + ^ S % m ^ a n f * T ^ ( ; I «· ff- 3 * 3 ^ ? or g ? g ^ is 
apprehended as invariably preceding a q ^ only as abiding in 
^y?gs and not for its own sake. Thus ^ ^ c ^ or ^ g ^ q is unessential 
and is only remotely connected with q j ? L e. through the çjSrjs. (2) 
d<j^snf^<4i i e. g. The father of a potter is apprehended as in-
variably preceding the pot, only because he is known to in* 
variably precede the potter who has made the pot in question, 
Thus the father is only remotely connected with the pot 
through the potter and therefore is 3Τ33ϊ?ΤΤίβ^ν ( 3 ) spg^C 
^im is known to precede spsj in the case of a baking jar or a 
ripening mango, ( for here the change of 3 7 ^ is accompanied by 
the change of ^;q also) along with ϊχ?£Γ£ΓΓ*ΠΤΪ^  which alone is, 
however, sufficient to produce τχ*η% in other cases. -Thus 3FWI*T-
^rq 1 is unessential with regard to ï f?^. 
I n one way, ( 3 ) is a general description of 
and (1) and (2) may be included in ( 3 ). On the other hand, some: 
Others enumerate five kinds o£ ^?^r%f^- ; <?. g. Β. P. h a s — 
É
^T 3T£ ^ H R : ^ 1 ) ^ T W ^ T ^ 3Τ S^T ( 2 ) 1 
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spar srià" <j#*n% ^T^ srci^nwi^M**; (3 ) il 
3R*I 5T% ^^fScfTiTqri^T^ *τ *rer 3ρί% ( 4 ) ι 
aa&RWTOîft *nr%finïd mm ^ t ^ r i ^ : (5 ) u •* 
The last line is explained by Mu. t h u s — c ^ g ^ r a ^ ^ l ^ ^ T -
This φ και is of three kinds:— 
( Ί ) Μ*ΗΐΠΐΦΚ^> o r intimate cause, is defined by S'ivaditya 
as ^HH^RF^T^f^TT^R^' ^ O T 3 7 Î ^ R U M ^ — ^ n a * i*1 intimate 
relation wi th which the product is produced ( t h e material or 
substantial cause ); e. g. ijfrï^T or clay is the ^ΠΤ^ΐΐ^ΐΦί^Γ of a 
g 2 3 because %çz is in intimate relation with 5jf%^|5 and çj^5 as 
long as it exists, cannot remain apart from the 3jf%^r oî which 
it is made. This intimate relation or ^y^^i-n exists between 
two things which are SRpïfèï^, as opposed to ^HJ^ TF o r °on-
j unction existing between g^ffe^r things. . S î ^ f f e ^ mean s cnot 
known as joined or separated/ (m[ i. e. inseparately connected). 
S'ivaditya defines ( sec. 197 ) s ^ % % a s έ (^^) ^rf^W?^": 
^rmnrr^^t: ^Φ*: srgcr%%: ι?—Cf. ' ^ ί ^ τ τ Ν ^ * ξ 3 > ? ? ^ ^ 
^ r q n f ^ d ^ ^ N Î d ^ d m ^ Î r ^ ^ f H ^ Î^^ld*4ri 5 Τ· Β. The pairs 
which are 3 $ ^ ί * Κ are ψ[ and gnft, % s n and ί ^ τ ^ %&&$ί 
and 3 Π ϊ ^ 5 5Π% and S3rf%, and fz&& and ft^s^. ^ 
(2) 3i^4jcuRj<feKU|? or non-intimate cause, is defined by Siva 
ditya as ' s m c n f w ^ S m S R F ^ ^ ^ 
That is a non-intimate cause whose causal capacity is ascertained 
and which is approximate to t h e intimate cause. Thus TOphfto 
which is essential and invariably precedes q ^ and which is in 
^çf3TO relation with the ^ j s ( the ^T^riq^ROT of ^ ) 3 is the 
3Η^4^ί&ΦΚ υ Ι of q£. The relation between the ST^iiHlHifol^sr 
and the <M433lf^RET inay be either direct or indirect—direct as 
in t h e instance above, and indirect when, for instance, ri^ri^'i 
is the 3Γ&7Τ3Ί{4{ΦΚυΙ °* Τ 3 ^ ϊ · H e r ^ cî?§^T is in cys^q- relation 
with ^ r j s which are themselves the ^H3l&cfcnu| of q^? itself 
t l i e
 34*41 Ri4>KUi of q s ^ q . Thus the ^^m^fri between 
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( 3 ) ί^ί^τίΦΚυΐ, or instrumental cause, is that which is a 
- cause and which is neither a ^^T^T^RST nor an SF^T^Tf^ROT, 
e. g. a rod in the case of a jar, or a loom in the case of a piece 
of cloth. 
- I t should be noted for convenience's sake that only a s ^ q 
( substance ) can be an int imate cause, and only a rjm ( quality ) 
or a ^4" ( action ) can be a non-intimate cause. 
6 4 . What is the purpose served by this Vais'eshika s'âstra % 
The correct knowledge of the seven categories enables us to 
obtain salvation. S ^ | f a ^ q A | ^ l ^ ^ u | c ^ < j | f f l ? g r i ^ S ^ ^ ^ N M f 
«τψ«π^ τ grre*3%qw1ygt s^Miilr:wra^i' (v. s. 1.1. 4). 
Correct knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is, without 
falsely superimposing anything which does not form the real 
nature of the thing. Thus to know pain to be pain and nothing 
else is correct knowledge. s^ndïTrÎ ^ q ^ = ' ^ Π % ^ χ ^ 3 * Π * Τ 
STRtTO^U^ ^r^pT : Έ3"φί 3 T R ^ Jin· A s opposed to this, 
ftj^njra o r erroneous knowledge consists in taking a thing to be 
what it is not, e. g. to regard so-called pleasure as pleasure, though 
i t is really pain or to regard the soul as non-different from t h e 
body. Of these seven categories, the right knowledge of the soul 
directly extinguishes false knowledge and leads to j^^f; whereas 
t h e knowledge of t h e rest is regarded as a cause of srf^f inasmuch 
as it is necessary for producing the right knowledge of the soul-
Here the r ight knowledge is in the form of direct 
apprehension, or stffifct, a s opposed to ^ r % or remembrance. 
This r ight knowledge is fourfold :-lst,3j^0T or understanding 
the nature of things by reading S'âstra; 2nd, discussing what 
i s read a n d applying reasoning to the same and thus arriving at 
certain conclusions; 3rd,constantly contemplating the same thing; 
and 4th, a direct perception (as opposed to verbal kno wledge)of the 
same. Cf. 4«Π^ΤΤ^Τ 3R 4£<^T; iifassïï îFcfsqt fîr%sqT%3*q-:l? S'v. 
Mere ^r^Uf is not sufficient; for though we may read and 
verbally understand that the soul is different from the body, 
still there remain doubts and«aisapprehensions. To remove these, 
reasoning ( 4j«j«j ) is necessary which would produce a conviction 
that the soul is different from the body. This again must be 
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followed by an incessant contemplation on the same ( ©fjç-
tajl^-H )> which, in the course of time, leads to direct percep-
tion ( HT^FTr^ T? ) of the soul being different from the body* 
This destroys all erroneous knowledge. 
U W J I ^ H ? o r erroneous knowledge, produces ^fas in us; e.g. a 
desire for something which we erroneously suppose to be pleasure, 
or an aversion from something which we take to be misery, 
impe l l ed by such passions, a man proceeds to do actions good or 
fcadfa^fci) which lays in store merit or demerit ( ^ j fg^ f ) .These 
produce a series of bir ths (3Γ?3τ) which again cause misery fe:^). 
This series of T S f ^ l ^ H , ^ H , M<£Î%, 5FTf and ^ ; ^ 5 incessantly 
following each other, constitutes what is called ^^ΤΤ· freedom 
from this ç?^nç is s^^r. I t is produced from tj^j$§^^rfrf thus:— 
The r ight knowledge of the q^rrsts and their distinct natures is-
necessary for the r ight knowledge of the self. This extinguishes 
fiT^m^tH. fe^t^R being destroyed, no passion can be produced. 
Freedom from passions makes activity or effort impossible. 
Cessation of activity makes merit and demerit impossible. I n the 
absence of these, there can be no b i r th and therefore no misery; 
and an absolute impossibility of misery being produced means 
salvation. c ^ :^^^Μ^^*^Ν(^«^Τ^ΤπΤ^13τ ί<ίτ ΐ<Ι4 ίν ΓΓ^ΤΠΓΤ-
^ N i ^ ^ l : Ϋ ( G. S. L 1. 2 ). The definition of fosRH or ^ g -
according to S'ivâditya should be dissolved thus :— 
^^wfa&ptx^ ( f t s ^ r e ) ^ ^ R T STO^g^sTRTSrSTTW:' 
—The negation, of all pains produced by erroneous knowledge, 
co-existing with the extinction of erroneous knowledge which 
is their cause, this extinction being produced by the r ight know-
ledge of things. Thus ^f^ according to the Vais'eshikas is only 
absence of pain and not any positive joy. As for the propriety of 
the words in the definition above, read-'s^TT^t I ^ à ^ f i i ^ T f c %&T~ 
( or ^ i f ^ 3 ^ T ^ 5 ^ : ^ f T V r T ^ T jg^pJT ^PTrecp^TOT^r 3T 
4 I Q M m 1$$R WM&fâ <Τζ*ξ Mita.) I STSrag^TOTÎÏ § Γ : & ^ -
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fi^rgiqtgUU|M^3' fà^T^R^nfà ^^TTFt f : * a i ^ f t fe<£l^fr 
<ΕΓ^>π^Πϊϊ: 3ΤθτΤϊξ£ :*â?%ST: ^ r ^ W d c i ^ ! 3%*Τ*Π*Γ ^ 
^ *nfc srerer H^TW+JWI^ Ώ^ππ^τςατΦ^ςτ: STRICT snra-' 
Mita. ) J i n . — P a d . also takes ^fxej^jl^e^T^T a s a n adjective quali­
fying °trzm. 
Mita., however, takes <gt5g?T«ÎUtri^ i as qualifying ^ΐ^ΓΤ^Π^"· 
According to it, ^ ^ T ^ t ê ? i ^ ^ ^ ^ T T : ^ i v r î ^ · : alone describes tne 
na ture of ς^φ; while the rest explains the cause and t h e way 
of obtaining t h a t ?$%$. 
W h a t k ind of s n y ^ is this s^y^r^n^" which constitutes 
OÎtsa"? I* cannot be Sfr-qi^iyrre, because ^^F^rfaSTSTÏ^ ( i n t n « 
form δίκΞϊΤ g:*sï ττ * ^ ί % ) is possible even in the state of ^ H [ . 
I t cannot be ^T^^divri?, for we actually see the soul passing 
through numerous pains and thus an absolute negation of pain 
is impossible. I t cannot be îp^hftîVïT^"; because the past pains 
have been already destroyed even without ^^$ΓΤΐΓ, the present 
pains will also be destroyed in the same way as t h e past, and 
t h e destruction of future pains cannot be conceived of, as they 
are at present non-existent. Thus 3^^" must consist in τ : ^ -
ΣΠΤΗΤΤ ,^ *he o n ^y kind remaining. If it be objected t h a t ΣΤΗΤ^ Π "^ 
is without beginning and therefore not produced, whereas zftig 
i s a M ^ T 4 " a u i ^ therefore something to be acquired by certain 
means, we reply that , though <r:?33TRnTT3' exists without 
beginning, still some exertion is necessary for maintaining i t as 
i t is; for otherwise in the absence of ^ ^ ) ^ } ?HsiMHl»TK wi l t 
be extinguished and g ; ^ will come in. I n this sense J^hgy 
though of the nature of STRTSTT^  * s a ^ M I ^ . 
So also it cannot be said that ξ^^ΓΣ^ΓΠΤϊϊΤ^Τ * s impossible 
owing to some pains having been already produced for every soul, 
for jft$sf refers to the non-production of pains in future. If i t be 
said that every j r^vrrq ends by producing its counter-entity and 
^ h a t thus g-^MHHIR which constitutes jftgj also involves the 
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production of pain, we reply that ^ ^ must be excluded from the 
rule stated above, since the rule is opposed to the scriptural passage 
dealing with îît^r, which says that a soul, once in possession of 
ij^f3 never again returns to this ^ Π Τ · 
Another view in point (e. g. T.D. p. 202) is that T J ^ consists 
î*1 ^i^liUlfè^^ÇT^NT? *· e' * n e destruction of the final pains, 
body etc. That body etc. is final, during whose existence r igh t 
knowledge is produced. 
I t needs no mention that , according to the Vais'eshikas, g ^ 
alone is the direct means of j r j -^and not 3 ^ whether by itself or 
combined with ^m. The utility of ^çf lies only in faci l i ta t ing^7^. 
T : ^ , freedom from which constitutes ^^f, is of 21 kinds—the 
body, the six sense-organs, the six objects of sense and the six 
corresponding cognitions, pleasure and pain. The first is called 
Ç;^· because i t is the abode in which the soul experiences Sf:^ *, 
the next eighteen because they are the causes of cf:^, and plea-
sure because i t is intermixed with g : ^ . 
65 . So far, the padârthas, their divisions and sub-divisions 
have been enumerated. îsTow the author proceeds to give 
definitions of the several things enumerated, in the same order; 
for without definitions, the several things cannot be accurately 
distinguished from each otherT and hence the r ight knowledge 
of them cannot be produced which alone leads to salvation. 
What is a ^%$u\ or definition1? S'ivâditya defines it as 
% ^ ^ f è > # Ig fè t f t : , ' For t h e meaning of % ^ ^ ί ^ Β % 3 
see section 151. How a ^%$u\ is ^ ^ ^ K K N S ^ , is shown in 
t h e form of a syllogism below. "We will take another i n s t a n c e — 
Sfêlcft i s defined as ΐρ^τ^χ. Now ΪΤ?^^Τ^ is a % ^ f ^ ^ % % 3 · 
The purpose of a definition is either «qtefa' i. e. distinguishing 
the thing to be "defined from all others, or 5^5%|^ i.e. calling t h e 
thing by a particular name for practical purposes. The syllogism 
may be put t h u s : — ι φ ^ ^ R > ^ r f v r ^ I *Τ?^^ΓΤ3; I ^ f S ^ f t 
*t fSra^ 33; 3TO33Î ^  ^ T ^ ^rr 3ΤΓΤ: ! surêt n^^rfr * *nr% 
f fèr * ι OTng; siifcft ^njvt τ τ π ^ ξ% *n sfà § ft^& 
^ - 1 — H e r e no similar instance can be found to illustrate the 
θ^^<*^ΐΪΗ; i. e. anything having τττ% and ^ f ^ i t ^ , outside 
g ^ j ^ · , cannot be found. Only a dissimilar instance, from which 
both q^g- and ξ ^ ί ^ are absent, can be found. Hence ^ ^ τ 5 
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I n brief the j^groT m Î l s t ke found in all the things defined 
without exception; i t must be found in no other things than 
the 3J2FT· 
A more intelligible and useful definition of çrepjf is CMW 
3TOKM]q4:?~a peculiar property; and the peculiarity consists 
in the property being free from the three faults of 3JO?JT% 
3ΠΓΓ33Π% and ST^T^. ST^TTÎH means ^ % ^ ^ F ^ f ^ j f. e. n o t 
being present in ,a part of the things to be defined; e. g. t h e 
definition 'a cow is a tawny animal' is 3 j ^ | u because tawny 
colour is not found in some of the cows. sncT^3T% means 
3Γ3Ε%^ΗΓΤΜ i. e. being present in things other than the things 
to be defined, e. g. 'A cow is an animal having horns. ? H o r n s 
are, no doubt, found in all cows, but they are also found in 
other animals. srçpT^ means ^ ^ M i c j ^ ^ i. e. being present 
in none of the things to be defined, e. g. £A cow is an animal 
having only one hoof.5 No cow possesses this characteristic. 
I n other words the ^qpi must be ^SffiÇTsrfijqd, i. e. t h e 
connotation of the ^ ^ u r and ^ψξ must be exactly coincident. 
3ί^ϊί%Ήτ4 is a correct definition of iff. 
Thus it will be clear t h a t the idea of a definition, according 
to the Naiyâyikas, is ra ther narrow. I t is not an exhaustive 
enumeration of all the essential characteristics of a thing, but 
only a differentia which separates the thing defined from all 
other things. Thus the purpose of a definition is more negative 
than positive. I t only excludes the defirdtum from others but 
gives us" no accurate notion of the definitum itself. I n illustra-
tion of these remarks the student should see such definitions as 
* 3€qc35nicfetfr 3 ^ t ' e t c · 
66 . The definition of τ&[[$ has been already given as 
Vf^TÎdÎsN^î: tr^nrV' ^n section 2 on which see the note. 
Pad., however, objects to this interpretation of the line in 
question, on the ground tha t 5rfitîçlfqlM <^:<=l c a n n o ^ be a <£^pjf i Q 
t he sense of %^^»^fd*<E&^? since there is nothing in this 
world which is not q^rsf a n c* s o ^rf^R^^TTfÇÎ a n ( * a dissimilar 
instance are impossible. Therefore the line means that a 
definition of tj^x^· has been given elsewhere by learned men, so 
tha t we may as well proceed to define the several q^raf3 *n 
particular; and so no charge of proceeding to particular defini-
tions without giving a general one should be brought forth. 
Mita, admits-that srfiff^f^M-M^ cannot be a definition in the 
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strict sense of the word according to S'ivâditya; still ne proposes 
that it may be regarded as a definition in a metaphorical sense, 
in as much asu&Hfe*=Hi<^ resembles a definition proper in being: 
applicable to all the things defined without exception. 
67 . The author here gives three different definitions of 5|«ar. 
(1) A substance is that which has the common characteristic 
jj^çcl ( in intimate relation or inseparably connected with 
itself ). That which enables us to have a uniform cognition 
wi th regard to all substances, in the form cthis is a substance,' 
and which distinguishes a substance from a non-substance, i s 
the 4^^^sriîfe·. W h y not say only ^ ^ c ^ f î t ? The ^ o r d 
ίΠΤΠ^^ Τ *
s
 used either to reject t h e Bauddha doctrine t h a t there 
is nothing like ^fT%and t h a t ΐχ)* means not j f t ^ but Jl^d^^U^Fd? 
or to bring out clearly the fact that ^44 4 m relation exists between 
jTsq· and jfeZfc?- 3"33T *^ïfcfÏT by itself would mean having a 
connection with ^ © 3 ^ and ^ s ^ o ^ g g f o r may be supposed to 
abide in ^ ^ ^ also. So the definition is to be interpreted thus:—•; 
S W T ^ r ô f ^ r : ^*îT: ç m ^ R : I H ^ * m % 3 ^ ! ζ ^ Π # SS%é *fà&Î 
All such definitions including 5Π% are to be explained 
similarly. 
The first definition being ra ther verbal, the author gives 
two others. 
( 2 ) A substance is that which has qualities (in intimate re­
lation w i t h itself). A quality or Tjm can abide only in substances 
and nowhere else. I t may be objected t h a t this definition is open to 
the fault of si*?n%5 since qualities do not abide in substances as 
soon as they come into existence, but are produced in t h e next 
moment. This must be admitted, because simultaneous produc­
tion of jjsîf and jjm would make the difference between them 
impossible. Thus the definition would not apply to substances 
in the first moment after their existence. This objection may, 
however, be removed by taking JTOÎ^T^ to mean jjUUc^^dl^TiRT?-
f£i<N<Jk4 or Tjnu^iMM\*M^. Though jrnjjs may not reside in a 5**sj 
for a moment, still there is no absolute negation; for they would 
abide there in the second moment. Thus the substance, even 
in the first moment, is capable of having qualities in the next 
moment. T. D. ( p. 20 ) interprets jp r^^f as '^um+UHlfitoim— 
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( 3 ) A substance is that which is an intimate cause. No* 
t h i n g else can be an int imate cause. I t is only substances, in 
int imate relation with which all products ( excepting, of course, 
3HTT31 ); a r e produced. 
A fourth definition also may be proposed, viz. 'Rb-MM^ 
4«^4i. '—For actions abide by intimate relation in substances 
only and nowhere else. Cf. 'fitflUJi"N< *HWlRw>K"lfaft 
3[*ΦδφΙ*( ( γ · s · Ι · 1· 15 )· 
6 8 . A ?pf is that ( a ) which is possessed of a 3Π%5 ( k ) 
'which is not of t h e nature of motion, and ( c ) which is incapable 
of being an intimate cause. ( a ) excludes ^ J H T , fèteR? ^TR^TT 
and sp^r^, because according to the Xaiyâyikas s n U T c a a abide 
only in 3 ^ , 3pr and ^ J . ( b ) excludes ^ * . *pr and ^ ή - are 
similar to each other in as much as they are both properties be­
longing to a substance; but they differ in t h a t the former is of- a 
permanent character, while the latter is evanescent, (c) excludes 
jf^. T. D. ( p. 21 ) defines jTOf in the same way, i. e. * 4 ^ Φ 4 -
pï^t *τ% HWT^TWH;.' Cf. ç^qrT^«^yui4ï^^rnf^Hj^*KiJi-
*prèaj f^rT ψϊ3>φ*ιτ( ( ν . s. 1.1.16 ). 
69. ^ f > o r action, is the non-intimate cause of t h e first 
conjuction and disjunction. I t should be remembered that 
a conjunction is of two kinds—that caused by action e. g. the 
conjunction of a book and a hand, caused by an action in the 
hand; and that caused by another conjunction e.g. the conjunction 
of the book and the body, caused by the conjunction of the book 
and t h e hand. Thus even a conjunction can be the non-intimate-
cause of a conjunction; hence the word STTSJ" is inserted in the 
definition. A first conjunction is caused only by an action. 
7 0 . ^im«-4j, or generality, is that which is in intimate 
relation with many, which is one and eternal. 
The word f ^ exclude! &ftrj, fipTTT, %^Γ? ψΖΦ&, ^xk^f 
etc. which are ^ ^ and ^Τ^^ΠΤ^τΓ* The ^οτ& 3ΠΤ^ is used to 
exclude gWHmfimgT which js fif^r? q ^ a n d ( rRTC )*ϊπ%?Γ. T k e 
-word c - i ^ a is used to exclude s ^ s ^ u m ^ which is q ^ 5 fîf^ and 
3**N>^fo. T&e w o r ( * ^ is used to exclude f ^ f^ s which are 
|ΪΓ^|· and 3TW'^+Md (each fe^iq in intimate relation with the 
corresponding f q ^ o ^ ) . Beally speaking t h e word xg$ is un­
necessary, because ^ Η Φ ^ + A d itself conveys the idea of 'one, in­
timately connected with many.' O n e f ^ f ^ i s intimately connected 
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with one fif^o^ only. Thus the word TÇ$ may be supposed 
to be used only to make clear what is already suggested by 
3Ϊ^£ΗΤΪ%ΓΓ. Thus Mu. ( p . 5 ) defines ^ T R T ^ a s ' f ^ R % ST% 
« à ^ n t à a s e n j . ' Though T. S. ( p. 170 ) defines it as ' f o ^ t M f S -
^j^TcOT, 'st i l l no a t tempt is made in T. D. to explain the 
propriety of the word ΐξ^^τ; and M l . remarks thereon, \<fei}4 
^ Φ £ « Ι ϊ Π ε & ΐ Η ^ S ^ ' — ( ^ 3 *ΪΝ5*ίΐ><Η$: I Bh. ) 
^ * U ^ d f à < ^ * H f^trmoiT^OTT ^ΤΤζΠΐΤφΚ*Κ ( of some only ) 
£«Mc4l$«li $KWi I ^ % SFSt fè^T srf^  3Ϊ3Γ$*Π7%3Τ: ^ f t fa 
Çï^ tlT^ îST^ af%v^ FÎ%î^ T^ TT^ î" ^φίΪΪΜ I (really this is inconsistent with 
t h e statement above ) I i f t ^ 4 ^ W t e W " l 5 e tHtàWTO^sft *T-
^ l ^ T h Î î i < U l ^ : I5 J in . 
I t should be noted that no definition containing ^lld ' *s 
given in connection wi th the last four q^r^s, because 5frf?f does 
not abide in them at all. I t is only ξ " ^ , «pr and ^ ή that can 
have Njj(fc{? according to t h e Naiyâyikas. 
7 1 . f^fhTj o r particularity, is that which is in intimate 
relation wi th one individual thing only and which cannot be 
possessed of Γ^ΤΤΠ^Τ. 
4M441«-^ KQ»d * s used to exclude %*%, ÎJOT and q^fe for some 
vms, l ike ^q- for instance, and ^ j | are υ^φό^ Rh^{%. 
^cb^irb^pd: means u^M fa^M^^^d:—^hich excludes 
^TWT^, iAM^iM and s ^ g - which are <εΠΓΓΤϊ*Τ*%Τ. ^TWt^ is 
•3&E*ai faw^d; *N44N is not 3 + ^ a t a 1 1 a n d besides i t is 
.^wNwrflfaftrt; 3ΠΤΓΞΓ is not mAld'» though it is ^ c ^ R h ^ P d . 
f ^ j ^ is also defined as ^ ^ ^ Ô ^ H P ^ ^ H ^ which clearly 
expresses its nature. 
7 2 . T?he word 3 3 ^ ^ , in the definition of çHT^Ts excludes 
all things, excepting ^sffcr ^ h i c h is also excluded by the 
word firer. ^<Η<3^ is one, and is an object of direct perception, 
according to some. Others, however, hold that i t is only an 
object'of eijpTïT or inference. C^U| E M i f ^ f e ^ f 1^: fetïW-
X«fg4jA ΦήτΤΤίξ^Τ^ΐ^ SW3T*T%f^: l' Mu. ( P. 7. ) 
7 3 . sj^T^y ov negation, is that whose conception necessarily 
depends upon the conception of its counter-entity. Thus a^4|<tjl4 
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cannot be conceived, unless first the re is a conception of ET£. Here 
the word a fa^ tpf is to be understood in the particular sense 
c
 the opposite of sror^- ' ; for otherwise the definition would be 
applicable to ^ ^ | ^ and ^ 4 ^ 1 , ^hose conception also depends 
upon the conception of t h e ^ f c ^ s , of which one is called MÎd4lRi 
and the other is called SM^Rl - The general sense of the word 
^ fa^ lRl . i 5 Ρί^ΜΦ or that which enables us to have an idea about 
something else which cannot be conceived of, independently of i|S 
74. So far the seven main categories have been defined. 
Now the author proceeds to define their subdivisions in the 
same order in which they were enumerated. 
^f^T^ is that which has odour in intimate connection with 
itself. The connection must be taken to be ^ ^ ^ ' , because 
otherwise all things are in connection with φ | ^ by ΦΐΠ»Φ^ϊ^Γ 
Ο Γ
 θ Γ Ν Κ Ι ^ ^ Ν * · ^ . îT^T abides in nothing but ^rfè^t, and in 
%f$|cfl everywhere. Thus j|r^m^cj is a correct definition. 
I t may be objected tha t a piece of stone has no odour and 
still it is ^ f s ^ . The reply is that the odour is there but is im-
perceptible only. For if tha t stone is reduced to ashes, then the 
odour is felt. Now if there had been no odour in the stone, how 
could it be possible in the ashes ? The objection tha t a jar, imme-
diately after production,is void of qualities altogether and there-
fore void of odour also and tha t thus the definition cannot apply 
to the case in question, is answered by interpreting Ï I ^ T ^ R ^ as 
Water also is sometimes seen to be possessed of odour; 
and thus the definition is ST^ô^nçf. ^°> * û e "Vais'eshika replies. 
The odour there does not naturally belong to water, but to the 
earth which is intermixed with the water. 
75 . ^ f o W ^ , o r cold touch, is a quality peculiar to water, 
found nowhere else, according to the Naijâyika. If a slab of 
stone has a cool touch, i t is due to nothing but the particles of 
water in contact with it . The hot touch of hot water is not 
na tura l but simply due to the admixture of heat or Η ^ [ , to 
which hot touch naturally belongs. 
7 6 . H o t touch is a quality peculiar to g^^[ and found 
nowhere else. H o t water has got hot touch; but there, too, i t 
i s d u e t o ^ ^ r . 
NOTES. 3 3 
Gold is regarded by the Naiyâyikas as belonging to the 
class ifjï^;, though popularly it is taken to be ^ f q ^ . The 
argument to prove the cM4-k^ °^ W\$t *s stated thus :— 
We see that the fluidity of ghee which is ς τ τ ^ is completely 
destroyed by the application of heat, provided there is no counter­
acting agent like water, placed in the midst of which, ghee 
cannot be deprived of its fluidity. Thus a rule is laid down t h a t 
the destruction of the fluidity of earthy substances necessarily 
follows from the application of intense heat, there being nothing 
to counteract. I n the case of gold, however, we see that i t s 
fluidity ( which can be caused only by h e a ^ a n d which is not 
natural ) is not destroyed even by the application of intense heat, 
though we do not see any counteracting agent there. Thus gold 
cannot be earthy. The argument may be formally put thus:—» 
Wç^rraT^FÎT^ I W ^ 3%W^ I 3ΡΤΓ IcH^ I etc. 
If on the other hand, gold be regarded as earthy, then there 
must be some liquid counteracting agent to prevent the destruc­
tion of its fluidity even on the application of intense heat. I t can­
not, of course, be f^sr^ Tf; for in that case its fluidity also would 
have been destroyed. Nor can it be water; for the fluidity in t h e 
present case is o n l y ^ i ^ p ^ or caused by some external circum­
stance, whereas t h e fluidity of water is natural. Nor can it be 
^T^, sn^sT^T, ^ T ^ , f ^ , ^ i ^ ^ a n d c p ^ ; for all these are without 
^q-j while we actually see ^q- here. Therefore it must be ^fSf^, 
t h e only substance that remains. 
If it be said ' that hot touch and brightly white colour 
peculiar to ^ ^ are absent from gold, we reply that they are 
there, but are prevented from being perceptible by the touch 
and colour of earth which is bound up with it. 
I t is clear t h a t the above argument is not very sound and 
that the bright glittering and the difficulty of reducing it to a 
gaseous state even with the application of intense heat, induced 
the Naiyâyikas to regard gold as ^3T^[, as opposed to ^fsf^*. 
7 7 . ^τ^Γ is t h a t which has no colour, but has touch. 3f^ifçcf 
is found in s n ^ r , ^ r ^ , f^Ç, 3TTcïT^ail(l Ζξ*&$ but they are also 
without touch, ^q^f^r^ is found in ^ fl^V, s r ^ a n d grsRO but they 
are possessed of colour. Thus 3 i^%5 and ^ 4 ^ " ^ are combined 
in 3 T O alone. • * 
34! NOTES. 
There are two views about the cognition of mzr. Some hold 
( e. g. the authors of T. S. and Mu. ) that ^ n j is not the object of 
Sj^ q-^ f or direct perception, but can be known only by inference. 
„ They say that the sensuous perception of a substance is possible 
only when the substance is possessed of a manifest colour. A 
manifest touch alone would not do. ^JTT has a manifest touch 
but no manifest colour. Others, however, hold that either a 
manifest colour or a manifest touch is sufficient to make a sub-
stance perceptible. Thus m?r is perceptible, because it has a 
manifest touch. 
The difference between these two views lies in the fact that 
the former understands j jHiy^M ° F perception in a narrower 
sense i. e, only ocular perception for which manifest colour is 
no doubt, necessary, while the latter takes it in the general 
sense of sensuous perception. 
The argument for inferring the existence of ^fsr is thus 
stated;—> 
The peculiar touch, which is neither hot nor cold and which 
we feel when the wind blows, must abide in some substance; 
since it is a quality and every quality must abide in a substance. 
This abode cannot be^ ^ f l r ^ because as a rule every ear thy 
substance having a manifest touch must have a manifest colour, 
but in the present case there is only a manifest touch but no 
manifest colour. Nor can the abode be 3^5 or ^ 3 ^ , since their 
touch is cool and hot respectively, while the touch in question is 
neither hot nor cool ( ST^STî^ffa ) · ^ cannot be ^ΙΦΙ^Ι, ^ T ^ , 
fèîr o r aik+41; for their touch would be all pervading, since they 
are themselves all pervading. Lastly it cannot be + H ^ ? because 
ÏT^RÎ being atomic, its touch cannot be an object of sensuous 
perception. Thus .a n in th substance must be admitted as t h e 
abode of this touch in question, and that is 372Γ. 
7 8 . 3Π"3Π Γ^5
 o r
 ether, is that substance which has the quality 
of sound in intimate relation with itself. If it be asked why t h e 
definition is not stated in the usual form as ' ^«^44, 31ιΦ(^4^* 
similar to 'τπ^Γ^Τ ^fèrâr' etc*> t î a e r e P 1 7 i s t l i a t t i i e w o r c l 3°T i s 
specially put in, to show that ^f^ *s a Jpf a n c^ n o ^ a ?^T as-
the Bhâtta mîmânsakas hold ( Mita. ), 
* Here the word Tgs\ is used in the sense of fagtM<ju| and ςςζς 
is t h e only fi^jjof belonging to ^χ^[^ and to ^n^RT alone 
NOTES. 35 
{ Nil. p. 41. ). If the word ?ρτ were not used, then ^js^ may be 
supposed to be a substance. If i t is all-pervading, then no 
relation can exist between it and SH^T^T which is also all-per-
raiàmg. If not all-pervading, even then no <H+HI^ can exist, 
since a substance can be in intimate relation with another only 
if the latter is the parts of which the former is made. I n order 
to remove such objections, the word JTOJ is used ( Pad. ). 
The inference for proving the existence of sn^r^T a s a 
separate substance is briefly stated thus:—^rs^ must abide in 
some substance, as it is a quality. That substance cannot be 
^fsriVj ST^} %ST^ or ^T2T, which are all tangible; for their qualities 
which are perceptible are always produced by similar qualities 
of their parts and are never perceived by the ear while ^fs^ 
is not such ( 3r5aRgT^ui*4^4> ) a n ^ *s a ^ s o perceived by the ear. -
Nor can ^rs^r be a quality of f^, zgi& or ï ^ ^ , since it is a 
fa?r,M^iuJ a n <^ perceptible; nor -of 3ΠςϊΤΤ?
 s
^
nGe
 it is perceptible by 
external senses. Thus a n i n t h substance «π^τ^Γ must be admitted 
as the abode in which ^rs? abides by int imate relation. C f . s ^ © ^ : 
3(imMW\$FWt feiw, *' -^ - B * P* 5 8 * S e e a l s o ^ I u * o n B * P*> v e r s e 
44, and V. S. I I . 1. 25, 26, 27 and Yiv. and U p . on t h e same. 
34ΙΦΙ5Τ is one, eternal and all-pervading. 
7 9 . Time is that substance which is an abode of t h e non-, 
intimate cause of priority or posteriority produced by the motion . 
of the sun, and which is not at the same t ime an abode of the 
priority or posteriority itself. The notions or expressions such as 
past, present, future or elder, younger etc., are due to the connec­
tion of the things with one permanent, all-pervading entity called 
^ i m e ( φ ^ φ υ ^ ί Γ ί τ Ο . This connection is, therefore, the. non-inti­
mate cause of priority or posteriority in question; and it abides in 
t h e thing as well as time. Thus q " ^ (ij'^ cf W ^ ^Tf^RQTT^lift" 
belongs to the thing also, to exclude which the following expres­
sion is inserted in the definition. The thing is also the abode of 
the priority and posteriority, whereas time is not. Though time 
is really one and eternal, still different times are spoken of, owing 
to the limiting adjunct of the motion of the sun, just as one and 
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the same sn^RT *s styled by different names owing to the 
adjuncts of çfs, TJZ e t c * ^ o r * n e propriety of the several words 
in the definition, see Pad. 
T. S. (p. 42) h a s a j d i d i H M c K k l g : ^ T ^ J : which comes to the 
same thing as above, when ^ j is understood to mean ^TPÎROr-
Cf. '3TORT SR^: 3ΡΤ3*: S T ^ W ? * ^ îTçf: I 
T T T E R ^ ^ t l : ST*IT%: ^HgqrfsRT: II' B. P . (verse 45,) 
The definition of f ^ç is to be understood in the same way. 
Notice tha t in the case of 3ΓΓ^ Τ3Τ, 3ϊί3? and f^rç no definitions 
containing snfa like Sflc^, M 1^3 etc.,h ave been given; because no 
vsflfif is possible in them, since they are each only one, whereas 
the conception of 3ΓΤ% necessarily presupposes plurality. 
8 1 ; STT^ TT5
 o r
 soul, is that substance which has the quality 
of intelligence in int imate relation with itself. I t is inferrible 
t h u s : — 
The existence of organs of sense and their appropriate 
objects implies a distant knower who can use them, { ^ < i u ^ m r e : 
t h a t agent is the soul. 
<|f|}r or «Γχξ£Τ î s a quality which can be perceived only by 
t h e mind. And a quality must abide in some substance. Now 
w^$i cannot abide in any of the 8 substances excepting snWH 
for the qualities belonging to them are not such as are only 
mentally perceptible. Therefore a ninth substance must be 
admit ted as the abode of ^ ^ r , gf^ gr etc. That is s j f^r . For 
a fuller statement of this inference, see T. B. (pp. 98, 99.) 
If i t be said tha t the body itself is ^n^T 5 since i t is the 
body that is the object of such consciousness as c I am fat, I am 
fair ' etc., we reply that the body cannot be su^TT? ^ o r though the 
body is deprived of one of its parts, the soul is not felt to be so ; 
and moreover we are conscious of one and the same self, t hough t ^ 
t he^ody undergoes a change as we pass from childhood to youth 
ana from thence to old age. For the same reasons also the 
sense-organ cannot be regarded as sn^rf. For then there would 
be as many souls as the sense-organs, and thus such a conscious-
ness as ' I touch the object now, and it was the same myself 
t h a t saw it before ' would be impossible; for how can one re-
member what another experienced 3 
NOXES^ . * St; 
"• The soul again is of two lands—the Highest soul or q<4iu444> 
and the individual soul or ^ f i^m* God is one and eternal and. 
afl-gervadifig, and is defined as being the abode of eternaL 
knowledge and so omniscient, as opposed to the individual souls 
which are infinite and whose knowledge is comparatively 
trifling, though the latter also are all eternal and all-pervading» 
- The existence of God can be proved by such an inference 
as the following— 
All products are produced by some intelligent agent. 
The world is a product. 
-,\ I t must have an intelligent agent. And that is God 
with extraordinary knowledge. I t should be noted here that 
there is no distinct mention of God in V, S. or in P. B, 
The individual soul is the knowing agent, possessed of 
fourteen qualities, that sees through the mind or τρκξ. The. 
process of at cognition according to the Vais'eshikas is explained 
thus:—the soul is first conjoined with the mind, the mind with 
the sense-organ, and the sense-organ with the object. Thus the 
objection that an individual soul, since it is all-pervading, 
would possess the cognitions of ail individual souls simultane­
ously, is answered hy the fact that a conjunction of the soul 
and the mind is necessary for every cognition, and that the 
mind is atomic in size and different for every souL 
The soul cannot be atomic in size, for then it would be 
incapable of feeling pleasure or pain affecting the several parts 
of the body simultaneously. Nor can it be of a middle size; for 
then it must be either of the same size as the body, or otherwise. * 
I n the former ease, the soul would change, as the body changes 
from childhood to youth or from one birth to another. Thus, 
there would be different souls for different births and it may 
happen that the seed sown by one will have to be reaped by 
another. In the latter case the soul would be either too small 
v
 or too large to be accomodated in the body. Thus the only 
• '"'ι'-^possible alternative is that the soul is all-pervading, 
82. 4H4JU o r m*n^> I s ^kat ^kich is void of touch and at the 
same time
x
 an abode of activity. The word ^^f$l-*f excludes all 
tangible things like a jar etc., while EMufe^im excludes all 
other intangible things like $Π5>Τ3Γ e t c · Though this definition is 
correct, it does not give us any-aotion about the nature of the 
4 . * . ' '• " - - . - • _ • - : • . * 
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mind. The definition * &^Î&Mtet^=Hdl^«t&Pj{^g ' is better 
from that point of view. The mind is a sense-organ which is the 
efficient cause ( Φΐ|ϋΐ ) of the perception of pleasure, pain and 
other qualities intimately related to the soul. Thus, according 
to the Naiyâyikas, the mind is as much a sense-organ as the eye 
and other s ; only that it is internal, while the eye etc. are external. 
The mind has a double function to perform—1st, to produce the 
perception of pleasure3 pain etc., which is not attainable by the 
external sense-organs; and 2ndly, to aid the external sense-organs 
in producing their corresponding perceptions. For no sense-organ 
«an produce any perception, unless it is first in conjunction with 
the mind. I t is thus that the necessity of admitting mind as a 
separate entity is proved-'smîf fojm§£ fa3$ 3jH<g ¥TT^rtS*n^ï 
4l«HJft felj^j* ( Y. S. I I I . 2.1 ). I t happens that the object is 
Ibefore us; still it is not cognised. The reason is that the mind, 
which is atomic, is engaged elsewhere and thus is not in conjunc-
tion with the sense-organ in question. Or if the mind is not 
admitted, then the soul which is all-pervading,may be in conjunc-
tioM*with all the sense-organs simultaneously ,~and thus different 
cognitions would be produced simultaneously, which is against 
our experience. ^ m ^ M I ^ M Î r i Î M ^ fosHt' ( G. S. I. L 16 ). 
Every individual soul has got its own mind. Thus minds 
are infinite in number like the souls. ( Bee section 20. ) They 
are eternal and atomic in magnitude. The Mîmânsakas hold that 
anind is all-pervading. The Naiyâyikas, however, refute them 
thus:—if the mind is all-pervading, then* no conjunction can 
take place between soul and mind, both being all-pervading. 
If, however, the conjunction is admited, then it would never 
«ease and no sleep would be induced. According to the Naiyâ-
yikas, the mind enters a particular vein called the gffcj^, and 
then its conjunction with the soul ceases and sleep is produced. 
If the mind is all-pervading, then even if it enters the gffcj^, 
still outside that, it would be in conjunction with the soul. No 
£uch difficulty remains,ho wever,if the mind is regarded as atomic. 
Or the mind, if all-pervading, would be simultaneously in 
conjunction with all the sense-organs and thus a plurality of 
cognitions would be produced simultaneously; and besides it 
would make the cessation of cognitions impossible, 
83. After having defined the nine substances, the author 
now proceeds to define qualities in order· 
XOTES« ssr 
^q· is that quality which can be perceived only by the eye. 
The word ^ n ^ *s inserted to exclude such qualities as çr^r r etc., 
.
 f which can be perceived by the eye as well as by another sense-
organ e. g. tha t of touch. The word goj is inserted to exclude 
q^eSf which is also ^ ^ Π ^ ΐ Τ Π Τ , but which is a srrflr. The rule is 
that t h e >sufa and STOTC oî a thing are perceived by the same 
sense as the th ing itself. -^feliiWiU^I means fnot being perceived 
by any other sense t han the eye.' Thus the colour of atoms,-
though it cannot be perceived even by the eye, is still included 
in the definition, as i t is not perceived by any other sense-organ 
also. îretfirfèrcrifrrjo r * û e conjunction of a wall and light, which 
is a quality and which can be perceived only by the eye, may be 
excluded by taking the definition to mean S^4jVsliU41?ltRw*% 
*pi; ' ; for w f N M is not ^-«ÎaSilCl·-
^ q can abide only in ^pflgftv 5pgg and ^ ^ all the sevea 
kinds being possible in £&4U *>ut 0 Ι % ^ h i t e in ^ ^ r and i^ SRÇ—' 
the white of ^ f ^ being brill iant and tha t of ^ j not so. 
8 4 , 85-& 8 6 . The word κχ% is unnecessary in t h e défini* 
tions of %# and ϊΤ^Γ3 because no other qualities t h a n these a r e 
perceived by t h e respective sense-organs. On the other hand, it is-
necessary in the definition of ^ q ^ to exclude &*$M\ β ^ . · 3 ^ h i c h a re 
«f*i«UU«, b u t n o t Φΐά«Μΐ4ϋΜΓ< 
8 7 . ^^TT5or number,is the special cause of counting,or accor­
ding to T. S. ( p. 54 ), of the use of such words as one, two, many 
etc. N o better definition of^f^rf can be given,since really speaking: 
i t is no independent a t t r ibute possessed by t h e thing, but is only^ 
notional or subjective. Hence Mu. says that the numbers from 
two to mjj[' are only 3<M%U^(^sf *· e. relative. The t £ $ ^ , o r 
" unity, is eternal in the case of eternal things which are indivisible,, 
and non-eternal in non-eternal products—because a jar which i s 
one can be divided into two and thus the uni ty of t h e jar is des­
troyed—while fek<4 and other numbers are all non-eternal
r 
Since they are s f t ^ l g f ^ F Z T . 
When two things are brought before us, we do not a t once 
cognize them as two, but first apprehend each one separately, ia 
the form * this is one, t h a t is one ' ( ξ ^ ^ Φ ^ 3 ^ « M t ) . This 
notion of many unities is gpfeu^fer ( ^ ΐ ^ Φ Φ ^ ^ [ ^ Χ I t is this: 
combined notion of two unities, which produces t h e conception of 
duality ( f | [ ^ ) , and then we know that the things are two. But 
ί#0 .NOTES. 
,as long as these unities are not combined mentally, no idea of 
U ^ c a n arise. 
For a full discussion of a f l m ^ Q ^ j M i ^ see Mu. on B. P .
r 
'kârikas 107-109. ^ m abides in ail ^ssfs without exception. 
The word θΐ^ΐΜΚ^ΙΦΚ^ in the definition means 'a special 
cause, peculiar to the product in question,' as opposed to mvum-
ΦΚαι or common causes e. g, time, space etc, which are causes 
with regard to all products, 
88. *Γίτ$ΠβΓ» o r dimension, is the speeial cause of the com­
mon usage of measurement. The qRmui of a thing is produced 
by ei ther 4ttuj4$cc|, ^ROOTp^?o r u^faSN (a particular kind of 
loose conjunction of the parts ). For instances of these, read:--· 
<fatMR4n5> g « W ^ & l d ^ ^ ^ Ι Μ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ φ κ υ μ ^ V Viv."on. 
V. S. VIL 1. 9. 
- "' ' 89. The wôrd ^Trf^" in ^rF^ttfàpÎrfÏT *aust be understood 
to mean %3|τΗτ4> *· & thesfrfrT abiding in the quality g%frF3 
'which is. the special cause of the common usage Ά is different 
f^rom B.' - If it be~asked that this is the same as { A is not B/ 
which is nothing but ajMÎWu^M or mutual negation, we reply, 
.that * ^ τ Η and ^wH^WM convey two different notions alto­
gether. ιΈ&: qdiç^ n<%* means not only gg:: q j : sy but something 
-more, τΐζ. Έ&: fa^fo ë^f. Again we can say ^f^or ^ I ^ *T but 
not Φκυι Φ Ι ^ Κ ^ ^ ; for φ|<υ| and qpfijf are really inseparably 
connected. Thus $SRf^ is the negation of objective identity, 
whereas ΒΤΐ^τ^ΠΠ? i s the negation of the sameness of natures 
( drçftui'ftta: )—cf. Éa*?*îterwr3rcft mm ^ rf tcrr^g^ ι «rarr-
*%?éti ^ r xémi fesm* η' ( Β. P. verse 114 ). 
90. <H4VU> or conjunction, is a relation which is non-eternal, 
'•as opposed to ^4HHI which is eternal. φ%&ϊ exists between 
&dfa< things, i. e. things which are proved as joined or sepa­
rated. Thus &qtf\ implies that the two things between which it 
^exists, once remained ^ apart and can do so again. See section 19X* 
91· UfcreT)or disjunction, is the separation of two things join­
ed together. I t is not only the absence of conjunction (ΦΪ^Η^14), 
Î>ut it denotes an actual separation which produces the destruction 
frf a previous contact ( &fUH XW*\ *F*: # ^ π π : I T * & Ρ· 56), 
NOTES. 4Î> 
93. 5%5or knowledge, is the light abiding in the soûl. T.S. 
(p. 58) defines it as *^ jo^H^lUii^T:*» *• e· *bat quality which is 
the special cause of the usage of all words in general. We cannot^ 
utter a single word unless we have the corresponding idea. 
The word %π [^%Γ3" is used to exclude the light of the sun 
etc., and the word if <ffj5g[ to exclude pleasure, pain etc. which 
are also in intimate connection with the soul. Thus it-should 
be noted that g ^ according to the Yais'eshikas is knowledge 
or cognition which is the result and not intellect, the instru­
ment of knowledge. 
94. w % or pleasure, is that whicht is felt as agreeable, 
without any other cause ( than itself ), i. e. for its own sake and 
not through any other medium» Thus the objects of pleasure 
such as a sweet substance etc. are excluded, because they are felt 
to be agreeable not for their own saké but for the pleasure which 
they produce. And moreover what may be pleasant to one, may 
be otherwise to another. Hence the word fi^mfe is necessary in 
the definition- I t is with this view that g^fs though defined in 
T. S. (p. 166 ) as c < j 5 q w ^ ^ 4 « f t 4 ^ 4 j ^ , i s differently denned 
in τ. B. as ^^f i î rsïras^TOra^ ^<sTif^>îte ^grorç/ 
and Nil. remarks—" 5tg ^HlM^i^aki^M^ fSrrf^ *jé?prT-
Thus pleasure and pain "are subjective and attributes of the 
Boul, according to the Naiyâyikas, as opposed to the. Sânkhyas*' 
who regarded them as attributes possessed by the things. 
Pad. paraphrases the definition t h u s - ^ ^ ^ 1 5 ^ « - φ ^ IÎ5M4V 
3Π3": iJ Notice, however, the view of J i n , — ' f ^ n ^ T : 3*j<fe<a^«f 
which, however, does not seem to be correct. 
98. SRftf, or effort, which is an attribute of the soul, must 
î>e distinguished from the actual act, of which it is the cause. It 
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may be called volition or some mental activity which precedes 
an actual act, ' s p j ^ j ^ T and g ^ t ^ are only synonyms.'—P. B„ 
( p . 263 ). One kind of s r ^ is defined by P . B. as 'feaifèd-
5 Π % 7 ^ Τ ^ Π Τ ^ Γ ^ m i ^ % § : , ' and not the ô s n w i t s ^ l f - T h e 
word ^ % in T. S. ( p . 166 ) means the same and not 'action,' 
which is the usual meaning of t h e word. 
99» 5 ^ f , or gravity, is tha t which is the non-intimated 
<sause of the first act of falling, and which abides only in one 
thing. The word 3TTSI is used to exclude %yy or velocity which 
is the cause of the subsequent acts of falling. The word ^cfe^fa 
is.used to exclude ^ 3 ) 41 which may also produce the first act of 
falling; e. g. when a ball thrown up in the air is stopped in i ts 
upward course by striking i t wi th a hand from above and made 
to fall down, i t is the conjunction of the ball wi th the hand 
t ha t is the non-intimate cause of the fall. This 4^M\*\ *SJ 
îiowever, not ^cfcdpd, but abides in both the things conjoined. 
I t is noteworthy t ha t the word u^ fr^ Pd *s nowhere used in the 
definition of jraç^·, as far as I know. I t s purpose is served by 
supposing that the ^pftrr, in the instance above, only destroys 
the upward velocity of the ball, and that i ts fall downwards 
is due to gravity and nothing else. 
Pad. speaks of another reading which is, however, found 
in none of the Mss. consulted b y me: 'M^^frT ΐ | τΗΙ^ΜΗ^ΙΦΚ υ Ϊ 
-fl^m^—^7T a n d < J 4 H * a r e both excluded, since they are t h e 
cause not only of q^nr, but of ail kinds of activity. They are 
^ΓΜΙ^ΐν^ΚυίφΚυι. I n this case, t ^ ^ f i f only states t h e nature 
of JTC^, as i t has nothing to exclude. 
j|^ycf abides only in ^ f s ^ and * ^ ? , and is ^ r f t p j ^ and 
-enly inferrible by t h e act of failing which is produced thereby. 
I t cannot be said t h a t TO^ is perceptible by the organ of touch;, 
for in t h a t case, the organ of touch should be able to produce a 
perception of jj^r< by i ts mere contact with the object, as is t h e 
case with the sensation of touch. B u t that is not actually t h e 
case. I t is only the contact with the object from below t h a t 
produces the perception of gravity. - Thus even in this case, mScW 
is only inferred by t h e downward tendency of the h a n d e t c 
and not perceived by the organ of touch. ( N . 3L P. 264. ) 
1 0 0 · The definition of 4 ^ 4 , or fluidity, is to be explained 
i n t h e same way as t h a t of ? j ^ ^ # 
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- 1 0 1 . 9^f, or viscidity, is the special cause of the agglutina-
tion of particles, at the same time not possessed of ^ 4 ^ 4 . 
Particles of clay, for instance, are held together and formed 
into lump ( pju j forre o r ÛM$ ) when mixed with water , 
owing to the viscidity which is a peculiar quality of water and 
which is possessed by no other substance. 4 Φ ^ , or fluidity, also 
is a special cause of this ^ i | ^ , because we see t h a t water, if 
deprived of its ^ ^ i. e. reduced to ice, cannot hold together t h e 
particles of clay. I n order to exclude this 3 ^ 3 " , t h e word ^ φ φ ^ 1 * 
agjTq' is used. £^<A is possessed of the ^ ΐ ί τ ΐ ^ Φ ^ ^ , whereas 
• j^g is not. t 
Pad. and many Mss. of Saptapadârlhî read ^ q e ^ j ^ : instead 
of 4« | ^cc f^ i | : . ^ ψ ί * * ^ may mean ^ ^ t ^ T : ; or ψ&3 may be 
taken t o mean ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ and then there is no difference of meaning* 
Jin. reads 4Φ4^ί«-^: but interprets t h e word differently» 
^ j } or ghee, is also the cause of ^ i ^ ; at the same time no % ^ can 
belong to ^ j which is qfrffg·. I n order to exclude ^ y , the word · 
-*H<^I*m *& used, ^çf can produce ^jij^ only when possessed of 
vjétccf and not when reduced to a thick lump; whereas % ^ is 
necessarily ^ ^ r ^ ^ l ^ , because a quality can never abide in another 
quality* 
W h y not regard 4 3 ^ only as the cause of Aug) s o &&& 
there is no necessity of admitting % ^ at all ? No, we reply « 
For we see tha t an excess of s*4r4 does not produce an excess 
of 4ji4^? while an excess of ^ ^ does produce an excess of <jijg 
e.g. when water is mixed with pulse-flour, which increases the ^jjÇ 
of water and renders it more effective. Thus the causal relation 
between %ff and #M£ must be admitted. 
Then why not say tha t ^ ^ belongs rather to such things as 
pulse-flour etc. and not to water 1 No, for water without pulse-
Sour can produce ^ i tgybut not vice versa. Hence i t is reasonable 
to suppose tha t φ ^ belongs to water, but that it is only manifes­
ted more effectively when mixed with such things as flour etc. 
1 0 3 . ^f^T?5or impression, is t h a t quality which produces iû 
its abode the same condition in which it (abode) was, at the time 
when the quality itself ( i. e. impression ) was produced. The 
word jpf is necessary in the definition, in order to exclude t h e 
abode itself which is also a cause of the condition in question. 
Thus %îr,or speed,which is one kind of ^ ^ T ? 5 is produced from an 
44 NOTES. 
action in the arrow etc. and itself produces an action therein· 
m^HI) another kind of çfc^T?3 is produced from a cognition in, 
the form of SM~+H? and itself produces ^ j % 3 which is also another 
kind of cognition· The same is very obviously seen in the case 
o f
 f&fd^ r r e , the third kind of < ^ i < . 
No attempt seems to be made to define < j ^ n even in P. B., 
and Ν. Κ. Τ. B. is silent, and T. S. only says, '^^feK^sHlkUti^ 
iy^K* ? I* is in T.R., however, that we find a similiar definition of 
«*Φ1{ though with a few alterations.-'^sn^mg^qT^resrT^SfÇT 
^KUiH-1 5ΠΓ 3ra%3ïrâte: ifemi ST &fr *T3: II' Τ. Β* (P. 147.> 
s. s. 
Beally speaking κπ^ΓΓ, %*T and f^j[d^m<*> are so very 
different in character from each other as not to deserve to be 
regarded as only three kinds of one quality^^ng. And hence the 
difficulty of defining it. Another definition of ^^ <feK * s found in 
S - C . - ' a 1 \ M M ^ u i M f t ^ J w ^ ^ f a p ^ ^ N ^ I ( d ^ \ V meaning 
that 3 ^ n is the only quality which is both a mm«-^u | and a 
flnsNjpF* 0?ΟΓ %*T an<* ΐ^ίτΚΜΙΜΦ are classed under H i m ^ ^ t 5 ? 
while 3||cHl is regarded as a fa£mj|U| of the soul. ) 
103, ^ ^
s
 or merit, is the special instrumental cause of 
pleasure. I t is something positive (popularly called τρκξ ) which 
arises as the result of the performance of actions enjoined by the 
scriptures. If it be asked how, for instance, *H^KHI*H which is 
an sr^Fj-, can give rise to pleasure, we reply that the pleasure . 
there is due to some previous ^ ή , and not to the 3T%if being; 
actually practised which would not fail to produce its evil 
consequences. 
104, 3re?h o r dement, is the special instrumental cause of 
pain. The sufferings caused by a bath in a river are due to some 
previous s p ^ , and thus the ^μς itself is ^jj- and not sreTFf. 
105, $js^ or sound, is that quality which is cognized by the 
organ of hearing. According to the general rule, that a sense-
organ can perceive its object only by being in contact with it^  the 
perception of sound by the ear presupposes a contact between the 
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two. Of these the 3?tàp4^ cannot have motion, since it is nothing 
but 3M<H31^hich is all-pervading and so incapable of motion. 
How is it possible then in the case of a sound made at a great 
1
 distance from the ear % By the cfl-^cKsH^N or the cfc^+^jj^-
?mM) ^ Q reply. One sound produces another, this again a third 
and so on, in the way in which one wave produces another, or the 
kadamba tree puts forth buds in all directions, or the bud of the 
kadamba flower expands its petals all round; until the last is 
"produced near the ear. I t is this last sound which is actually 
perceived by the ear; still we are conscious of having heard the 
original sound, owing to its extreme similarity with the last 
-sound. Sound is a special quality belonging to the sn^M. 
106—110. After having defined the twenty-four qualities 
. ..S'ivâditya proceeds to define the five kinds of action in order. 
111. M^JUcfr is that which pervades the other («arreq·), ί. & 
'which is present in more places than the sarrcq-. Thus gfajsH^ is 
^ΙΜΦ with regard to qdrtj, because ^fajU^ ^ found not only in 
all the instances in which g a ^ is found, but in many more e. g* 
3n things having \\&# etc. So also ^ ^ is said to be ο^ ΠΜΦ with 
ijfegard to OT-5 because ^ f|j is found in all the instances in which 
**CT & found and in many more e. g. in a red hot ball of iron. 
537*3? is that which is pervaded by or included in the «??ρ?3>* 
% e, which is found in a less number of instances than th&sgrjq^» 
- β* 9' Ηάκ4 and OT· in the instances above are *M\U{ with regard 
*° utël<=n^ ^à 3 % respectively. 
Ή4ΙΙ4ίΜ4 îs that mm^M which is only νΜ|ΐ|Φ and never 
44J114J, or in other words3 which is found in a larger number of 
instances than any other—that is to say, which belongs to a class 
which can only be a genus and never a species. Thus ^^χ is such* 
I n the same way a immm-q and m i m m m w i may be ex­
plained. See sections 7 and 174. 
112. ϊττίχ^π^ is the non-existence of a thing before its-
production. Thus this kind of STSTTW ^ beginning-less; at the 
same time it is destroyed as soon as its counter-entity is produced. 
This iiHi^m of a thing is regarded as one of the causes 
contributing to the production of that thing. 
:
 113, iTMm+JN is the non-existence of a thing after it» 
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destruction. Thus this kind of spQTO has got a beginning, but 
has no end. 
114 . ST^dlsrra', o n the other hand, is an absolute non» 
existence of a thing, e. g. t h e absence of colour from the wind* 
Thus this kind of STOTO has neither a beginning nor an end» 
These three ^ i n d s fall under <SmiPfTiq which is distinguished 
from dMMl*H«f. 
115. ^ < - J M I + J M is the denial of identity, e. g. τ&χ q ^ · «f 
( WdM 4^V: flKk+^H^: )- 1^ w e express the same idea in the 
form c g£ x&£ q\ that would be STSFçrWT^. θΤ^^ΓΗΤΤ^ to b e 
distinguished from s j ^ ^ p t f 1^ t h u s : — I n sc^FrTPiTT^s the counter-
entity is characterised by some connection like ÇT^ÏT or çra^PT; 
or it means the denial of a connection other than identity 
between the îrfd4^ÎY a**d the srgqftift. Thus *jjf% g£ t *f is an 
instance of 3TçM*ën3Trê; for it denies a connection between t h e 
^jd<£ a**d ^2 · ^ijf^ a n ( ^ ^ £ a r e η 0 * o n t y n o ^ identical with each 
other, but are not even connected with each other. On thfr 
other hand, in sp^fc^n^tTO t h e counter-entity is characterised 
hy HI^I^T or identity; or it means the denial of identity between 
the sifeq^ft and s i g i h f t . Thus γ^φ nit ^ ^ ai#4)*JMI<t» 
which may be present, even when there is no SF^T^rWT^ *· *• 
when 3£d^' is i*1 connection with g £ . 
T. S. ( p . 172 ) clearly distinguishes t h e m : — 
^ R f i ^ ^ t j Î d ^ R t d l ^ : ajwftwfwre: il The word % Φ | Κ Μ > i a *ke 
former definition distinguishes 3j^4Wf|?Tra from MIJ(+U4 aî*d 5Γ^~ 
^fnTT^", 'while the latter portion distinguishes it from θ{«^ΪΙ<- |^+ΜΦ 
116. After having defined t h e main kinds of the several 
categories, the author now proceeds to define the subdivisions of 
t h e same. Thus ^Rjéft was described as twofold, ft^TT a a d diW^IC. 
Now, this division cannot be understood unless &<Λ|<:4 an(l 
3Τί?Π$ς3 are explained, which t h e author proceeds to do now. 
fa<^ç^, or eternity, is the freedom from destruction. Accord-
ing to this view, srdfcfrerc is fsrSfc because though i t has got a 
beginning, it has no end. But really speaking f*f^R^ means 
wi*i watfinftPi^  gfo Asrowfe^Pi^b *· ê · t h a t tf™gis ca l l e<i 
f^çr or eternal, of which we cannot predicate either the antece-
dent negation or consequent negation, i. e. which has nei ther 
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beginning nor end. Thus atoms, ether, time, space are f ^ · in 
this sense. %<%\ focfc^^lM fe^?kci also means the same thing. 
117. ^fo<*k4 is M ^ M f a ^ p M . -I» other words, that thing 
is said to be 3jfvf<jq or non-eternal, of which we can predicate 
destruction. 
Corresponding to the second view of fa ^ 4 , 3rfa<&r^  must 
be denned as a n i W r e g f t ^ f i w ^ W f a f l pMl^d<<^4fr In 
other words that thing is said to be non-eternal which has 
either a beginning or an end. Thus ^f^i^i^ would be «rfSref 
according to this view. 
118. ψ^ was said to be either *H+||u^m or ^N^TT* 
So M4^ T1U| and ^sf are now defined. A mmu}, or atom, is that 
which is without parts and which is possessed of an action by an 
intimate relation. The word Ρ κ < 4 ^ is nsed to exclude products 
which may be fe^H<^. fôv!J(4t«^ is used to exclude Tjrpj and 
other eternal things which are f^ ft^ RW· Time and space are both 
&K^^Hand & ^ Ι 3 φ because they are the general abodes of every­
thing; or fcyiiT may be said to be connected with ^ ^ 5 by what 
is called ΦΙ ί ^ Φ ^ ^ . l n order to avoid this objection, fa^^u 
must be understood to mean CTTCTOÏÏ^^Pf f55TTWT^an(* n o * k j 
any other relation. 
119. The word 3H^H which occurs in the definition of 
q ^ mj is next defined, as being the intimate cause of a substance. 
Thus gras are the parts of a q j , because they are the intimate 
-cause of the same. The word jjsq- is necessary in the definition, 
for otherwise 3Π Γ^3Γ a^s° winch is the intimate cause of 3{5ξ 
^ which is a quality, however, ) may be called 3(4444. 
120. A «pfq-, or product, is that which was possessed of an 
•antecedent non-existence i.e. which (first being non-existent, 
afterwards ) is produced. srdfcfTOT? * s ^ n i l s a s much a ^ § - as q ^ 
-q^etc. © q ^ n ^ , ^T^, f^ f», sn^reretc. a r e > however, not products 
because the antecedent non-existence cannot be predicated of 
them. Φΐ4<:4 is also defined as ΣΠ3Τ*Τί5%&4ΐ fil^ » 
121. <jfà^ was divided into ^ifft3 f f ^ T a n (* feM*T3 which 
.-are now to be defined, ^en^n^rf^ is, however, first defined, for it 
-occurs in the definition of $|fl | which is to follow next. 
An SfTçEiTO^ rfèr» o r a ^3 1^ product, is a substance which is 
itself a product, bat which does not produce any other substances· 
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Thus a jar or a body is a final product; for it is itself produced, 
but is not the producer of any other substance. > 
The word ^sq* in ^ ο ^ Η Κ + ^ Φ ^ is necessary to avoict the 
feult of srcfcrer, since every final product is the guo^cf» or produ- -
cer of its quality e. ^ a q ^ is the intimate eause of (j&^ij. Thfr 
word ?$& isrnecessary to exclude 3ΠΦΙ$Γ, for instance, which is 
4«4HK++H>4«**? ^ u t ** n o t a Φ1&ί^<· T n e ^ord s[zq in ^ r -
fraj is necessary to exclude the qualities of a product which are 
^ H H ^ and cÇ^ jf. Simple cfeiifesq would have included srçjç 
etc.; hence ^κπ*ΠΤ*¥Π5. ^ brief, a ^ 1 product is 3nr?TC5F?: \ 
^ . * Η 4 « 4 * Μ Φ : · 
122. ïifti, or body, is that final product which is an abode 
of enjoyment. *T^lH|d«* excludes τ& etc. which are a i ^ i ^ i f a s . 
ttf^cMN^ft excludes hands, feet etc. which are :*TNu^d«l sp^rT-
^rflr^r f^% ^ST?snîc^ is also a good definition of 3 ^ , %£τ 
meaning voluntary actions ( f|dlf|dm{*mfciKiq1 ί ^ Π ).' 
123. ?fo{ means the direct perception of either pleasure or 
pain intimately-connected with one's own self. The word ^ u ^ d i 
is necessary; for the perception of pleasure and pain simultaneously 
is not possible. ^ ^ 4 ^ d is used to exclude the perception by 
God of the pleasures and pains abiding in other souls. God has* 
ûo pleasure and pain of his own, and hence cannot have iftif 
also. So also a mere intellectual apprehension of the pleasures 
and pains of others cannot be f^t*T. 
124. IfNU^dd is that abiding in which ( or limited by 
which ), the soul can possess ^ τ . Thus a jar etc. cannot be called 
^4U<Hd«f) though they are the means of enjoyment. So also the 
soul itself cannot be r^fan^RPT, though it is an abode in which 
^iX remains by intimate connection. Souls are all-pervading 
but it is the different bodies which restrict and enable them to 
have certain enjoyments only. Thus there is no confusion and 
the faults 3j$dl+^Hm (*· & reaping the fruit of what is not 
done by oneself ) and an-^id^H ( *· e* being deprived of the 
fruit, of what is done by oneself ) do not arise. 
The word 3M4d*i^*n t u ^ definition stands for ^ U % H 4 f . 
125. «[frijrcr, or a sense-organ, is that which is the special 
cause of direct perception, and which is itself super-sensuous. 
^ 4 ^ R etc. are ^ Η Φ ^ ί but they are not mmsMft^m^m.. jj^jf 
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pr contemplation which leads to çn§f?t^T? °? direct perception of 
Crbd etc. is 5Π%<ΊτΦΐΐ^ Η<=Μ<ϋ, but is not afr f lp^. φ ϊ ^ also is 
^TT^Ic^lR^H^oT ail<2 3*ffiP^*f but is not ^ffÇif, because the 
«ΤΙ^ΐΓφΐί^Η in the definition means only, ^sp^rr^T^îftgTO 
that which is produced and therefore non-eternal, as opposed to 
CkxTs direct perception of the world, which is eternal. 
Note the definition given by Pad. These sense-organs are 
sis in number—+H^( which is an internal organ as opposed to 
the following five which are external ), g ^ ^Πΐ, ^ÎTM ^&t 
and ç^». 
126. That which being known is the cause of enjoyment to 
the soul is called faq^ or object. Pad. very aptly paraphrases— 
f
^^n^TTc^Rt ^pzRTHg^sl^sts: ' . ^31 *be absence of the word 
^ 'WlHd^l? the definition would apply to ^ f ? ^ also, which is 
also the means of enjoyment. If it be said that in the case in which" 
some pleasure is derived from the cognition of another's body, 
£hat body also may be faq^3 we reply in the negative; for in that 
case it is the beautiful form or soft touch or some such quality 
of the body, whose cognition produces the pleasure and not the 
body itself. Thus the definition is not applicable to it. Or it may 
be said that ςμ^ΜςΗΠ means Έ$%φ τ$\ΜΜ\*\^Μ\) *. &* NM^ must 
Only be an object of cognition ( objective ) and never a subject 
of cognition ( subjective ). But a body is generally a subject, in 
as much as the soul as abiding in the body, can have cognitions, 
by means of the sense-organs also abiding in the body. 
Many Mss, and Jin. ând Mita, read the definition without 
the word ^H^Hd-MU Then they have to understand some such 
"word as ^ l^P- j^m^k^ ' Çfflr, which is but implied by the three-
fold division of ^rffc, <$$£Μ and faq^. 
127. See sections 13 and 76. 
128# In sections 16, Έ&& was divided into three—^ijpd-
Φΐ^5 fefd^l^ and fa^fl^ftfrl^S. Kow the author proceeds to 
define ^qf%5 f^% and '$H|* | . \ 
Stfjfrf, or production, means the simultaneous co-existence of 
1^1 the causes. A ^^ is produced only when all the causes 
C^HTÎSiï) are-at hand and not, if any one of them is wanting, 
129. Simultaneous co-èxistence means the connection of 
several things with one moment. • - " -
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130. A Sffur3 or moment, is that part of time which covers : 
an action connected with the antecedent negation of the dis-
junction which is not produced by a disjunction, i, e. which is 
produced from the action itself. We see that when two things 
once together, are separated, at first an action is produced in one 
or both of them, which is followed by their disjunction. (Cf. fevm, 
^^TUT^fa:). Ήον that P a r * of time in which the action is produc­
ed but the disjunction is not produced, is a moment. Thus the 
sMÎf<q[r< and f^THlMNf^l^ a r e together possible only in the one 
moment immediately preceding the production of the flrWT 
which belongs to the next moment. The flwRSTPTOTW alone 
extends over all the time preceding the production of the flrWT» 
so also the Έ^ alone may extend over several moments even after 
the production of the fèpTTT. ^ t both ^ § and flf*Π*Τ5Π*ΤϊΠ3Γcan 
fee found together only for one moment; for in the following 
moment f%3TT*T is produced and thus f^ T^TTTJn^ TW^ is &° more, 
and in the preceding moment ^ή· itself is not produced. The 
definition can be better stated in the words of Pad:— 'dccfrJÈ-
dvsl·^&MHIMHfflWMfca*: ^T^: qmi*. 
131. That is said to be ^ f j ^ , or momentary, which lasts 
for a moment only and no more, 
132. "fërfèf} o r existence, is the being ( of a thing ). 
I t consists in having a negation of one's own antecedent non-
existence. CA ΦΖ exists' means that it is without its irpPflTIW· 
Instead of ^f^r, Pad. reads fe^. and remarks that the negation 
°î MHi+JN cannot bejnTT^TT j^ sirLCe 5Γϊ*Τ?Π^ *s without beginning* 
So it may be either s p ^ m ^ H a^ *n ^ n e c a s e * °^  non-eternal 
products, or ST^TTPTT^ as in the case of eternal things of which 
there never was a i|(tfTffl^ . I t may be, perhaps, objected that 
the destroyed condition of a thing is also sn*T*TW Π^τΓ and may 
therefore be called ctd+{Mç4 which is against our experience· 
But the objection is answered by the word ^ ^ Η τ ^ ; a thing is 
^ ^ K f e e ? "wnen it is destroyed. To mark the same clearer, some, 
* S M 4 M ^ l ^ w R d ^ » M * v < q / J i n · a î s o n a s f o r n i s text 
* i l H I + » ^ l W * i w w f e d ^ ^ * w £ All these mean the same 
thing; i. e. a thing exists when its SfHfSfli' has been already 
destroyed and its JTM^tMN *& yet to ^ produced. 
Another explanation of ^ ^ ^ M ^ 1 is proposed thus;—A thing 
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exists ( Φ 3 ^ 1 « 0 as long as it is in connection with the antecedent 
non-existence of its own product/ Thus f^P^ js exist as long as 
i|2 is not produced. 
134. sn^ JTT v a s divided into two, m+jkm and g ^ r . Now 
^fôzg is defined as that which can have knowledge, only by 
conjunction with a body. The individual souls, though they are 
all-pervading, can cognize only there where they are in conjunction 
with their own bodies, in the absence of which they are practically 
non-intelligent e. g. at the time of H<$M and in the beginning of 
creation. Thus the knowledge of the individual souls is produced 
and therefore non-eternal, as opposed to that of the Highest 
Soul, which is eternal and independent of anything else. Some 
Mss. read 'f^^gjT^^ï^ q ^ M l ? ; Iftt the text followed by Jin. 
and Pad. does not seem to have it. 
135. In section 20, we had '^p^f 3Wk*<fr%Mt<t«t«W^ 
Now what is meant by M^-jl^Pt^^ ? Ϊ* means 'being favoured 
by the merit and demerit in intimate relation with each of the 
souls'. That is to say, the mind peculiar to a particular soul-
produces cognitions of pleasure and pain according to the merit 
and demerit possessed by that soul, 
137. _ A éwi is Φ 4 ^ Ο Γ <j^ TUw3 according as "its non-
intimate cause is ^ | o r ^ j ^ i 3 the intimate cause being, in each 
case, the things conjoined. 
138. See section 79. 
139. 5 ^ , or cognition, is of two kinds—^jfèr or-remem-
brance, and sprpr^ or apprehension. Remembrance is that cogni-
tion, of which an impression is the special, peculiar cause. The 
apprehension of an object leaves some impressions on the mind, 
which, in their turn, produce a remembrance of the same object 
tinder some circumstances ( e. g. the sight of a similar object ). 
The object cannot be said to have produced the remembrance, nor 
can even the apprehension—for both these belong to the past— 
but it is the impressions which follow the apprehension. The 
^ord s^n^R^T is put in the definition to exclude ^ïrfÎT^r o r 
recognition, which is caused both by *η«ΗΙΜ*ΦΚ and ^ff jpn^ 
ζτΒτ^Γ. "Yesterday I had seen Devadatta; to-day I see him again 
and am conscious, 'This is the same Bevadatta as I saw yesterday" 
(^raj^^ï;).—Here this cognition consists of two elements—\\^\ 
a u ( l 3τΤΤ5 of which the former is M^faqq- i. β. produced by 
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^ f c ^ i ^ f a ^ ) and the latter is produced by the impression* 
left by the past apprehension. 
3rg*re, or apprehension, is that cognition which is not of 
the form of remembrance; i. e. every new cogaition which is 
not a repetition of a previous cognition is 3M+I5. 
140. 3f3?TW again is of two kinds—jf^f or right apprehen* . 
sion, and SPFRT or incorrect apprehension. In other words 3ΠΤϊΤ^ 
may be either qsy fqf o r ^ΠΓ^ΓΠΪ· ΦΤΓ«ΐΪ3*Τ3Γ o r 5TJTÎ *s defined as 
'apprehension of the real nature of a thing as it is'—for the 
meaning of çfç^, see notes on section 64 The ^«n^ç^r o c 
correctness of a cognition is technically defined as %gf '^ 
dcJ4*K*«44j;' or S ^ f e f i M ^ çrflr c R 5 r e R ^ ^ J I u ^ β cogni­
tion in the form cgj^ 3Τ:33 ^S * s the f^ ^h^T and ^ s ^ is the 
î l^R or f% |^t|U|. This cogaition would be q^f^ ^ ^s fk£\wA *& 
q&:cH< and its Z{^\i is Έ&Α%·9 that is to say, if it sees ^ c ^ . iû a 
tiling which is possessed of ^ ^ . On the other hand, 3ΡΤ2π4?? 
means ^ f ϊ Π ^ ^ % <ΑτΜΦΗΦ^ e* 9* when we mistake a rope for a 
serpent. Here the cognition ' s ^ ^q^' has for its f^^fa^, a thing 
whieh is possessed of ^ j^ff l [^ ( i. β. a rope ), and for its sr^fç 
lake s j g ^ , ^ f e also may be ^ n ^ or ^ , . 
141. snmn/r^T^ or snrar i s also of two kinds-sfepï and 
fsfq^q·. ^\M, or doubt, is defined as ca cognition which is not of 
the form of certitude,' expressed in the form ' ^ ^fng^r, 5^ i t 
^χ/ As truth can be only one, right apprehension must be 
always of a certain character; and absence of certainty is possible, 
only in incorrect apprehension. çfew is better defined as '<ζφΗ&<ι 
qfflfit fa^HMhblfôè ^ Π ^ 5 *- & 'a cognition referring to two 
alternatives opposed to each other, in regard to one and the 
same object.' Thus ^ f f gzqff' is ^ P T , £ o r û e r e t i i e ^Îfrs- aTQ 
two. ς^πί Έ[Ζ: ? ^ Π ^ * s n o ^Nr^j ^ o r k e r e the two ^tfês are not 
fa^ i. e. can be found together in one place. 'qzg3fè|4^fcJ4t44J«j^ 
3Γ3ΠΤ' is no 4j^m, for here the <£)(d is one only. 
f%q4i|, or erroneous knowledge, is 'a cognition which is false 
and of the nature of certitude,' as when a rope is cognized to be 
â serpent. When we cognize a thing to be positively that which 
it is not, that is flfq^r— ' c f ^ n ^ f e 3^ΦΗΦ£Γ3Γ3Γ:. ' T h u s t h s 
difference between ^ q and f%q$3T ^  ^ e absence a a < * P r e s e û C ^ 
of certitude· 
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1 4 2 . ίΠΤΤ? 0T r ight apprehension/ is also of two k i n d s — 
5J3T3C5WT a n ( * Sï^micr. ΪΓ3Γ3Γ5ΠΤΤ) or direct perception, is denned 
as a r i ght apprehension not producible by a cause which is being 
cognised. Thus $j?£y is the ^ u f of ίΓ^ Τ Γ^ϊΠΤΤ; a n d ξ ^ ^ Γ i s n o t 
s jWJR» i ° r *fc is? i*1 the first place, ^t-f i fc^ and 2ndly, its cogni­
tion is of no use in the production of s r e r ^ i j H . On * u e other 
b a n d the f ^ p or indicatory mark such as *çm is the cause of the 
Sjwfnid; a s ^ n a ^ °^ ^ % ; a3i<i * û e fê^ c a n be known and i t pro-
duces srgfïrfèf o n V a s i* *s known. 
But it may be objected that %g; is not the ^ o t of aMfe fe 
according to the writer who later on defines 3 j ^ H a s *3τ%-
^ ^ ^ d l f t & ^ & ^ M ; and fè^fM is as l i t t le ^rWU*T as 
^F"4^« Thus the definition extends to et H fa fa' also« ^ a e objec-
t ion is answered by interpreting c ^ ^ j \ ^ ^ Η Φ ^ ^ ' to mean 
^ g j M ^ t J i ^ i ^ or % H C ^ U H ^ * H ? ( See Pad.). Thus î r e q ^ r p r 
is that knowledge which has not a cognition as i ts cause. Whether 
^ p ^ or efetffT^^PfcfcM is ^ n e cause, i t is not a cognition. On 
the other hand, all other kinds of knowledge have a cognition for 
the i r cause e. g. a ^ f a f e has fo^M, ^qf*r% n a s «Κ$Ώ(Π*» 
^Tio^M^lf n a s ^Γοζ^ΐΡ* and W & û a s ^3^%» f o r t n e * r respective 
^ u j s . (Of course our author does not admit of ^nftffa and 
3U<^M+U a s independent kinds. ) 
The definition, as it is in the text, may, however, be defended 
by saying that- fo^ m produces 3T*jftrfe only as i t is ^ΓΡΤΗΤ^Γ*·e* 
a n object of consciousness or 3j«|f&H^i^ and not otherwise. Thus 
31^fit% is ^I^WFH^or^r?q. Another useful and popular defini­
tion of sr^rsg^R is c%f^^gfeifa4>4*t*4 wà s r ^ r ^ — t h a t 
cognition which arises from the union of the sense-organ and the . 
object. This is a good definition for all practical purposes; bu t 
i t is open to the fault of 3 rên%, since the ί^τ^Γ^ΓΗ belonging t o 
%3%ξ is not at all sr?^, but eternal, whereas the definition in our 
t e x t can include §·^5Π?Τ§Γ also. B u t the difficulty is solved by 
saying that the sr^^T intended to be defined is only that belong­
ing to sff^s and not that belonging to God; for even Gautama, 
t h e author of t h e Nyaya Sutras, defines srerqnfrç as "^jfe-
( G . S. I . 1. 14 ) . A n d the different kinds of cognition such as 
SI^STj 4 i4&fd e t c · are not possible in the case of God, whose 
knowledge is invariably Ϊ Ϊ ^ Γ # 
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1 4 3 . The definition of s ^ f a f e also comes to mean ^rpT-
Φ ^ υ ΐ ^ ^ ^ ί τ ^ Μ ^ ^ : . As, according t o our author, all s&Û except 
ST3F3? i s ^rafî?%3 * û e definition is quite correct. But otherwise 
the definition would include ^ f a f d ? ^qfafèf a n d ^ N ^ ^ J R . 
1 4 4 . Corresponding to the two 5nTTsJ there are two snTTO8 
or proofs of r ight apprehension. But what is a m i im, in the 
first place 1 
l\H\u\ is generally defined as ' ï j ^nn : ^ ° T ΐΓ^Π^Π^-' - ^ · η ^ a 
ï&pt is defined as ' ^ i ^ h ^ c t f c ^ ' Φΐφή Φίυι^ . ' A <£*υτ is 
t h a t cause which is never unconnected with the effect i. e. which 
is immediately and invariably followed by t h e effect; e. g. for 
the cutting of the tree, there are several causes—the tree, the 
axe, the union of the axe and t h e tree. Of these only t h e las t 
is the cfc^ uiy according to t h e definition above. 
According to another view, q^uy is defined as C53TFTR3*C 
31441^ 1 Kul 3>UU> 4><uj4jr.? That special cause which is possessed of an 
intervening operation is called ^rs[. And a ssn^ TTT i s defined as 
' d « M ^ ^Γ% rTwF^nra: . ' A o ^ i q ^ is itself produced from t h e 
Έ$ΦΙ and at. t h e same time produces what is produced from 
t h é «£φ7ΐ. Thus in t h e instance above, *>6\i is *>ue ^ T T a D L^ 
^ i U r H ^ i ^ l is * n e «*ΙΙΜΚ wi th regard to t h e effect, namely, 
Thus the definition of j^TTO ^ n ^ n e text, viz. c * ^ | < ί Ν ΐ ^ Φ 
f^^^î JTOnro'j seems to follow the first view of ^<?T, viz. c^j^T-
^ U ^ P ^ ^RST^.' sn f t i î sq^ fè^ r means s*ns and not merely 
^ i ^ < ; for, in tha t case, even the object of s&f\ would be JTRTT— 
since i t is connected with the jj^n by M M ^ N M ^ ^ * - ^ — ^ u t i t 
is not Î W T ^ T T ^ . 
This definition of im\u\ may be objected thus:—ï$t} every-
thing is invariably associated ( *m# ) with the stiff of God who 
is omniscient and whose knowledge is eternal and not produced; 
and thus everything would be im tuy. 
%ndlyt If, to avoid this objection, the word ^cq-is put in and 
Slum means ^ ^ M ^ U - M I H J ' t n e n ^R ceases to be ΐ^Τ^ΓϊΠΤΓΤ, 
since his stm is never Sf^; while | h j ç is included in the list of 
ϊ ^ η ρ Η Π ? ! 8 * *>y t n e author. 
Both these faults can be avoided by implying 'βΤ3?Π$Γφά;-
i ^ d < ^ *fà? in the definition. The word ^ n ^ T prevents any-
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thing from being a i\M\m; for though i t is ^3HMHMlM?
 s t i U i t i s 
only an object of <|^5Γϊττ and not ^ r ^ T - A n d ês&t is the 3rT$nr 
of 5ΠΤΤ? though not çn^R"- And one Ms. actually reads the" defini-
t ion as % T ^ T S H 4 U ^ d ^ *fà OTlii^-WiW* SRUuHfr' 
Still the definition is open to one more objection. s[f?jpj 
which is called îT^T^M^im is not, really speaking, ï r^^rTTïÎhT-
<HMkad or 3rer%jM4JM'IgS for even though the ^ { è ^ is there , 
still the 5cm may not necessarily result, unless there is ? p ^ | ^ -
<dft'cfe$. Thus the definition in the text is more applicable to 
I j i ^ n ^ fa <*>**- Whereas ^T^q* can be %^\u\ only according to 
the second view of ^ Q T , viz. S ^ I R K ^ ^i^UHK^T <$H*4 *GW\*ff 
for then ^ f i ^ may be ^ U T a n ( * %fc4^ë4<jfa<=fr§? the sqTW· 
Thus the author does not seem to have suificiently distinguished 
between the two ideas about ^ |U| , and consequently his 
definition of i\mu\ or 3rer%^+nui is not consistent with his 
illustrations of the latter. 
Seeing the force of these three objections, Pad. proposes 
another definition of im\u[ as intended by the author, viz. 
•UMXMMM\l4r&WW4^lH&MMMv4*£ which means, in plain 
words,—ÎTÎTT^T: S4l<m<4<i«iV4U<4 SÇROÏ fêf^T^TFîn^t ^T ϊΠΤΤσΠΪ, 
t h e last expression being put in solely to include #^a^. But i t is 
quite apparent t h a t this definition is altogether different from 
the one in t h e text and embraces quite the opposite view of cfr^uj. 
1
 - J in., however, who also reads c ^ [ ^ H I ^ n P T ^ ^ d < ^ ' ^ % ^ t c . ^ 
solves the difficulty thus:—'q^rfif ![fi^U3Wft<=b4 *ξ3" SHn^TTHtsfe 
1 4 5 . The definition of s^ TT^ T c a n he, of course, made appli­
cable t o ^ % | ^ | u i a n d 3 j ^ U H ? o n l y b y prefixing the words j ^ g -
and ^ ^ 3 i f d t o z&R
m
 The sr^rs^TOTT^s, or direct proofs, are seven 
in number—corresponding to t h e seven kinds of 5ΓξΕΓ3?5ΠΤΓ 
mentioned in section 33—where the words § · ^ 5 ^pJT) etc. stand 
for the direct perceptions resulting therefrom respectively. 
Here, the twofold function of +H<^, or the mind, must be 
remembered. I t is necessary for every kind of cognition; a n d 
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even the other sense-organs can produce their respective 
cognitions, only when united to the mind. But when M^\U is 
called a î r^f ïWTOî ^ *s 0Jdj ^n view of its producing t h e direct 
* perception of pleasure, pain etc., which are qualities of the soul 
and which are beyond the reach of the external sense-organs. 
T^Tj <W3 ^ T j ^ T ^ a n ( * ^TS^ a r e * û e special qualities which are 
peculiarly perceived by the five sense-organs respectively. 
146 . After having defined a r a ^ H , the author proceeds to 
state what i t is. I t is the cognition of t h e indicatory mark, 
characterised by its invariable concomitance (with the thing to b e 
inferred,and its connection with the particular abode in question)· 
I n order tha t we should be able to infer the presence of fire on the 
mountain before us, from the presence of smoke, the smoke 
which is the indicatory mark, must first be connected with the 
mountain ( q ' ^ j ^ f T ) ; ^ o r ^ n e smoke in any other place cannot 
enable us to infer fire on the mountain and secondly, the smoke 
must be invariably associated with fire (β*Π%). Thus that 
cognition which has the f ^ p for i t s f ^ - c q a n d sqrfçï a n ^ Τ%Γ^ -ΗτΗ 
for its fi^iqui or sr^jf, expressed in the form, for instance, ^r%-
« 3 1 ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ q 4 t r : > ' * s 3 ^ H « i — a l s o technically called f^fqTT-
j$—which is immediately and invariably followed by the 
3 ^ & Î d i û t ù e £ o r m C«N" q^rat ^ ί ΐ ΙΤΠ^ 5 The compound may be 
solved thus:— ί 5?π%ίΐ Τ ^ ^ Γ Τ ^ W&a feRfô % # 3*T gTOJv' 
Cf. êmvzm TOflrM^; <ΤΠ*Ηί ^ s ^ r — Β · ρ · (verse $8). 
The word sqxfçj is necessary in the above; for otherwise, 
the cognition of the indicatory mark M ^ c ^ in S ^ ^ : ^ i f a ^ : 
^ ^ r ^ T ^ ' would be an ^ H > a s & is n e r e qualified by <T$jre4cTI, 
ϋ+Ι^Μ being present in 3?!^; though MÎ(^5 is here an instance 
oî θΗΦίΡ^ύξΜΐ^ΤΓξΤ) for want of 5-mfo between MÎ|^<^ and 
BîS^T^· So a l s o TgTM^dl *s necessary; for, otherwise, S M ^ Î 
FRST: ^njfe^T^Trr ' would be an instance of ^correct argument, 
since STOchï^PW is invariably associated with fa^^. But 
tha t is not the case, since ^ 4 j d ^ ^ c ^ is not present in the τ&$9 
viz. ^Γ5ς[. Thus it will be seen t h a t both t h e invariable concom­
itance between the indicatory mark and t h e thing to be infer­
red and t h e connection of the indicatory mark with q^p· are 
necessary for a correct argument. 
1 4 7 . e*n% is t h e co-existence of the thing to be inferred 
C «4ΝΦ of HT^T ) witffi t h e indicatory mark ( #\H*i or ^ or f^sgr 
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or o^i^j) qualified by the absence of any extraneous circumstance 
(^mfèf)'» Thus there is ëqr% between ^ and ^f^3 because gp f^ 
is always found wherever gravis found; and this their concomitance 
is invariable, because it is not due to any external cause but to 
their very nature, as ^ra is the effect of ^ % . Thus it can be said 
'«CT 3Ϊ?Γ ψΚ rr^r c^ T 3%: ' . τ · S- defines s?n% a s % l f ^ £ t ^ ' 
it e. co-existence as a rule or invariable concomitance^ and this 
f^ppT or invariable character of the concomitance is more fully 
explained in T. D. (P. 83 ) as 6 ^ 4 ^ ^ Η ΐ ΐ ^ φ < υ η ^ ^ ^ Ν Ι ^ ^ Π Ρ ΐ -
jg l^^l^Hlfa^u^44. 5 This literally means 'the co-existence of 
mv|t | with ^nsq·, which is such that it can never be the counter-
entity of an absolute negation co-existing with the ^ τ or ^n^*f. 
Thus the^qt^i+ncjof q^ or q^can co-exist with ^pj and there­
fore 3?,'fi?6tc· are the counter-entities of the absolute negation 
co-existing with vra"; therefore the co-existence of *ro with ggr^  
q5 etc. in some cases cannot be ssnfcF· ^ u * 3^Τ*Π3Γ c a n uever 
co-exist with OT·; and so^f^ cannot be the counter-entity of an 
absolute negation co-existing with ^j·· therefore the concomitance 
of OT" with ^f|j is sqrr%. This means; in plain words, that 
^n^TT^n^ must never be found in a place where there is m ^ r j . 
If ^ven one instance be found where there is the < Ι^^ Η> but no 
ξΠ^Τ, the ô^rfçr falls down to the ground· 
Thus gqifg proper consists of two elements, ^ Γ ^ Η Ι ^ Φ * ^ 
and f^d<tf. 
This fa^dç?> or invariability, is the same as ^fij-MUWM ^ 
absence of violation ( of the concomitance ) or absence of an 
exception Le. a contrary instance in which there is m>=t«l but no 
^nsq·. This fa^dêcf or gqfa-dKt+JN is possible only when there 
is no jq i fe or some external cause bringing about the co-existence 
in the particular case. To take an instance, though /we can 
justly say ^ τ& ψξ: Γ^<Τ3Γ s j%, ' still we cannot' say *z& 
?f^  ^%* tt W% ^JT·'; k* other words, we cannot say that ^f|j is 
invariably associated with smoke. For though in a particular 
case we may find them together, still this co-existence is not 
invariable. There are exceptions or cases where there is fire, but 
no smoke, e. g. in a red hot ball of iron. And the reason of this 
is that there is ^mfe or Μ^Ι^ΗΦ ( s©e T. B. p. 39 ) viz. sn^P^f-
QM\H or connection with wet fuel, which alone makes it possible 
abat fire should be associated with smoke. On the other hand, smoke 
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is necessarily and invariably associated with fire, without a n y 
extraneous circumstance. Thus the word 3*ΓΡ^Γ*Π3Γί%ί^ Πΐ * α 
our text ultimately comes to the same as f ^ g ^
e 
What enables us to ascertain such a s q r % ? I t is t h e 
knowledge of the co-existence of the two things, accompanied 
by the absence of the knowledge of a contrary instance ( c5arf^ T* 
^ K ^ H f c ^ U g t k d U ^ ^ M ^ «4Ι.Ι(!ϋΙ£«|κ4ΐ3ί' Τ · ^ . Ρ* 8 δ )·• 
The ΐ Ε Π π Μ Τ ^ ί Φ ^ ' is ascertained by q r ^ u ^ p f , and the 
p N c M ky «srfH^TKsJ wBftÇ· Thus first we see several instances 
where smoke is found associated with fire ( ^ ^ u ^ p f * )· next 
any doubt about a contrary instance is removed by such reason-
ing based upon the relation of cause and effect between fire and 
smoke, as follows:—cIf there were no fire, then there cannot be 
smoke; as there is smoke, however, there must be fire ( 5φΰτ~ 
- c t K ^ H f a ^ ) . ' Then we come t o ascertain t h e invariable con­
comitance of smoke a n d fire. 
1 4 8 . ijgr=i4dl is the connection of the smm 1 or f%^ : with 
the q^f ( for the meaning of q ^ see section 152 ), or the thing of 
which we want to predicate the ^n^q·. This connection must, of 
course, extend to all the individuals included in t h e q ·^ ; other­
wise there would be t h e fault named ymufèrfqg» Thus in 
*ΜΖΤΦΙ3Η f ^ r « f Ç ^ S ^ R j / « Ï*CÎ%W î s found only in srTOTO» a 3 a d 
not in Έ(Ζ. Thus there is no q^ r^ PRêTT *η ^ e proper sense of the 
word· and so the ^ H + ( R * s ^ot correct. Thus the q - ^ ^ ^ f of the 
f^: must be q ^ R T T ^ ^ e ^ T ^ f ^ ^ N ^ f a t ^ - ^ac** i n Î © r P r e Î S tbe> 
definition in the text a little differently So as to bring th i s 
meaning d i r e c t l y : - ^ ^ ST^ T (%^b ) ïï^ré^^T:?' &fl$t meaning 
the same as ^ ^ Η ^ ^ Φ Ι ^ ^ Ι ^ ^ Ε ΐ ί τ Τ - But this is far-fetched; 
and the idea of «qîfq^f can be easily taken to be implied, 
1 4 9 . The f^: and ^TT^ are called s q r ^ and 5<mq<*> res-
pectively, with regard to the *?n% subsisting between them. 
Q i^qcfr lit. means that which pervades or is larger in extent, a$ 
opposed to squat which is pervaded by or included in the other, 
Thus in the case of OT- and ^-(^3 ^ f^ is ô^nq^, because it is found 
in a larger number of cases than vro; i. e. it is found in all the 
places where there is smoke and also soma other places where 
there is no smoke. On the other hand, ^ is τζητζξ, since it is 
found in a less number of instances t h a n ^ f | j . The places of 
smoke are all included in the places of fire. Of course, in some 
cases the ^nsq- and ^n^H m a y t>e coincident, i. e. t h e ςπ^Τ may b e 
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iound in exactly the same number of cases where the m ^ H is 
found and in no more; e, g. in the syllogism * q^ · 4^4 j ; l goft-
^Rc^T^ 1 >' ^ ^ T and j j u n s m ^ are coincident. Thus «41144 
must mean *not found in a less number of instances than the 
t ^ | U | or fo5^', and similarly ^mu\ must mean 'not found in a 
larger number of instances than the ο ^ ^ φ or ^nsq-\ 
I t should be noted here t h a t the ^ΤΜΦ-^ or ^ l ^ ^ i s to be 
determined by t h e greater or smaller number of instances in 
whieh the thing can be found. Thus Rs. 100 are really greater 
i n amount than Rs. 50, but are not Q n^jcfc with regard to Es . 
50, because instances of persons having Rs. 100 are less in 
number than those having Rs. 50. Thus we can say q ^ qj^ f 
4gJH*id^t*sM ?T?r W E r â a d ^ i : , b u t n o t t n e opposite. Thus 
^ J W t & l d ^ U l is ^ Ν Φ , and ^qcfe3ld4frl is «qx^, with regard 
to the other. 
150 . S^rRf ^t . means 'that which, being placed near, confers 
its nature upon another thing.' Thus a red flower causing a pure, 
white marble to look red on account of its vicinity, is an sqrrfèf. 
The redness of the marble is due, not to its own nature, bu t to ν 
something outside itself L e. to some external cause. Hence 
samfèr comes to denote an external cause. Thus the argument 
C
*phr: * t*Hl ·^ ^ t ^ H M i q / ^ould be possible if we should be 
able to say ^ τ& *f%: ^W ?m ψΐ'Λ feut t n a t & not the 
case; for OT[ is not the necessary consequence of fire by itself, 
but of its connection with wet fuel. Thus 3 f T j ^ H ^ 4 ^ i * s t h e 
5 Ht fa in the present instance, which qualifies t h e association of 
fire with smoke. To take another instance, '^nçf^T fiNn ^TOjf-
UtW'HJjii'SrT^T^I5 θ ΐ ^ τ ^ π ^ Τ ^ Γ does not necessarily follow from 
f ^ f l ^ ; that is to say, a certain act, because^t is an act of killing, 
cannot, for that very reason alone, be said to produce demerit; 
but it is jfrft^ç^ or being forbidden by scriptures, tha t is the 
άί^Π^Φ of 3P*4*HVHr4· Hence f ^ f q ^ ^ i s t h e ^qrf^- which quali­
fies the association of f^nc^fwith « f ^ T ^ T ^ T ^ j ^hich, therefore, 
Cannot be called s?n%. 
I t follows, therefore, from its very nature that an ^qrfw 
must be ^π ϊ^«Π53[Τ<Τ% *· e* t h e f^pqqf must not be invariably 
associated with the ^mf^·· for, otherwise, the grqrf^, being 
invariably present wherever the mvttf is, would cease to be 
^Tnfè . Thus if we can say τ& ^ ^ %
:
 ^ ^W w f ^ m & l f a : , 
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wë ean as well say ^  W% 3 % : <J5T ÇTW ^Jtt; for ^ j j îs invariably 
associated with 3Π4^Η*Ϊ^ΓΝΐ which is the cause of OT-# 
So also sqif^, by its very nature, must be ^ i i ^ m ^ i j ^ 
( W&fa 3WÏ 5*Π%: *Ρ?0> o r exactly coincident with the w&f* 
that is to say, ^nf^" should be the 5qiq$ of f^j^ j- which, in its 
turn, should also be the ^ nqf^ °^  the gTn'Bf, since ^qrf^- is the 
UM\*i* of the çfpar. Thus we ean say « ^ 3 ^ ^ : ^ g ^ ^ J * 
which but follows from the relation of cause and effect between 
3*uf*fcH*î^ '*I and ^ . If even one of these fails, ^tyrf^r would 
cease to be an ^crf^. 
Thus ^nf^r bas been defined in the text as Sgr^^^i^^^T 
f^% HT^^^o^tiy: | \ For its explanation in technical terms, see 
Pad. For the propriety of each of the words in the definition 
read—"βΤ^Π^ΤΠΤ^ 3T<TT&%g% 'sr&ST: ^T^: ^ î 4 ^ | ^ S T S ^ 
' ITOOT πζ% çrcqrçfitft ssrrçh %Μ\$\ «MiG^wngt ι ara1 TO 
aai&rftRi efutemd: swrç' i r^?r TO' ^ W i f i ^ i i ^ ^HIr ι 
^m% ι srsgs ^ ^ τ ί asn^rfiHcr CT^^ISR'4 ^ N I ^ I «TCF: 
I 3 ^ TO *t3ïd I HT^rg^:ÇRT ^ ^nf§ l^r :ÇRT^ 
**ρ3τ§*:*τ*τ **flfici% ^tmf^ m&^an a^terifc% ^nf^s^r^rr 
ψ δ Γ ^ ^ SnPRSTCT i n n r o ^ f t thr i f t : II" Mita. P. 61, 62. 
The presence of an ^qrf^ renders an S^FTTC falteeioûs, by 
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vit iating san%; for ^ q i f e , being the «4Μ*{Φ of t h e ^ T S ^ , takes 
away with i t the CT&3 from t h e q ^ in question. Thus, in t h e 
instance, Λ ^ ^ ^FT^T^ 3%:*' « η ^ Γ Η Η ^ Τ is the.aqnM» o f ^JF; 
:that is to say, s r a is impossible without a n ^ V H ^ j ^ H » Thus 
the absence of 3TT%^«t<tj<Jl^ necessarily involves t h e absence of 
OT; and thus a ô^ f s^ î^ or contrary instance (i. e. the mountain 
itself which has g ^ bu t no sro for want of s n ^ ^ r e ^ î î ) 
-vitiates the sqr% V ^ ^ W%: 33Γ 3W ^JT:/ Cf. '«M<ftNl<|*l4 
1 5 1 . ό^|(^| ; or invariable concomitance between #\ΗΛ and 
^n^f, can be expressed in two forms, either positive or negative. 
Thus i t may be said ^ q ^ ψς
:
 ^ 3 ^ s r % ' o r ?«m qsr «(<3-
*Π^: ξΓ^ " ^ " ^ΡΠ¥ΓΤ^:5' both t h e assertions meaning one and the 
same thing. To say t h a t smoke is invariably associated with fire 
o r i s impossible without fire, is the same as to say t h a t where 
there is no fire, there can be no smoke. The first is called 3773^·. 
* * Π % and the second ο ^ ΐ ^ $ 3 3 Π % . 
The sq(d<cfr<&*4r% follows from t h e ^ k c H ^ i f e by the process 
of obverted conversion. T h u s — 
3Γ5Τ ^  ψ τ : *Γ3Γ *m 3 % = 'All smoky places are fiery/ 
;
 By obversion, 'No smoky places are not-fiery/ 
- By conversion, eNo not-fiery places are smoky;' 
L e. 'All not-fiery places are not-smoky7 
^ Thus i t can bè clearly seen that the ΒΠίΤ^ of m^H» which is 
5?ntq in the sn^s^ïTÎHi becomes 5^m^> in the ssrf^gjs^rfçr; 
and the SWT^1 of ξΠ^ΤΓ5 which is gqmcfr in t h e former, becomes 
sqrs^F in the latter. 
( S'lokavartika, Anumâna-parichchheda, verse 121, ) 
w*£t m^k *m*$ m&t ssw+iÎMà ! 
Thus, really speaking, both the ^χ ί ϊΓ 3 c a n ^ e predicated of ..an 
indicatory mark, of which any one of these can be; since" one is 
only a -paraphrase of t h e other. But t h a t is not t h e case, I t 
is a ru le ' that the ε ι π % is not complete wi thout a corresponding 
il lustration. A n d it may happen that though there may be an 
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illustration for one kind of sgT%j there may be none for the 
other. I t is thus that a ^ j or indicatory mark is threefold:— 
( I ) 3>**<SM4k o r ^ a t °^ w a i ° n o n V ®n^^^Tlf|r *s possible, but 
no «2rf3^53T% for want of an illustration e. g. s gs: srfiT^T: 1 
J^ii^^l^Lt ^T^^sra^ ^ ^ ^ r f ^ T ^ n ^ t ^glTtrg: I.5 But if we say 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ R T ^ ^ I ^ N : ^m WZ Μ Ϊ Ν ^ Ι ^ Μ : , ' wecannot point out 
an instance ; for there is nothing which is possessed of srRr^T-
τφ4ΪΙ5 and M A ^ ^ I ^ M ? everything without exception being qrfcf 
and srfvr^T. * u other words, there is no firq^r ( see sec. 153 ). 
( 2 ) φ ^ ^ £ & & , or that of which only ^ Κ ^ Φ * Η & is possible, 
but no s w ^ ^ i Î H ; e* $m ΛΆ^^^Μ 4JI^«È Hiuill^4ix«t'l<' *"IST 
•<«k*&.OT MW»%*Kft I «TOT *S: V. But if we say ^ 5 Τ Ι ^ Ι ^ < 
H^ C ^ i ^ W ? w e cannot point out an instance, because everything 
that is snmtf^H<^and *Uç*H>*s included in the i&g itself. Thus 
there is no ÇTTîJ ( see sec. 153 ). All definitions or ^ ^ T J S are 
instances of φ ^ ^ ^ f c K & ^ (see above, section 65 ). ( 3 ) H J ^ ^ -
^ k i ^ # ) or that of which both the 3Π=3??€3Τ% ^ d the 5^&<Φ-
5?Π% are possible e. g. qsfcft W%FTT^  -I ^ ^ W l < l W cRT 
A correct indicatory mark is characterised by the following 
five attributes, which, really speaking, follow from the very 
nature of 3f«pn«t consisting of the two elements of sqr% ^ n ^ 
W^ihrT· The attributes are—(1) q%j^ m ^ or q%ra&4 **«.' being 
present in all the individuals included in theq^j; ( 2 ) ^ y q ^ q ( ^ ^ 
o r
 3-Π%Ν^*^ *' e' being present in a similar instance (*. e. a 
place which has the ^nvq^ and is other than the q^j ) if such is 
possible; (3) fe^Urffcqi^fd: *· e- being absent from a dissimilar 
instance ( L e. a place which is void of the ςπ^? ) if such is 
possible; (4) SHlfadfa**^^ *· e* n0^ having the f^pr or qtfsq 
disproved by a stronger proof; and (5) 3^Μ&Μ%Μ i.e. not having 
a rival indicatory mark which proves the opposite of the #\\j\ 
( see section 34 above ). The last four characteristics follow from 
the very nature of s^ffsl· Thus all the five characteristics are 
essential to an ^ « ^ « ^ ( ^ &$ς|. But H^^MUM' is impossible 
in the case of a ^ ^ ^ { ^ { φ ^ for want of a cfq^r, which has 
thus the four remaining character ist ics and is gq%t&^|. RmfrU4' 
^ i ^ f o is similarly impossible in the case of a ^ ^ r ^ f ^ g , for 
wanfrofa^q^. 
Thus-in the instance «qs&ft A%W^ \ ^ΠΓχ^Γ^ V ψϊ is 
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present on the mountain, as alsoln a kitchen which has fire, but 
is absent from a pool of water, which is void of fire. Its ^ T^JV 
the 3r%5 is n°i> disproved by another proof e. g. direct perception;, 
nor is there any other %g which can prove the absence of fire 
from the mountain. Thus OT-, which is ^Η^^ίτΗΪΦ? satisfies 
the five requisites. 
The SMHfrfd also * s regarded as-threefold, corresponding to 
the threefold character of the f l ^ ( see section 34 ). The five 
characteristics, described above, are spoken of as 3*Wjh&' *η 
sec. 34, where n^tCT means both 4c||%A^4jM a n <* *Τ?ΡΤΪ3*Π«Τ· 
Of course, the variety ^«-ej^sqf^ÊE only is implied, where alone-
all -the five characteristics hold good. 
152. Here the author goes on to explain the meaning of 
<rsr, W&S and £ q ^ 
What is mentioned as something, of which the thing to be 
inferred is doubtful, is q^r. Thus a mountain is a q f^5 because 
it is a matter of doubt whether it has fire or not. In the case 
in which we know positively that the mountain has got fire, but 
we wish to prove the same to another by means of a syllogism,, 
the mountain ceases to be a q^y for want of a doubt. To remove^ 
this objection, it is said that even a desire to prove, even though 
there be no doubt, is sufficient to make a thing q^f for purposes 
of argument. With this view, qgrgr *s defined in T. S. (p. 79) as-
3ï^fj^; ) i. e. the absence of certain knowledge characterised by 
the absence of a desire to prove. Such a |%f^ vpum is possible 
in three ways:— 
( 1 ) No #nmrfïpïri%*f l» t % % only; i. e. there is £)*ΠΦ£ΑΠΓ,' 
though there is also %f^ or certain knowledge e. g. in the-
ordinary instance when we know that the mountain has got 
fire, but we wish to prove the same to another. 
( 2 ) Ήο $\*4mÏMmÇki£ and no %f^  also, i. e. there is a 
desire to prove, as well as a doubt, e. g. when we first want to 
prove the presence of fire on the mountain, of which we are 
doubtful. 
( 3 ) There is fam^famfa^ but no fiiQg, i. e. there is no 
desire to prove nor a certain knowledge e. g. when we infer 
the presence of clouds from hearing the thundering in the sky. 
Thus it would be seen that either fam^&Ml ( a desire ta 
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prove) or {^ ΠΓ^Γ^Π^ (absence of certain knowledge ) is sufficient 
t o make a thing a q-g- proper. 
1 5 3 . A T^T^ T i s a similar instance which is positively known 
to be the abode of t h e thing to be inferred ( f i r f ^ 5Π^3Τ^ΙΦ*ΜΪ 
3^sr 3Π^:)> e* 9* a kitchen having fire, in the argument S j ^ f t 
^fepj-CT ^ΤίΠτί'* Ά- f^T^f * s a dissimilar instance which is 
positively known to be void of the thing to be inferred, e. g. a 
pool of waterj in the same argument. 
154 . 3ïgïn«T k a S a i u twofold, ^ γ ^ a ^ d q ^ ( see sec. 
34 above ). When a man infers something for himself by a 
mental process without any formal expression of t h e same, that 
is called ^TOT3*rT*r. ^Tîfef i s defined in the text as a r e f e ^ ^ 
which is explained by Pad. as ^ | ^ i M 4 ^ M < w 1 f a M ^ M 4 j | / 
When, however, a man expresses the inference in" proper 
words in a particular form for the sake of another, that i& 
called q n ^ M ^ κ i. e, the formal syllogism consisting of five 
constituents ( for which see section 156 ). ^l^M^Ti^MiW^T' 
ftpRsp^-HPad. % δ ^ : i j d v ^ l : ΐ Μ Ν Φ Ϊ Wim ψ&&&ζ~-ίιιχ. 
1 5 5 . This line is interpreted by Mita, and Jin. as an 
argument for not regarding ^js^ as an independent im\ii{ which 
t h e Xaiyâyikas do; and then i t can be translated t h u s : — W o r d 
also is an inference, owing to its object being l ike that of 
inference and owing to its depending upon the relation of in-
variable concomitance.' 
^rs^, the- Vais'eshikas say, is included in Sjg+HH or is of the 
nature of 3?37ΤΤ«Γ9 for two reasons:—1st, the object of $|£^ is 
something indirect as opposed to that of ΐΓ^Γ^ΓίΓίΤΜ; a n < ^ ^ n e 
same is the case with 3W+jH. Or g f ^ R Q * ^ ^ may be „akeu 
to mean, as Pad. proposes, that s^s^also produces indirect know­
ledge, just like a j ^ j H * ^ h e argument may be formally expressed 
thus:— ί 3Ι3ξ: ^r^TTR^I ϋ ^ | ϋ | ^ STÎïï rô^fè^^ï^^SÏSÎl'W^-
ccir^r ï 31^41 M 4 < I ' . 2ndly, ^z^ also cannot produce its know-
ledge, without depending upon ε?π% o r 3ϊί^ϊΤ3Π^ ( ^*· n o t &e-
ing without the other). For instance, when we ut ter some words 
* & e ^U±iMJ4 !p£T y§'«f/ before their sense is conveyed to our 
mind, we go through some such mental process * as this—· 
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association of words with sense, which enables a word to produce 
its sense. The same is the case with Yedic sentences like 
'Sïfëité I f n g ; w W w I'. For t î i e s e reasons ^jc^ should not 
be regarded as a third sj4{iu(. 
If we take the line before us by itself, the interpretation 
Just given is quite reasonable and correct, and is supported by 
tradition. Even in P. B. ( p. 213 ) we have %οξΓ^Π?Γ3Τ3*Π-
on which Ν. Κ. remarks—'...^FT W Î B W Î U M S W I ^ Î I H 5ΠΤ#$ 
But there are objections against it, on the ground of context. 
First, a defence of the view of ^ d being included in 3T37ÎTC 
should very reasonably take its place at the end of the 3?«j+iM 
section, whereas, as it is, it is in the midst of the same. Secondly, 
we should expect something corresponding to it in the ^ 3 1 por-
tion of the book, just as, for instance, towards the close of that 
portion the author has tried to show that r^frK, ^lt^M, ^W& 
etc., instead of being regarded as independent qô[î^s> should be 
included in any one of the seven. For these reasons, Pad, 
proposes another way of interpreting the line so as to be in con-
formity with what immediately precedes,mz. <qxt^r^ ^To^^q^sr.1 
How words can form the nature of 3π?π*Γ is "explained in this 
line· Words are metaphorically said to constitute 3T37TTO—first, 
because they are necessary for 3nra"FT proper or fè^*iHimtt 
{ styjJW &Φϊ: W * T : 3ïg4{MCtwr: TOT ^ TT :^ S T J H T s r i ^ n ^ ) 
^nd thus they give rise to 3Ι<37ΪΓ%; a n ( ^ secondly, because they 
help to produce fe^iHt+^ by first stating the s^tÎH ai*d thus 
they depend upon s*n% a s niuch as 3Mmq does. Thus the 
-*!«449JM of *tg44M really means ^ ^ ^ ^ « U l ^ f a N ^ i- e. 
having the fô^Ktjj^ or other mental process essential to 
3î«jRtRf5 expressed in the form of formal syllogism. 
Thus, though, really speaking, fe^tKI^I alorLe> which is a 
omental conception, is a^m*i, still the formal syllogism or tffjvfi-
QM Κ is secondarily designated by the word 3<«UJH, since it 
serves to give expression to &#mUJ31 or real ^τ^ΤΠΤ- Thus the 
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twofold distinction of q?H *^H4flH and M^[V|Î^R *s on^y *· 
matter of convenience, as one cannot do without the other, or 
a s
 W^?rfm«i is only the expression in words of ^HMHm«i 
which is barely a mental process. 
The second view is to be preferred out of regard for the 
context, though the first view is familiar and would be not 
incorrect, if the line were found at the close of the dwm«f section. 
156. The formal syllogism in which TO^fl^i+lH k expres-
sed and which, therefore, may be styled as q ^ W I ^ H itself, 
consists of five constituents:—(l)srf^Tor assertion, which states 
t the q^j as possessed of the ^ n ^ , e. g. ' q^r ; W%*Tn .^' I*3 
purpose is to assert what is going to be proved. ( 2 ) ^ j or reason, 
which states the f%gi or indicatory mark as abiding in the q^j, 
^· 9- **\1\^τΑ\ύ? ^ s purpose is to state in brief the evidence on 
which we proceed to prove. [ Here it should be noted that some 
sort of distinction seems to-be made between the word f&^ and 
^ J . f l ^ *$ the indicatory mark itself e. g. OTJ-, while ^ j is a full 
statement of or a sentence stating the fe$ e. g, y ^ ^ ^ l ^ . 
However this distinction is not strictly followed in writing, nor 
is it important. ] ( 3 ) sd^l^m i. e. proposition or example, which 
states the samcr with an instance, e. g. ^ % s j p n ^ S T ^ ^ % Ή ^ 
^rar <H4N4d:<»? Its purpose is to state the connection between the 
evidence and the thing to be proved, which enables the latter to 
be inferred from the former. (The word ^g|7Çf in the text 
necessarily implies *?n%, because the idea of a ^CT*TPS impossible 
without the s^ rfCT which is to be illustrated thereby· One Ms., 
however, actually reads Ή*τΗΝ> g&I^3TM4^!4W*i'- ) ( i ) 
<4<H44 or application, which states the q^u^l proper L e. applies 
the general rule to the special case in question, e. g. 'ajq- ^%-
v q i m ^ c H ^ , 3 generally contracted into '$& ^^ΠίΤ5· I t s purpose 
i s to show the relevency of the preceding statement, ( δ ) faj^wi 
or conclusion, which states that the qsy is connected with çniar, 
owing to its connection with the f|^, e. g. Vwi^M ? ί ^ Η Ι ^ \ 
often contracted into %3ΠτΤ«π'. I t s purpose is tostatethat the 
conclusion follows, there being no opposing circumstance such as 
contradiction by another stronger im\u\ or by another ^ ^ r . 
157. After having described the nature of a right ^ j , the 
author proceeds to exglain what a fallacious %π means, whose 
knowledge is quite essential for proper inference/The word^ç^r-
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3jTçf is generally used in two senses—either to mean the fault in 
» %3<kSb ^TiTRr:)*. Λ the<*fas («. $r. the « % % , fspfcr» «ifo-grc, 
a r a u i ^ H , ^ r a r a n d ^ ^ f a q % | < ^ ) which render a ^ f a l l a c i o u s ; or 
t o mean a faulty ^frj, ί. e. a ^ j which is rendered fallacious by 
virtue of the several faults. Thus a ^^Tsn^T nieans a fallacy or 
a fallacious indicatory mark, in which latter sense, however, t h e 
word is used in the text. A ^ ^ { ^ f in the first sense may be 
object of right knowledge which obstructs a^ f i j fa o r i* 3 
special cause. Thus Ο^ΓΗ-^Κ, 3TO etc. are ^'^I^KTS? since their 
knowledge obstructs siwfiffd or right inference either directly 
or indirectly through vitiating the precedents of ^nfr l fd viz. 
s ? n % or q^p^ifor. I n the second sense, a | ^ t ^ ï ( â | § i n 
appearance only and not in r e a l i t y — ^ ^ 3 + | | ^ + t H * ) may be 
defined as \ BT^-fa^^; ξφ** *· e* a ^ 5 wanting in any of the five 
characteristics stated above. 
These ^r^ j^ i^s are only three in number according t o V - S . 
C^fe<? f^*3C & *i !%*%)• 3?· B. has four—the same three wi th 
ϋ φ ^ υ ^ μ ΐ and ^ t ^ ^ ^ m ^ ) , which is t h e generally accepted 
number. Accordingly Mu., T. S., T. B., T. R. and such other 
manuals t reat of only five §ç^P3W s · ^ u t S'ivâdifya states six 
%^T?HHS instead of five. 
1 5 8 . 3T%3[ lit»· nieans ' tha t which is void of %f^'; and 
fijfeT means i the ascertainment of the ^ j as a f^g: proper·* 
This consists in the ^ j being possessed of ssnfçf and abiding in 
the ifsgT '*tmt ?3P*4c4Udffir: fef^:' Τ, Κ (p. 22*); and t h e 
absence of such a fçrf^r makes a ^ srf&^. Thus a | ^ j is ^ i f i l ^ 
for want of €3Π%, or of the q-^ f, or of the ^TJ, being present in 
t h e q ^ ; and accordingly a i f ^ r is of three k i n d s — o - m ^ ^ i f a ^ ; , 
^ΤΐίΠπ'^Γ^ and ^ ^ q r f e ^ -
' ^ f ^ t H A ^ K 1 ^ f t ^ x g » ^ I ' i s an instance of t h e ο ^ Τ Γ ^ ^ τ ί ^ -
%^T^TRT; because here the association of fire with smoke is not 
due to their nature by itself but to the ^ q i f^ viz. 3f nfT^rcrctn» 
and hence is not invariable. Thus in the case of a red hot ball of 
iron, there is fire but no smoke for want of 3Ujf«-M«KJ4fr*l« Hence * 
^ n * f t i u R l < is also called ç f o r r f ^ f ^ W T ^ STTffrl· one of 
the five essential characteristics, is wanting here. 
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33W;I i b f i R R ^ T ^ »' a r e instances of this kind of t ^ P T R T , ftft--
^ T and *!Wq*N'ftuiW being Φπ$ρ respectively. 
^ Η Η Κ θ ^ 3g*fàf I ST tKl^wq , I ^ R N r R ^ F ? ^ I* is an 
instance of sm^f f i rg ; , since here the srrsnr or ψ$ viz. ïTTRR^^ t 
is not existent. 
% ^ : « r f ^ : I ΐ3Τ§Γ*^Π3Ί ^ ε ^ Ι 5 is an instance of ^ ^ m R | < j 
since here the ^<j i :3TSf^^55 though invariably associated -with 
erPtVj^', is not present in the q ^ , ^fs^ never being an object 
of ocular perception. 
I n both these varieties q ^ f ^ ^ · , one of the five character­
istics, is wanting. 
Some Mss. and the commentaries Mita, and J i n . read 
*Tgre*i^«i for feaJH, which can apply to 3n*H4lR<< and 
^t^Mtfa<' oinjy and not to ^ ( I ^ I R H ^ . ^ n e last then will 
have to be included in %i^<fe|fcicb, which seems to be against the 
general practice. , -
1 5 9 . f ^ t ^ is that, in which there is a contradiction. The 
^ | in question, instead of proving the çftçq1 intended, goes to 
.prove the opposite of the çjrs^f. Hence the f%^r is present in 
the φ$ and the fèq^f only, but as a rule absent from the ^ΠΤ3Γ· 
Thus t h e f%$% is q - g r f è q ^ i ^ q Î ^ . ' ^ F ^ : fasr: I $<!4rc4l<JL I"* 
is an instance of this kind of | ^ τ ^ Π Η . H e r e the ^ j , φ^Φ<^, is 
never found in any eternal thing, but is found in non-eternal 
things only. Thus φ^φ<^ can only prove P t ^ r ^ W N instead of 
'£kU«i· Τη™3 a | g which is f^^ is m*H| |<HN^IH a n d n o t 
çn^j^mÇF which a right ^ j should be; for in the instance above, 
we can say ^ ^ $ 3 4 * 4 Γ^5Γ ^ r ^ f T O f f r W ' s f o ' instead of 
*^Br ^ ^ c i ^ # G& ÇT3" ft<*M^> for which there is no instance 
at all. Here ^pT^t ^f^ and f^qsgTR' s^I^fëf are both violated. -
1 6 0 . S i 3 * l P d * lit. means not ^ φ ί Ρ ^ φ , ^ r f ^ ^ (ψ$: 3ΠτΠ 
^ ^ d < 0 means 'having only one definite extreme,' i. e. tending to 
prove only one thing. Thus ^ Η Φ ί Ρ ^ Φ nieans cnot tending to 
one extreme only b u t also its opposite.' Thus a ^ j which is 
associated with the çn^y in question as well as its opposite is 
called θ Η Φ ί ί ^ φ . Such a ^ j is present in t h e q^·, STT3T and 
f ^ T also. Thus $ Α φ Ι & Ι Φ ^ is defined a s q ^ ^ p ^ t h e qq&q 
meaning qrg-, ^q^ and $&%[. I n t h e instance, 'tpfgt ^ f t ^ K 1 
il44^<;cji^ I5, ^î)^çcf is present in places having fire as well as in 
places without fire. Thus 3H<ferfrdq> is also called ^o^ fa^K» 
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because i t involves a violation of the sqr%, there being an 
instance having the ^ | without the çnsq". Here f^ r^ STST ^ l ^ f d 
is wanting. 
I t should be noted that the ^ΗΦίΠ-^Φ? a s defined here 
( viz, q^T^Jdfd ) , stands for only what is generally called 
are regarded as only two varieties of t h e θΗΦΐΡ-οΦ5 according 
to those who admit only ûre 4 ^ 1 m ^ s and not six. 
«mm^lf i f t^ and 3H<frlPd=fr resemble each other, in as 
much as both violate sqrfcj by being present in the feq%[ also; 
and according to one view both are regarded as one and the. same. 
But they can be also distinguished from each other by t h e fact 
that in the e3nçq^r%q£5 t he presence of an ^ iyrf^ in the technical 
sense of the word prominently strikes us, which is not the ease 
with the 3ΗΦΐΡτίΦ» I n the former the idea that t h e çfrsT 
is due to some extraneous cause and not to the ^rp£*f by 
its very nature, is more prominent, whereas in the latter the 
idea that the ^ n ^ q is associated both with t h e w*q and its 
SPHfT^ f is œore prominent. 
Really speaking, | C c j ^ | ^ 3 can be only of two kinds, accord- -
ing as they violate q-gn^fll or ssn%5 * n e Î w 0 constituents of 
fe^Mim^l- And in a way, the definition of a t f a ^ given above 
is applicable to all the^ç^pfnçfs, since fçffêgr practically amounts 
t ° fe^M<\MA> &xit *>ûe different varieties are made for conveni-
ence's sake, distinguished by the prominence of some special kind 
of error. Thus i t may sometimes happen that one and the same 
^ j may be shown to be possessed of more than one fallacy from 
different points of view. Still i t is to be named after that 
which is most prominent and which strikes us first of all. c ^ q ^ T -
^ r ^ S f r Sqrsb s re^*: 5 T. C. ( Anumânakhanda F t . I L , p. 926). 
Cf. ' s r f f c ? ? ^ ^ΓξΓ^Γ Ι ^ Γ : <Γ$η*&ϊ*ΓΓ Ϊ Π Μ Γ : & ί < ^ * Π 3 Ϊ 3 -
%&*&• "a*rrft w τ mw$ preterit t $t H* *ni mtà 3*: 
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*TW^ ΦΠΐ&ι ^ s % ^ [ : | 5 T. Β. ( p. 167 ). 
R ^ and ^ Φ ί Ρ τ ί φ are both present in the fsfT$T; o u t t n ^ 
former is never present in the ςρτ$Γ, while θΑφ| Ρτ<Φ îs. 
161. 3H*=^3fad lit· means that which is void of 3{%3Γ3ξΐΤ3Γ 
or any kind of ascertained knowledge. Thus that ^ r which 
can neither be said to be associated with the ^nsq· nor with its-
opposite, owing to its being present in the x&g only, is called 
3WV^fod^;4l+»a. Thus in % s ç ; sr^Tc*:, ^ Π ^ Π ^ — t h e | § 
*$1*%Φ? is found only in ^ i ^ , and in no other eternal or non-
eternal thing. 
If, however, q ^ n ^ l f ^ W alone were the definition of 
àf«t^4'RWg t nen even a right % ^ ^ q f g ^ % | g would become 
SHfc^fÀa; for that is also found only in the qgj. Hence the 
phrase ^ | ^ | ^ | ^ Φ ^ ' ^ Γ ^ Τ ? is necessary. That |^ j which is present 
only in the x&$ and which is incapable, for that reason, of proving 
the ^fj^q is 3j«paHfad; whereas a ^ ^ ^ ^ ί ί κ ί φ ^ ^ does prove 
the ^T^T. This difference between the two can be briefly 
accounted for by the fact that in the case of the %^^>^fe^%, 
there is no ςπΤ$Γ possible at all, though the ^ | is invariably 
associated with the ξΠ^ϊ; a n { l hence %pj§ φξ$ is violated there 
for want of a ςρ?§?. At least the e4&^4>«4jii|f oaû be positively 
and justly ascertained; On the other hand, in the case of the 
3HV~H&^? there is the ^qfg e. g. a thing possessed of non* 
eternity like a pot etc.; still the çrWT *s not found to be present 
in any such ςρ?§Γ; and hence there is the doubt whether the 
^I^H is able to prove the ςπ^Γ o r n ° k 
I t may be noted that this sreu^faëf is nothing but the 
^^ΠΚ
υ<ΜΦΐΡΜΦί a subdivision of ^iH^lPd^? which is defined 
as *3faqgTÊTO«t]^ : ^SiTOT^î^:5 by Τ- 'S. ( p. 103 ). 
162. ^ ι ^ Ι ^ Ι Ψ ^ ϋ ut. means 'îçre^r Μ<ΜΜή 3iqfi'3g:' i e: 
stated when the fit time for it has passed away. I t is only when 
the ςπ33Γ * s doubtful, that the #m*\ should come in and help us 
to solve the doubt and ascertain the presence of the OT^· But 
when there is no more doubt, the opposite x>f the çn^î being 
ascertained, then the ^ professing to prove the ^fvs^ 13 
^ r a r a ^ n r ^ E and so, a % * Ϊ * Π 3 . [ %^t: 3ΓΪ^Β*Γ %HTS2TS^f* 
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^Thus, when the opposite of the ψ(\^ has been ascertained to 
be present in the q^y by some stronger proof, then the ^ j which 
is stated to prove the W£%, becomes Φ Ι ^ Ι ^ Ν Ϊ ^ — a l s o called 
^r f^r (lit. negated by a stronger proof), S ï f o BT^TOT: I φ ^ Φ ^ Ι ^ Ι 
Mi^cj^ p. Here ^ U M } the opposite of srgraJir^, is known to be­
long to fire by direct perception ( a<fl%|iU4lu| ) . Here 3i«f|fe<f-
Ι^*4*Μ3 one of the five characteristics, is violated. 
If it be objected that the mfÈreC should be as well 3ny^|fà<£, 
since here q^f^ in the sense of ^i^vifU^HJH1^ *s ^ ^ 1 1 * 
owing to the ^n^TOR* being absolutely determined, the answer 
is that this srfèrflsr of the TJ$JT necessarily presupposes m& and 
cannot be known without it. 
163. 5Τ^ΠΪΓ5ΠΤ, also called ^ s r % q ^
r
i s that %§ which has 
a rival § ^ of equal strength, going to prove the opposite of the 
Sfpa* in question. %s^ : ft^r; I « W W I < * ^ ^ < a * C , - V H e r e 
31 HUM is found in %t^<^ (since the ^ TTftT *s perceived by the 
same sense-organ by which the abode of that srrfo is perceived ) 
which is ftfcf, being a snflr* At the same time, however, we can 
say % ^
:
 srf^r: ι ^Hten^t HZ4\ Ι.' T i u i s h e r e t h e Is- **Μ*Η<=*' 
is *Kfffd*WT- Another instance may be given:—*ffs^; j ^ r : «rfSf-
çTM^î^d^ï< » sr^ Ç: *x$m: I &<κ^4*%τΜΐ< ». T*ms both 
the ^gs being of equal strength ( r^H3S ) , no definite conclu­
sion can be arrived at. 
-M4WKM1 lit. means sreiftHWK or a ^ u u H f a ^ ^ : ^ which 
leaves the subject in doubt as much after inference as before it, 
* ftwfifiwwT wriçprefir ^ft^srafij^i SKOTH t ^r-fjpft-
^W S*pE: ^ ^n^rn^nrq;S|«Mm4wRM3qM; W ^ ' ^ W 
5f œ&àt I 9 ( V. B. on G. S. I. 2. 7 ). 
Thus the ^M Idq^?414TTÇT *s possible only when the two 
%fjs,trying to prove the HT^T and its opposite,are of equal strength 
( gç4M&' ) . On the other hand, if one ^ j is stronger than the 
other ( ^qsiH^ ) , then that would be an instance of ^ rf^f. Some, 
however, would put this case also under ϋτΜ&ψ#, holding that 
*
n
 4i(vkl' *&θ negation must be due to a stronger proof which is 
necessarily other than inference. Thus, according to these, the 
distinction between grrf^r and K m & ^ i s that in the former a 
SHTTO other than 3*g*TR proves the ^TT^FVTTW, vhile in the latter 
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it is another a W i H , which may be stronger or not. But this 
view is not very reasonable, as:—1st, t he very idea of a MÎd Η 3? * s 
impossible without equality ( φ ^ < £ ^ ); a n ( l 2ndly, a stronger 
CT would negate the weaker one thus leaving no room for doubt, 
which is the very idea implied by the name ΜΦ υ^ΐ<Η±4* 
H e r e there is a great confusion regarding t h e original text. 
I have followed Pad. in this matter, though about section 163 
I am not sure t h a t Pad. follows exactly the text adopted here, 
which, however, is found in t h e Ms. F., 350 years old. Sections 
158 and 159 are read almost uniformly by all t h e commentators. 
But for sections 160, 161 and 163 Mita, has only ' ^ T ^ H ^ - H N -
ç r r e g ^ * i t d ^ t ^ 4 j ^ ? *H^sr being a general name including 
3?$Φΐ£τ1Φ? 3f«TViH'{*H a n < ^ Σ ^ ^ Π Τ . ^ n * n e c a s e °^ all these three 
"" t ^ W T H s ) * n e STC^ T ^ o e s n o ^ follow necessarily from the ^rpsR", 
of course, under different circumstances; and both t h e ^frs^and 
the ^ji^nvrre can be equally inferred from the Τ^Τ^ ΠΤ* * ^Γί^Γ 
fauWl+JNl·^ ^ ^ P ^ M ^ l ' — M i t a . , which also notices another 
reading t h u s : — - ' Φ Ρ Φ Η 3t%felfid4>M^Hfad4l: W ï T O P T - ^ P l t r 
*ΓξΤ < ϋ Ρ φ Μ ^ ΐ 3 ^ « | ^cMÎdM'g ς^Τ ϊΤΤΙΓ: I.' Jin/ reads for the 
same ^sections '4MU|d4+it44flttM S r f N * 1 ^ ^ * T^T^Ï^fèr: 
. T O R K N ' f i . f a ^ f l t S : SWtOROT: I' ai*d remarks thus— 6 $&-
wfè ^ξ^σΠΤί? *'. After showing how the definition of ^ f p ^ i ^ 
is applicable to t h e three severally, J in. remarks^-'q^jf ^rtSfif 
v
 . According to the views of Mita, and Jin. ^<-ί|&ΜξΓ or 
,W»iHW44 should be defined as ' ^ T ^ r & ^ N Î M T fe^A | § : % 
which is also the reading of some of our Mss. of . Saptapadârthî. 
This altogether differs from the nature of ^d^fdMgT as ex-
plained above* . The ^M fëuffi M ^ n a t f § which, is alike posses-
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led of tlie three characteristics, viz. wçpxffe) ^PT$r *C& »&<* 
& Μ ^ Ι ^ Π % ΐ % ? a s l t g ° e s t o prove the ^ n^f as well a s ^ π ^ Γ ^ Ν in 
t h e q g \ I t is instanced t h u s : - f ? i ^ : ^ ^
:
i f ^ c i q ^ ? n ^ ^ d ^ ^ t < l 
^ΓΤ^ΠΤ^ I ERS: ^ l ^ : q ^ P T ^ ^ R r ^ ^ m g ; I Çnrgreg; I ' .Here one 
and the same %g, viz. q g r e P T ^ ^ U - ^ d ^ *s present in the q^r, 
i n the T^T^ T a l ic* absent from fèq^T; for the q-^ f and c fq^ must * 
be qsgrerra^U^d*» which the fèrqg- cannot be. 
This is not, however, a reasonable view; for, in the first 
place, the definition is open to the fault of ^RIÎTW· H O W is/ i t 
possible t ha t one and the same ^ j should be possessed of the three 
characteristics, with regard to both the ^n^T aud its opposite? 
Thus with fif^r^f as the çn^T? TPT»r becomes *cpTa=r3 but the same 
becomes f ^ q ^ with regard to gfp^ci^. Now, if the | ^ j is present 
in 4HH t n e H ^ ^ Û 0 W c a n î*j a^ ^ e same time, be absent from 
the same sjiy^ as f^q^f ? Secondly, the | ^ 3 ?%Γ^*Τξ4Mii*Md*<^, is 
one only as far as the words go; but really, from the point of view 
of the sense, the ^ ? s are different. For, wi th regard to Η < ^ ^ ? the 
f g comes to mean ςτ^ΦΓΦΜίΙίΐΙφβ: 3TO3T d 4 U « ^ d i * « 9
 b u t
 w i t û 
regard to ^ft^ccf, it means 513?« 3CT%«P: W&$% d i k « ^ d W . 
The reading of the Ms. A. c m ^ d ^ M m m b c j ΣΓ^^Γ-
53+M4f? seems to be more consistent in form with the rest of t h e ' 
text; but I have not followed it here, as i t goes against t h e idea 
°^ 5Γ^νϊΤ^ΠΤΐ a s generally adopted. 
To compare English syllogism with Sanskrit, it will be seen 
t h a t t h e former consists of three premises, while t h e latter has 
five parts. But i t need not be supposed t h a t one wants some­
thing, or t h e other has,something superfluous.What is only im­
plied by t h e juxtaposition of t h e premises in English syllogism, 
is actually expressed in so many words in' Sanskrit. Besides5 
i h e tjdi«-d or ^ i ^ U j in Sanskrit, serves the purpose of h int ing 
a t the process by which we have arrived a t the general law of 
concomitance; while in English, we s tar t wi th t h e major premise 
which is taken for granted. Thus t h e Sanskrit syllogism com­
bines in a way both induction and deduction, while the English 
syllogism is purely deductive. 
While converting Sanskrit syllogism into English or vice-
versa, i t should be remembered that the | ^ j corresponds to the 
middle term, the 3ppaf^.to the major term, and the qrg- to the 
minor term. The ^ | g ^ u | excluding t h e ^ | H generally corres-
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ponds to the major premise, the ^ I H ^ to the minor premise, and 
the ffij|*H *° * n e conclusion. This is exactly the case with the 
mood JSarhava; but mutatis mutandis with other moods. 
The order of the premises in Sanskrit is based on the prin­
ciple of φ | φ ^ | or expectancy, and exactly resembles the method 
of Euclid which begins with enunciation corresponding to the 
Sanskrit ΪΠΓΓ^Π, J u s * *° produce expectancy in the mind of the 
hearer. How every following premise is a reply to a question 
raised in the mind by the preceding premise, can be easily seen, 
^ One thing more to be noted is that owing to the very nature 
of the Sanskrit terminology, no particular conclusion nor a nega-
tive:conclusion is possible. I t is always an A proposition. Thus the 
fallacies of the illicit major and illicit minor are never possible as 
such in Sanskrit. So also the ambiguous middle which would 
involve two ^TS has no place, or it would amount to the 3f% r^« 
^ ( ^ ^ t The undistributed middle very commonly comes to 
WH -^wUfàraC or *Π^ί*υΐΗΦΐΡτΙΦ. ^ & i i d ^ and Wlffo may be 
very well said to be material fallacies, for which there is no room 
in formal logic. 
164. In section 35, the author said that the cognitions,^ 
called ^ and ^jy, are included in cfero and fa q 4^1- Here he 
proceeds to define them in order, çjΈ$ consists in 'the imposition of 
the more extensive thing whieh is contrary to the thing desired.' 
I t corresponds to the'reductio-ad-absurdum' method and serves the 
same purpose. To take a particular instance, one wants to prove 
that the mountain has got fire, because he sees smoke thereon, 
Now the adversary, unwilling to admit the invariable association 
of smoke with fire, does not admit the fact. Thus the question is 
whether the mountain has got fire or not. Let us take for granted 
for the sake of the adversary that the mountain has got no fire· 
Then we argue—if there were no fire, there would be no smoke, 
( 5 % 3TW ^ΙΡΓΪΓΓΞΓ: ^ Π 3 ^ τ | 3TW ^TT?nwtsft W ^ ) ; because in the 
absence of the cause, the effect is impossible,. This is called ^4?. 
The conclusion thus forced, however, viz. the absence of smoke, 
is opposed by direct perception, since we see the smoke actually· 
^Thus the adversary is required to accept our proposition, via, the 
mountain has got fire, gf^  is defined by T, S. ' «*!l^ U4)$9T 
«<41ΜΦΙ<14:? £e. a deliberate imposition of a more extensive thing 
( e' 9- ^TWT^ )—wfiich is contradicted by direct experience or 
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"w-hich we know to be false—made necessary by the deliberate 
imposition of the less extensive thing ( e. g. ^ - φ Ρ Π ^ ) . Thus ^ 
helps us indirectly to arrive at a right conclusion; and it is regard­
ed generally as an independent variety of 3ΤϊΓ*ΤΤ5 since i t is dis­
tinguished from ^m and fiqjffiby the fact that t h e cogniser 
is conscious of the falseness of t h e conception ( e.g. the cognition 
of t h e absence of smoke ). B u t S'ivaditya includes it in t h e 
varieties already mentioned. The line {<i4^'tfT Φ ^ Ϊ Τ Φ Ϊ ^ ^ Ϊ ζ 3 * 
( section 35 ) is interpretecldifferently by the three commentators. 
J i n . explains i t by saying that { ^ is nothing but < j ^ , as i t 
refers to the two extremities, whether there is fire or not; and 
^5T is faqj^.' Mita, says t h a t 3 ^ may be ei ther ^ {M or fSttfifcr? 
while 3^jr is f q p r ^ . Pad. on the other hand, says t h a t g ^ is 
fèq4^' as it refers to ^raT^fT^ which is the opposite of m f 
actually present, and ^ j y may be either ^ ^ or f ^ q · ^ · 
I t seems on the whole more reasonable to regard ^% as an 
independent variety, owing to the special purpose which it serves 
viz. of contributing to produce a r ight conclusion. 
The word s r ç r ^ r occurring in the definition of ^% is 
explained next. I t consists in the statement of a negation which 
is contrary to the thing in question ( %Μ^£<#' 3 T O N ^ ^ ^ Π ξ ) * 
a n d which follows from t h e invariable concomitance between two 
negations ( sr^TR^t: 4<^çiN ) · T û u s t n e assertion of ^FTT^n^j 
in the instance above, following from the c^tÎH between ^g^Tïn^ 
and ^jn^n^" is the ïr^fëfîïof the^ fa^mqcfcand is t h e r e f o r e ^ » 
165· ^JT really means the condition of dreaming, when 
the mind abiding in the ar tery called μ ^ ι is in conjunction with 
the soul, and without any relation to the external sense-organs» 
But here i t is metaphorically used in the sense of the cognition 
in a dream, and is defined as 'the cognition produced by t h e 
internal sense-organ5 i. e. the mind, as it is vitiated by ( the 
influence of ) sleep. The external objects are not at all present; 
still the cognitions are produced. Thus qaa^jH should be a 
k ind of θΓ$Γϊπ·. I t is well described in t h e following passage 
from P. B. ( p. 183 ) where it is regarded as a fourth kind 
tâ vrfkm- along with ^ r s r , feç4*T and gp^^cffjcrpf.— 
Υβ ΝΟΤΕ& 
σπί^ ^Τ#π^Τ^«:ΦΚΙ*3ΪΤ *ΠΓ^Ϊ I ' B u t S'ivâditya includes ^ r 
in R l M ^ ( s e e section 35 )3 as it refers to objects which do not 
really exist as such. T. D. ( p. 164 ) also says '^ST^r 
WwÛfaq4<«4'wlK ^ t H ^ r f N f a : ϊ5. τ · Β · ( Ρ* 1 5 0 )ι however, 
regards i t as a k ind of ^ r ^ n ^ ^ R P Ï a n ( * n o * 3T5F?TT or snrsnsfi^-
I t should be noted that the individual soul has three condi-
tions, 3Π3ϊ^, 3ïïr and § f % . CRT is distinguished from g f % 
by the fact that in the former the mind is in conjunction wi th 
the soul, thus producing mental cognitions, whereas in the latter 
there is no such conjunction, the mind entering the particular 
par t of the heart called *KtrRT; though in both, the mind is free 
from all connection with external sense-organs. 
fa;*! occuring in the definition of ^ j y , is next defined as 
s
 the abiding of the mind in a region where i t is free from all 
connection with the external sense-organs, provided the mind 
is not possessed of the powers acquired by sfar.' The last part 
is necessary to exclude ^+Hp? o r a trance, when the M\4{\ 
deliberately separates his mind from all sense-organs, by virtue 
of his control acquired by the practice of qfaî. 
166. According to many wri ters on Nyaya, îr^^ÎJ^ïT *s °^ 
two kinds—^ΗΦ<?ΜΦ a n d ^ ί ^ φ ^ φ i.e. indeterminate or incom-
plex cognition, and determinate or complex cognition. When a 
th ing—a jar, for instance—gradually comes within the range of 
our sight, we are first conscious t h a t there is something without 
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any reference to what i t exactly is. I t is after some time where 
we see t h e thing more closely, that we come to know t h a t it is 
a q"£? with all its attributes. The former is an indeterminate 
cognition, and the latter, a determinate cognition. 
ΡίΝΦ^ΜΦ^Η *
s
 defined here as 'the apprehension of t h e 
thing only, apart from its attributes.' I t is Ρ ΐ ^ Φ Κ Φ ^ Κ ( ^ · 
S., p. 70), or fe^MU|fagr^*H^N^U% w* ( τ · D · X t h a t i s ' a 
cognition which has no reference to the connection between t h a 
Î5$l<m and the fa^qgy or %^\ς of t h e ?tm. Thus in t h e cogna­
tion s3{qf Έ&:\ Έ& is the fa^fo^ and ^ g - is the SF$&r, The fsrf^ 
^^ΜΦ^ίί^, however, is of the form cœ ( φ { ^ ^ ? The object, apar t 
from its attributes, and the attributes may have been separately 
known; but their mutual connection is not yet perceived. 
On the other hand, ^ Η Φ ^ Φ ^ Μ refers to this connection 
and is therefore defined as 'the apprehension of a thing with its 
a t t r ibutes . ' I t is <^ΦΚΦ;?Η (T. S. p. 70 ), or «mi^ï<&ï%-
Î ^ ^ Î f e ^ ^ ^ ^ M N ^ l ? ^ Wïï ( T* ϋ · )> i n t b e f o r m ' ΜΑ?4«Π·£ 
sNi" ^Ξ: ? which is invariably the form of our cognitions in 
practice. 
S'ivâditya says ( section 36 ) that these two kinds may be 
as well included in S&R or sfir^T according to possibility and are 
not to be treated as separate varieties. Thus ί ^ Γ ^ φ ς ^ Φ ^ Η * s 
always STfJl and can never be 3Ϊ5ΠΪΤ, since the ^ τ τ 4 ^ o r SRPTT^^T 
of a cognition is due to t h e ΜΦΚ- °^ which, however, there is no 
reference in the frriif^T^sjPT. Whereas ^ Γ Γ ^ Μ Ι Φ ^ Η m a y be 
ei ther sCHT or 3ΠΤ?ϊΤ, according as we perceive a fa^mui or l\^[i 
in a [ ^ ^ ^ ' which is possessed of that f ^ q o ? or otherwise. 
167. ΐϊ^τΐϊτ^Τ, or recognition, is ' the apprehension of a 
a thing, characterised by the idea of being past,3 in t h e form * ^ s 4 
φ $ ^ : 5 ? ΐ. e. this Devadatta ( whom I see presently ) is t h e 
same as t h a t I saw before. Thus this sort of cognition consists 
of two p a r t s — ^ n and ^ F t ( d ^ d N ^ R m J * ^ T ^ Ν. P. p. 74), 
of which t h e perception of g ^ j is produced by the sense-organ, 
while t h a t of ^ n " , by t h e impression left by a previous appre­
hension of the object. ( ^ k ^ f g ^ r ^ ^ f H d ^ ^ K ^ ^ ^ d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " 
^ M d M consists in cognising an object to be the means -of 
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^ m ^ H ^ j M consists in cognising an object to be the means of 
pleasure or of acquiring our desired object ( jjQMRf 3Γ^Π%-
3 ^ 1 % ^ M K N ^ f a : Ν · P · P· 2 9 )· ^ W ï ï consists in cognis-
". ing an object to be neither desirable nor otherwise, which there* 
fore produces an att i tude of indifference ( ^ ρ π ^ Τ Η ^ % ^ i l ^ 
WflWkMdfa: sWwf&p'l N. P. p. 29). 
All these four kinds of cognitions ( i, e. sr^rf^T^T, ^ R , 
3HMH and ^tr^n" ) a r e η Ό ^ t 0 k e t reated as so many separate 
varieties, but a re to be included in s&f\ or 3Γ5ΓΪΓΤ according as 
they are srsnsf or sresfpl ( s e c * 37). 
1 6 8 . 3^", or conjecture, is t h a t knowledge of incertitude, in 
which one extreme appears more prominently t h a n the other. 
I n a <H^ H4 P r o P e r 5 i*
1
 the form cIs this a man or a pillar? the 
two, man and pillar, are called e^fes or extremes, between which 
our cognition is wavering and to both of which i t inclines equally. 
B u t in 3 ^ it tends to one extreme more prominently t h a n the 
other. Thus *3&? ^ Ν Η ^ ΐ Β ^ Π gftoff ^ R i d ' s ^ (* S u e s s 
t h a t this must be Har i very probably ) is an instance of 3 ^ . 
sn^q^ffq- is non-ascertainment ( indefinite knowledge ), 
which does not specially refer to two extremes as opposed to each 
other, but refers to t h e th ing in question in general terms, in 
the form c3sVSM^4i* ( this is somebody), wi thout any reference 
to the special character. Thus, for instance, when wê see a tree 
whose name we do not know, we have a cognition, 'This is a 
t ree of some name. W h a t may i ts name be ? This is S H ^ H ^ i ^ . 
We do not have a ^^m proper, which would be the case, if the 
apprehension is of the form £Is i t a tree or something else ¥ W e 
apprehend it in general terms, but not more specially e. g. 
'This is a tree called panasa' and so on. Technically speaking, τ&ρξ 
arises from 3~3retfql4im«i^HU| o r a recollection of two extremes 
opposed to each other, while STînîq^TT^" is aTSftJÎ^ rfèi M M fe *$Μ o r is 
heedless of the particular character. STrfsq^n^T is one of t h e kinds 
of s r i ^ n 5 along with cpSHT, feqjfa and ^ f according to P . B. 
( p. 172). 'ihrib <çt ^ Tcrr%s w^K^tii^ThRr-d^iQi^Nir^-
'^^W4H^iftdft$w*ra*«w: 1 ^ r ^ ^ r f ^ R T ^ r ^ -
srârot *tw «HJ)«MM' mml%g ι H r^i^  q*r% s^ç^^iWt-
i^^rts^r^n^r ψ£ ι sprites «nraitei 
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Κ Κ ( p p . 182, 183.) 
According to S'ivâditya, however, both 3 ^ and 3CT^f33TTO 
are not to be treated as separate varieties, bu t are to be includ-
ed in ^ps?·, inasmuch as both possess the character of incerti-
tude; and two extremes opposed to each other necessary for 
φς&ξ are implied in both, though they may not be directly-
expressed ( section 38 ). 
1 6 9 . ξρρ· was described as twofold i. e. ^î^lfcfr and ^ | 
( = ^ f e f ) *& section 39. Of these, ^nçrrf^ o r worldly pleasure 
is that which depends upon means tha t are produced by effort 
or exertion; e. g. the pleasure arising from a fragrant garland 
of flowers etc., which can be secured only by means of exertion 
on the part of the enjoyer. On the other hand, ^ ή or heavenly 
pleasure ( i. e. qKm{3fc a s opposed to ς ^ or STÎHïfcç ) is 
tha t which arises from means which depend upon the will only 
( and upon nothing else like exertion ). A m a n ë heaven has 
simply to wish for a thing and i t is ready to serve him and 
afford him the pleasure he wants. Thus heavenly pleasure also 
is produced from such things as a fragrant garland etc., but 
the only difference is tha t they can be had at our will. 
Pad., however, interprets the passage a little differently. 
H e objects to the interpretation above thus: t ha t certain worldly-
pleasures arise, even without any exertion, e. g. the pleasure ^ 
arising from the unexpected sight of a friend or some dear objeet. 
So he distinguishes between the two kinds thus—heavenly 
pleasure is that which is enjoyed in a body that is not produced 
*>y sreril or demerit at all, but is solely the result of v ^ , while 
worldly pleasure is that which is enjoyed in a body, the result 
of merit ( of course, for without merit , no pleasure is possible ) 
and also of demerit. I n other words, worldly pleasure may be 
found mixed with pain, while heavenly pleasure is never so. 
170 , I n section 45, $4*4 was described as twofold, 
^TT%%^ and %^f%^. Of these HT%%3>> o r na tura l fluidity, is 
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tha t which is not produced by the application of heat but 
belongs to the thing, by its very nature, e.g. the fluidity of water, 
while t$(îj ίτίΦ3 or accidental fluidity, is that which is not possible 
without the application of heat, e.g. the fluidity of gold or ghee. 
1 7 1 . I n section 47, ^ ^ K w a s described to be of three 
kinds which are now defined. 
Telocity is t h a t ^fc^ft which is produced from action e. g. 
in the case of an arrow or a fruit falling, where velocity is 
produced bj the first act of falling. I t abides in ^fèr^T, 3Γξ, 
% ^ [ > Wig &nd S R ^ . 
Mental impression is that which is produced by a cognition 
( in the form of apprehension ). I t is this mental impression 
which enables us to have a recollection. T. S. (p. 167 ) defines 
i t as C3{H*H^«^I ^ta*j>d^l4«il?» -^ * s peculiar to the soul. 
; or elasticity is, as its name signifies, that 
^3>TC which produces the original condition of t h e thing e. g. 
a cane, though bent, is again reduced to its original straight 
form by virtue of elasticity. T. S. (p. 168) defines i t as 'g^rsjT-
^ct^-i <4«3^d^^Ml<ffi:?. Pad. and J i n . and some Mss. read 
=k^4NI^<=k: instead of f^r^rPTT^^:* ^ u ^ ihkt is not a good 
reading; fofein t h e case of a naturally crooked thinjg forced t o 
be" straight, elasticity reduces it not to Sf^jç^ but t ^ ^ . 
Hence the general term f^rflf is bet ter than ^^^^4' which is 
a particular kind of f^rfèf. Hence Pad. remarks very r ightly 
*5ξψ£ ^ l ^ m i ^ q ^ S F T ^ . ™ s elasticity abides in ^fsfïft 
only. According toothers, however, i t abides in the four tangible 
substances W M ^ t R f f r r : ' T - B* ( p. 1*2 ); ^ f e ^ r r q ^ ç ^ j ^ : 
ί$ί^Γ Φ & ^ ^ 4 ί ν Β. P. (verse 158), on which, Mu. however, 
remarks ' ^ l t ί ^ Π Τ ξ § fèjid^né %^Ρ*Τ*2Γ^Γ d4&HJ|U|ft% 
WW: I5. 
1 7 2 . See notes on section 50. 
1 7 3 . Cf. notes on section 43. 
174 . I n section 52, m m ^ was described as being of two 
kinds, snfrT a n ( * ^^Tîfèr. srrfçT *s * n a * m*IMI which is free from 
any of the vitiating circumstances. I t is also called s j ^u^ 
or ^ f f ^ k ^ ^ ^ t ^ t ^ . ^Trf^} o n t û e other hand, is ^ ^ u ^ or 
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which prevent a srWP^f ^ r o m being 5ΓΓ%. Such circumstances 
are summed up in t h e following verse of Udayanâchârya— 
< «ύ*ί*ηρ«* ««itsirnwftïfit: I 
( 1 ) Uni ty of the individual. Thus ether being one and 
all-pervading, no such snfcf a s 341Φ13Τ*4 is possible. ( 2 ) 
Identity of things with only the difference of names. Thus ^z&t 
and Φ < £ ^ ^ are not two different ^fîfçfs, ( 3 ) Cross-division, 
^jg^ is technically Μ ^ Μ < | < ^ ^ Ι ^ Ν ^ ^ Η ΐ Β ΐ Φ ^ ^ ^ Φ ^ *WT%&; 
When two çffîfriq'S or common characteristics are found without 
each other as well as together, then, there is 3 ^ 7 . Thus ^ ^ is 
found in sn^T^T without TMcM; *$ê&f *s found in s p ^ ï without 
ag^f , while both ^ j H ^ ai*d W T ^ are found together in the 
first four substances. So 3 j H ^ a n 0^ ^ ç ë f cannot be 3Π%3, 
( 4 ) W a n t of finality. Thus ^ m M ^ cannot bë a 5 π % abiding 
in ι^Ί-ΗΊ^? ^ o r ^ w e once admit ifcfi+n?^^, then there would be 
^ f W ^ c ^ and so on ad infinitum. ( 5 ) Violation of one's own 
nature. Thus though there are many f%tr^sj there cannot be a 
Sïjflf like f=H£p :^3 abiding in all of them; because f^ %^ or parti-
cularity is, by its every nature, opposed to the idea of çf|4U«H| or 
^H^MW^. (' 6 X Want of relation. Thus ^ i H m ^ cannot be a 
ς^ πΊ^ Γ; f ° r every ^nf^ rests in the individual by ^ g j H { relation, 
but as no ΗΤΓ^Τ^Γ i s possible on j g f + ^ ^ there is no connection hj 
which ^ j q q r q ^ should abide in ^ΠΤ^ΡΓ-
Thus any characteristic which is common to a number of 
individuals cannot be a siilkf P r °per or cannot give a class-notion 
in-the full sense of the word. Otherwise there would be'a 
great confusion about t h e distinction of genus and species. All 
such common characteristics as involve a cross division etc. are 
relegated to the class ^ ΤΤί^Γ· 
I t should be noted t h a t many times the word f^y^n a l t h o u g h , 
really speaking, a general t e r m including both sfrfèf and ^qrfà'j 
stands only for ^ ( f e ; and it is in this sense, tha t mm«m *s s a ^ 
to be possible only in the case of ^ ï f , 3pT and spj| and there, too, 
not in all the varieties. 
175 . See section 55. 
176 . See section 58. 
1 7 7 . I n this section, the author defines îjîfaç^» but the 
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reason for doing it here is not clearly seen. Jin, simply remarks 
— ' i r i f o c ^ a ^ ^ : *Τ^Π<3Τϋ%^: S J ^ Η ^ ^TRET^TTf... J 
Pad. explains tlie reference in two ways:—1st, ^TJ^fe?^ was 
.explained irx the.last section; from this the author is naturally 
led to explain ϊΓ^Τ^Γ, which is nothing but ffm<H*HST. 2ndiy, 
in accordance with this passage here, some read Sfire^r instead 
of T ^ T ^ i in section 61. Thus the explanation of what ^ ^ 4 
means, comes naturally in this place. 
The ^+jr t^ of an object consists in its being defined or 
distinguished solely by right knowledge. The word fiq^vj 
( — <ΕΠΦΐ*£«ϊ Mita. ) is put in to exclude greraufaq, where one 
of t h e two extremes is ^4^i ivfetra-^^ but not both, or to exclude 
34 44 fa 4^ as when we mistake a rope for a serpent, where t h e rope 
is 3 T ^ M « t N ^ â ^ f ^ut no^ the serpent. This is according to 
Jin. and Mita. But I think, the word ï^rîpT is unnecessary, 
as here fl^c? is nothing more than * τ ^ | & φ And Pad* 
also seems to read only β τ ^ ΐ ^ Μ - ^ ^ ^ ^ τ , since the com. runs· 
thus—i^ ç r^T r^ swm weèiïm ik^&f^m*n&nrm$i etc/ 
178 . In section 61, the author referred to the inclusion of 
4$*$m in the list of jras. Against this it is objected that if φ^Γΐ 
is only one of the qualities, then it must abide only in a j^sq or 
substance and in no other t r e r ^ a s t h e r u ^ e is that a ?pi can 
abide only in a ^ζζζξ. But we see t h a t φ?3Π abides in all the 
Padârthas; as when we say that the qualities are twenty-four 
or that the actions are five and so on; but this is against its 
character as a nof. Hence ^ '<^ [ should be regarded as a separate 
qçjXsj". To this the author replies by saying tha t the predication 
of number in connection with qualities etc. is due to the co-
existence of the number with qualities etc. in one and the same 
abode. Thus because number and qualities abide in one and the 
same ^sq* (e. g. a ^z û a s the quality of colour and the number 
M<bm also), therefore metaphorically, number is said to abide in 
ip ï j and not because number is in intimate relation wi th j^of» 
Really speaking ^ f ΐξ^ etc. in the text seems to be a repetition, 
though Pad. interprets sïcT ΐξ^ to mean. ^s^TO^T^Vd<4>^WIe 
i f t e n ^ . T h e Ms, Κ reads « 3 ^ ^ 4lx(W44l«fo: ^ ^ ' 5 which 
gives another instance of t h e point in question, ^ n " * s a WlidV 
and as such, can abide only in ^ s ^ , *&l a n ( ^ ^Tt· ^ u ^ w e predi-
Λ * β ΗτΠ even, of Mwfcm, fôjfc etc., as when we say that m + h ^ 
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is ^jgr, or f^fte * s f^^  a a ^ s o o n * ^ u * s predication is, however, 
due t o t h e eo-exktence of ^ f j with "^HTT«^ r e^c* * n o n e a n d t h e 
same abode—e, g. Έ& kas the ^ t ^ l ^ M d ^ a s w e ^ a s ^ΤτΠ— a n <* 
not to its abiding in intimate relation with ^ i m ^ etc, 
1 7 9 . See section 62. 
1 8 0 . 4j4ë5, or corporeality, consists in 'being possessed of 
a dimension that is characterised by a limit. ' I t is also defined 
as ijRIWsiqftmmct-^ which is the same as above, or &'4Π3τ3' 
which ultimately comes t o the same; for action is impossible 
wi thout limited dimensions, an all-pervading th ing like θΓΤ^ Τ^ Γ 
being incapable of it. Cf. sec. 18é. 
3ΤΒφ5{ or { I T H ^ *S * ^ e 0 P P 0 S ^ e °^ 3T&^· I* * s a ^ s o defined as 
t-4<Wd4*JAΗM\Pk3 (T.D.p.41)— being in contact with all corpor­
eal substances. çf^rët,3rç., r^5F5C»^ T3[ and 3T*f 3[ a re j j^-, while the 
remaining four substances are s r o é o r ^ g . See further section 196. 
1 8 1 . m+jiH' is that which is never separated from the 
production of the effect—'s^rf Φ&Χ 4>l4j^M3d Η ^ Ι ^ ^ ί 3 
^ T U q ^ ΐξ^' J in. Thus the totality of causes which must be 
immediately followed by the effect is ^mifl ' . If the causes being 
there, the effect does not follow, then something must be 
wanting to make up the çrWîft· Thus in the case of a piece of 
•cloth, îftsg, g f l ^ ^ l j qd4>R ai*d other things together form 
1 8 3 . This section states the number of qualities possessed 
by each of the nine substances. Erom this, i t follows tha t 
^q- and ^ ^ are common to s f ^ , sp^ andg^f^ ; S^T and 3 j ^ 
a re found in ^ f s j ^ and sp^only; ϊχ?^ and f^ fa^jΝΦ^ΗΦΚ a r e 
peculiar to ^ f i ^ only; ^ q ^ is common to the first four substan­
ces; ççzrr, qftjjiui, ψ Τ ^ Γ , JÂMUi and {% r^nx are common to all 
t h e nine substances; q ^ r , 3Wr<4 ai*d the ^ ^ * ^ Φ Κ a r e common 
to the ûve corporeal substances; 5 % , g ^ 5 g ^ , ψ^χ, § ^ ΪΗΤ Γ^, 
^5&j 3 ϊ ^ ή a&d the ^icHi^U=frK a r e peculiar to the soul only; j^ftr 
is peculiar to s r ç only; and ^ ® ç is peculiar to θΠ^ΠΕΤ only. 
1 8 9 . The destruction of a substanoe proceeds from the 
destruction of the intimate cause and of the non-intimate cause. 
When God wills that the world should be destroyed, an action is 
produced in t h e atoms, which produces a disjunction between 
them. This disjunction destroys the conjunction between the 
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atoms, and £hus the* binary is destroyed. The binary being des­
troyed, the tert iary is destroyed and soon. Thus the destruction 
of the intimate cause, e. g. of ^ υ ] Φ , ?4ΜΦ etc., produces t h e 
destruction of the effect, e. g. 54jU£«b, ^ φ ^ Φ e t c , except id the 
case of t h e <^υ|φ whose destruction is caused by t h e destruction 
of its non-intimate cause i. e. 3T'JUJ^|, since t h e destruction of 
its int imate cause (i.e. 3TO|S) is impossible, thesrçrs being eternal. 
According to this view, destruction proceeds in the same order 
as creation. J u s t as the cause first comes into existence and then 
the effect, in the same way, the cause is first destroyed and then 
the effect. But this is very strange, since it is inconceivable 
where the effect abides, during the interval between the destruc-
t ion of the cause and of itself. And besides, according to this 
view, ^ & ^ | & Φ Κ ^ Η ι ^ Η bas to be admitted at least in the case 
of t h e s M ^ . So for the sake of simplicity some of thé 
Naiyâyikas hold that i t is the 5Τ*ΗΦΗΐμ{ΦΗυΚϊ^ίί which leads to 
the destruction of the effect in every case. Thus the 3 W ^ ^ H ( ^ { 
leads to the destruction of the q^, t h e d«^sH<4<j4^Hi^l ^° that 
of the ^ϊξτ and so on. According to this view, the process of 
destruction is in the opposite order to that of creation, which is 
more reasonable, as analysis and synthesis are always found to 
proceed in the opposite order. Cf. 6 fan4^m 3 ^ : ST^: ^ T T O ^ ' 
Br. Su. I I . 3. 14. 
S'ivaditya's view seems to combine both, according to 
possibility, as appears from the dual °ί%*Π3ΤΠ3ΤΤ*ϊ. F&d. also 
interprets the line in the same way. 
The destruction of a quality proceeds from either ( 1 ) t h e 
destruction of the intimate cause^ e. g. ijd^q is destroyed on t h e 
destruction of the q£ 5 or (2) the destruction of the non-intimate 
cause, e. g. the t re^T is destroyed on the destruction of the 
^ ^ ^ q , or the Φ ί ^ ^ Φ ^ - ι Γ Η ΐ is destroyed when its non-intimate 
cause—-the ^ ^ M * d ^ 4 V u — i s destroyed, or (3) t h e destruction of 
tfie instrumental cause, e.g. fe^ etc. are destroyed on the destruc­
tion of the s H h ^ n i % ^ b i c h is its |?&τ<ΦΚ"Ι, or last (4) the pro­
duction of a contrary quality, e.g. &^τχ is destroyed by f^rPT 5 
Or | p ? is destroyed by ψ^. (Those qualities are said to be f ^ r f e 
iyr contrary, which cannot co-exist in one and the same place). 
The destruction of motion proceeds from either ( 1 ) the 
destruction of the intimate cause, or ( 2 ) t h a t of the non-
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intimate cause, or (3) from a subsequent conjunction. Thus t h e 
.motion of ah arrow is destroyed either when the arrow itself 
is destroyed, or when jthe velocity is destroyed, or when t h e 
arrow comes to have a conjunction with its target. 
Many Mss. and Jin. read ^ i H I & f r i ^ H W f c w W N H ^ T j 
omitting a m m i fa. For this view, cf. 6 ( ^ $ ) ^ T W ^ U < 
^rfo^Tsprrnarw * Ϊ ^ % ' τ. κ ( p. 20 ). 
^HI^tf^, f è ^ q and ^+t^i^ are eternal and are therefore 
incapable of destruction. So also are s r e ^ T W ^ a n c* 5Γ^ΦΕΠ*Π^-
STTT n^^ f is destroyed by the same causes as produce its 
-counter-entity. Thus the very causes which produce q ^ also 
•destroy ^ ϊ Π ί Τ ^ Τ ^ . 
STï^îSTTWW is destroyed by the causes which destroy its 
counter-entity. Thus the spsJfcsTWT^j expressed in the form 
Έ&: q f t *Γ ( *- e* ΉΖ: ^ M f d ^ l R i ^ l ^ ^ i ^ K ^ l ^ ) ; ceases to exist 
as soon as cf^  ceases to exist. Hence the cause of ^ ^ | ^ j y f | ^ -
5fî^ f in question is the same as the cause of the q ^ ^ . 
Others, however, hold that ^ ^ « ^ ί^ΓΤ?*s firefl&eSHsfaPTra 
and S i ^ r d m N ; for if ^ τ ^ Ι ^ ΐ ^ Ι ^ is supposed to be destroyed, 
then its destruction should be followed by a f % | ^ which is i ts 
opposite, just as the destruction of 5Π*ΒΤΓ3ί is followed by its 
opposite viz. the production of ETS. 
190. The production of ^ τ ^ , j s r and ^ | proceeds from 
three kinds of causes, viz, intimate, non-intimate,and instrumental 
or operative. Of these, only a 3*33- a n d nothing else can be an in­
timate cause. Thus H ^ s a r e t i n e ^ < = u R w < m Q £ a <T25 TC of q d ^ q 3 
and a ^ of ^Κ^Ι^ί^Π'* -^ s ^ o r ^ n e non-intimate cause, i t is a 
conjunction always, in the case of jczq and ^ | . Thus ëT?g4J4Vl 
is the 3Τ5ΓΤΓ^ ΤΪ35$1^ ΡΤ of a q^5 and ^K^jl^^TUl o r t* u e conjunction 
between t h e arrow and t h e bow-string, of the motion of the arrow. 
( The statement requires modification as far as ^ ^ is concerned, 
s ince? j?^ i s the 3[^+ΗΙ&ΦΚυί of the 3H^iH«i; a n ( ^ s o a l s o S l^^ j 
of the s u ^ ^ r ^ r . %TT also is the s m m i R w W of the subsequent 
acts of falling.) I n the case of a quality, however, the non-intimate 
cause may be sometimes, (1) another similar quality e. g^ti*d4$H9 
w i t h regard to q^^q"; sometimes (2) another dissimilar quality, 
e. g. the «j^^^^M 1 of the aqukfcs is the non-intimate cause of the 
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magnitude of the 33tçg^s> or ^ J T : ^ ^ T °f m4wi^Vft and some-
times ( 3 ) action, e.g. the action of a monkey is the non-
intimate cause of the conjunction between the monkey and a tree. 
As for the &&\<ΦΚ0Γ? it is the will of God, merit and demerit, 
time, space etc., in,all cases. 
ffimsq, fagN a n < * *WWTO are eternal and therefore never 
produced. So also are 5ΠΤΓϊΠ3Γ a a ( * s*cU«*diVHc{» The two 
remaining kinds of 3ΠΤΤ?,^· θ1*-4)*·^ Ι+1Μ andjrc^cfrsrrg-,require 
only the ΐ?τίΐΤχΤΦΚυΙ ^ o r their production. Since ^VTT^ cannot he 
in intimate relation with anything, it cannot have a ^ ^ 3 ΐ & Φ Κ υ ι . 
For the same reason, an 3 ^ 4 ^ ι Rw<U| also is impossible, since i t is 
a cause approximate to the intimate cause. WJLUMÎTJ is the ΐ*Γί^τΓ" 
ΦΚΦ o l w e i ^ ' ^ t ^ i ^ , while a striking rod etc., of q ^ M f l r e r e . 
According to others, however, sn^rfT^TTW * s neither pro-
duced^ nor destroyed; for even before q ^ is produced, q d l ? ^ * 
^ m ^ t ^ is present. We cannot say that g f^ jv tqd is not differ­
e n t from qz, 
1 9 2 . I n section 57, %fênï<î was spoken of simply to 
show that it did not deserve to be regarded as an independent 
q^Îsj*· Hère the Vais'eshika view of % " β ϊ ^ τ is explained. ^R>[^-q" 
means the distinguishing of a thing from all others. Thus when 
we say c ^^fc S ^ ^ s *** means that the man in question is 
distinguished from all persons who are not possessed of a ^u^, 
1 9 3 - 1 9 4 . From %Β?Πϊ^ ^ n e author natural ly proceeds to 
explain what a fa^fMUl is. A f^^qai is t h a t which distinguishes 
its abode ( t h e fi^foy ) from all others, and which is expressed 
by a word standing in t h e same case-relation as the word ex­
pressive of the f g f t ^ · ^ f l u s ^ 1 % Ή Ι < SS*% ^?T is a f^f^fur-
B u t when the same ( i. e. the distinguishing thing ) is expressed 
by a word standing in a different case-relation from the fcffjrq', 
it is called an ^ q ^ j o j . Thus in 'éréïfÏT: cTTTO:' 3ΓΞΤ standing 
in the instrumental case as opposed to arqH in the nominative 
case, is an 3φ£$τ&Γ. 
This is the distinction between fijfeui and sq^rgjur (both of 
which are Ο ^ Π ^ Φ ) , if the words 4j4JMlf^ t4>4UI a n ( ^ ^τίΜΦ4υΙ are 
interpreted as in the text. If, however, they are interpreted 
more literally, meaning 'haying the same abode 5 and 
* having different ^abodes ' respectively, then a f ^ ^ q is that 
ΧΟΪΈ& W 
which abides in the same abode as the &j|<gfd (*· e* * n ^ π β thing 
distinguished ). Thus in ^ r e P ^ S f ë : ' , ^ T abides in ^ i n which 
also abides eff^H^m%f% ( since it is τ& that is distinguished ). 
On the other hand, an 3 W 3 T T (Ht. ^ j çnft<T 4&4Μ414 ^ 3 Ρ Τ % 
çfç^ ) has not the same abode as sqT^frT. Thus in '^τ%"ΐ %3^τΠ£Γ 
*IM*£ * n e ^Ï3» *s s u PP o s e d ^° distinguish the house in question 
from others, even by being unconnected with the house, at the 
time of speaking. Thus a distinguishing at tr ibute is a fe^ftui 
when it forms a part and parcel of the thing distinguished, but 
is an 3'^ <gg^ pJT when it is not so or is only distantly connected 
with it. 
195 . arf^sft^uiçci ( being the abode of something ) consists 
in having a srrfrT in intimate relation with itself (^n%: flfeiwfri:). 
Thus a çj£ is possessed of 3τΡ^Φ^1<Η? a s * n e ETScWSTTfrT c a n abide 
therein by an intimate relation. Thus in '^n^s: qr^:' ^z * s * n e 
srfsF3R?î °* jftgjUn a n ( * ^T3:^T^nti%., Thus, but for the ^rfo-
^ t J T ^ of sœ, how can ^ J and q z d ^ l ^ f r i be *T*TR7f^?eT 
and sffe, the flrtf^ïï ? 
I t may be objected, however, tha t as snf^f can abide only 
in the first three padârthas, ^-[vii^ -tf etc. can never be an syf^^^ut; 
and thus' such expressions as ïrîrïfç^ ^Tl^l^^T ( ^TWT^ namely 
îTR^g -; where both are ^^tisuf^r^trr, which is not possible 
unless ini^i^M has got srf^bfr^M ) would be impossible. 
This may be answered by saying tha t sfrflf is here to be 
understood in the general sense of ^ΠΤΤ??Τ including both 5ΓΤ% 
and ^qrfer. Thus even ^ τ τ ί Π ^ m a v have ^rfèr^T^T^ because an 
;jqrfèr like y î i^c^ , for instance, can abide therein. Or ^ l fdU^l -
*rf% may be interpreted to mean 'sn^T STf O ^ r â W H H ^ g â n ) 
SRtimFri:'. Thus the definition is applicable to ^ ; ^ ^ q · also, since 
i t can abide in one and the same abode along with a sn%. Cf. 
sn%% ^ ι ^ ι g^wi^ft srrfe i^q; ι subite i | jnTTfè^ 
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T^g^isr^rr^f^: e i . j jMi i^^ id ' a ^ r m ^ ^ ^ *τ 34ΐ£«ίΐ3[ ι 
^W%Tfte$Èfâ rT ^f ï î f t^r : |? Mita. 
196 . See section 180. 
197 . ^ i h r ^s 3^f%T^^v^bich is the relation between things 
which are ( of course apart from each other ). As opposed to 
this ^ H i ^ o r ^T^ri RH fe i s t k e relation between two things which 
are not (of course apart from each other), and which are respect-
ively the abode and the abider. Thus some word like ^sj^ ought 
to be implied before T3SFRTH3Tt: a n ^ s r f a ^ H ^ U - J*n· proposed 
to take srf^rîTnT^t: a s a n ζ^Γ^ΐΡΙΓ? meaning p^<HfH^f f^^ " 
?Π?Τϊΐ^ Γ ^ . Thus the Έξχψιι can remain apart from t h e ^Hj", but 
the ^x^* cannot. This is the case with all the pairs which are 
capable of having»the ^ ^ i q · relation. See section 62. 
198 . 3 î î ^ is a treatise which teaches the means of the 
highest good. Thus the qjyfq$ and ?^π^ aphorisms are called 
^jj^j since they teach the knowledge of the several padârthas, 
which leads to îit^r. 
199 . The idea contained in the first line is the same as 
that generally expressed by such phrases as gn^cl·"^ Î4>4JT or 
^r ra^^lqfo l^ t t . But the expression here is very aptly suited to 
the name of the work. The seven insular continents are named 
3**IvS$r> STTSJTfl^  ^ T , 5&N?, ^ and ψψχ·, and the seven 
principal mountains, generally called ^«^τ^Φ or ^ ^ Μ 4 Π ' Ϊ a r ^ 
ϊΤ^τζ", ΪΤ^^ 3 $ΓξΤ, %^W?i, 3&> ft™? and ^TTR^T^. 
